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ABSTRACT 
 
The first chapter examines whether and how concentrated stock markets dominated by a 
small number of large firms affect economic growth. Using data from 47 countries worldwide 
relating to the period 1989–2013, I show that a country’s stock market concentration is negatively 
related to capital allocation efficiency, which results in sluggish IPO activity, innovation, and 
economic growth. These findings suggest that the structure of a concentrated stock market 
indicates insufficient funds for emerging, innovative firms; discourages entrepreneurship; and is 
ultimately detrimental to economic growth.  
In the second chapter, we challenge the finding of Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi 
(2009). They find that the average nominal price of stocks listed on New York Stock Exchange 
and American Stock Exchange has been approximately $25 since the Great Depression and that 
this “nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American phenomenon.” Using a larger 
data set from 38 countries, we show that the nominal share prices of most stocks in every country 
are mean–reverting and their best predictor is the beginning of sample period nominal stock prices. 
We demonstrate that corporate actions maintain these nominal stock price anchors.  
The third chapter investigates the executive pay gap between public and private firms. We 
find that the executive pay gap escalates when there is less supply in potential competent 
executives, when shareholder’s power is stronger, and when a stricter rule on monitoring and 
disclosure is enacted. These findings largely support the view of the competitive executive labor 
market hypothesis that executive compensation is determined by market forces and increases when 
executives bear additional risk. The findings are inconsistent with the argument of the 
entrenchment hypothesis. 
  
iii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Min–Young, for her devoted support throughout my 
Ph.D. study, and to my sons, Taein and Kenneth, who have reminded me of the passion in my 
life. 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am indebted to my Ph.D. advisor, Professor Kee–Hong Bae, who has enlightened me on 
my study. I am thankful to Professor Yisong Tian and Professor Douglas Cumming for their 
invaluable advice on my research.  
The first chapter has been benefited from many supportive suggestions at a seminar at the 
Finance Department of the Schulich School of Business in October 2015. I extend my thanks to 
Professor Mark Kamstra, Professor Lilian Ng, and Professor Yelena Larkin for their helpful 
comments. It is scheduled to be presented at Financial Management Association Asia Pacific 
Meetings in July 2016.   
The second chapter was presented at Northern Finance Association Annual Meetings in 
September 2015. I thank Professor William Weld for his helpful discussion.  
Last but not least, special thanks to faculty, staff, and my fellow Ph.D. students in the 
Finance Department for their support and encouragement on my research. I am also grateful to the 
Faculty of Graduate Studies at York University for generous financial support throughout my study.   
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. ii 
DEDICATION............................................................................................................................................ iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................. viii 
CHAPTER ONE: MOTIVATION AND INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER TWO: STOCK MARKET CONCENTRATION, ENTERPRENEURSHIP, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH ............................................................................................................................ 3 
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 3 
2.2. Data and Summary Characteristics .................................................................................................... 7 
2.2.1. Data and variables ...................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2.2.  Summary statistics.................................................................................................................... 10 
2.3. Stock Market Concentration and Capital Allocation Efficiency ...................................................... 12 
2.4. Stock Market Concentration and Economic Growth ....................................................................... 13 
2.4.1. Regressions of real per capita GDP growth rates on stock market concentration ................... 13 
2.4.2.  Endogeneity tests...................................................................................................................... 15 
2.4.3. Stock market concentration and stability .................................................................................. 18 
2.4.4.  Stock market concentration and institution.............................................................................. 19 
2.5. Stock Market Concentration, IPOs, and Innovation ........................................................................ 20 
2.5.1.  Stock market concentration and IPOs...................................................................................... 21 
2.5.2.  Stock market concentration and innovation ............................................................................. 22 
2.5.3.  Two–stage regressions ............................................................................................................. 23 
2.6. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 23 
CHAPTER THREE: NOMINAL STOCK PRICE ANCHORS: A GLOBAL PHENOMENON? ... 39 
3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 39 
3.2.  Data ................................................................................................................................................. 42 
3.2.1. Nominal stock price .................................................................................................................. 42 
3.2.2. Other variables ......................................................................................................................... 44 
3.3. Trends in Nominal Stock Prices ....................................................................................................... 44 
3.3.1. Time–series trends of nominal stock prices .............................................................................. 44 
3.3.2. Reversion of stock prices to initial price level: tercile analysis ................................................ 46 
3.4. Determinants of Nominal Stock Price: the Role of Anchor ............................................................. 47 
3.4.1. The role of the anchor price in predicting current nominal stock price level ........................... 47 
vi 
 
3.4.2. Speed of nominal price adjustment to anchor price .................................................................. 51 
3.5. Corporate Actions and Anchoring ................................................................................................... 53 
3.6. Nominal Stock Price after Euro Introduction................................................................................... 56 
3.7. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 58 
CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT CAUSES THE PAY GAP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRM 
EXEUCUTIVES? ...................................................................................................................................... 75 
4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 75 
4.2.  Hypothesis....................................................................................................................................... 78 
4.2.1. Entrenchment hypothesis .......................................................................................................... 78 
4.2.2. Competitive executive labor market hypothesis ........................................................................ 79 
4.3. Data and Summary Statistics ........................................................................................................... 79 
4.3.1. Data and variables construction ............................................................................................... 79 
4.3.2. Summary statistics..................................................................................................................... 82 
4.4. Pay Gap between Public and Private Firms ..................................................................................... 83 
4.4.1. Overall pay gap ......................................................................................................................... 83 
4.4.2. Managerial supply .................................................................................................................... 85 
4.4.3. Investor protection and shareholder power .............................................................................. 86 
4.4.4. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) ............................................................... 87 
4.4.5. Robustness tests ........................................................................................................................ 88 
4.5. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 89 
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 108 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 112 
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................................... 118 
Appendix A. Data Source and Variable Definitions ............................................................................. 118 
Appendix B. Stock Market Concentration and Economic Growth: Robustness Test—Regressions with 
Concentration at t–10 ............................................................................................................................ 121 
Appendix C. Stock Market Concentration and IPO: Robustness Test—Regressions with Country 
Fixed–Effects ........................................................................................................................................ 122 
Appendix D. Stock Market Concentration and Innovation: Robustness Test—Regressions with Country 
Fixed–Effects ........................................................................................................................................ 123 
Appendix E. Data Source and Variable Definitions ............................................................................. 124 
Appendix F. Country–level indices and IFRS Adoption dates by country ........................................... 126 
 
  
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2–1: Summary Statistics and Correlations of the Main Variables ……………………………………… 26 
Table 2–2: Cross–Sectional Regressions of Elasticity of Capital Allocation on Stock Market Concentration … 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………….. 29 
Table 2–3: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration……………….… 30 
Table 2–4: First–Stage Regressions: Regressions of Stock Market Concentration…………….……………… 31 
Table 2–5: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration: Endogeneity Tests 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32 
Table 2–6: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration and Stability Measure  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 34 
Table 2–7: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration Partitioned by 
Corruption and Bureaucracy Indices…………………………………………………………………………….. 35 
Table 2–8: Panel Regressions of IPO Activities on Stock Market Concentration ……………………………..  36 
Table 2–9: Panel Regressions of Innovation on Stock Market Concentration…………………………………..  37 
Table 2–10: Second–Stage Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Estimated IPO and Innovation Activities 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 38 
 
Table 3–1: Mean and median of nominal stock prices per country  .…………………………………………..  64 
Table 3–2: Percentage of firms whose stock prices in local currency remain in their initial tercile groups per 
country ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..  65 
Table 3–3: Cross–section regressions of nominal stock prices on firm’s IPO prices ………………….……….. 67 
Table 3–4: Cross–section regressions of nominal stock prices on firm’s initial stock prices …………..……..  69 
Table 3–5: Speed of adjustment of nominal stock prices ……………………………………………………….. 71 
Table 3–6: Change (increase / decrease) in nominal stock price in local currency due to corporate actions per 
country ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..  73 
Table 3–7: Number and percentage of decrease in nominal stock price in local currency due to corporate actions 
by year for euro and non–euro European countries  .…………………………..………………………………..  74 
 
Table 4–1: Distribution of Total Executive Compensation  ………………………………….…………………..  92 
Table 4–2: Summary Statistics of the Variables    ………………………………………………………………..  96 
Table 4–3: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy……………..…………..  100 
Table 4–4: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy excluding the U.S. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………..  102 
Table 4–5: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy, Manager deficiency, and 
Brain–drain  ..……………………………………………………………………………………………………..  104 
Table 4–6: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy, S/H suits, and Transparency 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..105 
Table 4–7: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public and IFRS Dummies 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..  106 
Table 4–8: Coefficients and t–statistics of Interacted Term of Public Dummy with Manager deficiency, Brain–
drain, IFRS, S/H Suits, and Transparency with expanded definition of compensation and executives  
…………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………..  107 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2–1: Average Stock Market Concentration of Each Country ………………………..………….……….. 25 
 
Figure 3–1: Trends of median nominal and median total return stock price, equally– and value–weighted total 
return index   ………………………..………….……………………………………………………………………. 60 
Figure 3–2: Trend of median nominal stock price of euro and non–euro European countries in euro ……… 62 
Figure 3–3: Trend of median absolute difference in nominal stock price in euro between firms in euro countries 
and their matching firms in non–euro European countries  ……………………………………………………. 63 
 
Figure 4–1: Trend of public pay premium ………………………………………………………………………. 91 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: MOTIVATION AND INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to investigate various issues in corporate finance in 
an international context. Specifically, I examine the role of finance on economy, managerial 
behavior in corporations, and the contractual mechanism of executive compensation in this study. 
Cross-country differences in economic development, institution and regulation, and corporate 
governance enable me to test those issues at either country or firm level.    
In the second chapter, I investigate whether stock market development boosts economic 
growth. The primary function of any financial system is to faciliate the efficient allocation of 
capital and economic resources (Merton and Bodie, 1995). A developed financial market should 
allocate more capital to more productive, innovative firms. Finance researchers have commonly 
used financial market size in investigating the relationshp between finance and growth. They 
assume implicitly that financial market size is commensurate with financial market development. 
However, a larger financial market is not necessarily functionally more efficient. For 
instance, a sizeable stock market may simply allocate more capital to large, doddering firms than 
to small, emerging ones. This merely causes the stock market to appear larger in terms of 
capitalization even though it does not allocate funds efficiently. Appropriate measures that capture 
the functional efficiency of any financial market may need to be established first when the nexus 
between finance and growth is investigated. 
In this chapter I introduce a new measure of stock market functionality—stock market 
concentration—and explore the relationship between stock market functionality and economic 
growth. I also investigate the channel through which stock market concentration affects growth. I 
provide evidence that stock market concentration is negatively associated with capital allocation 
efficiency, IPOs, innovation, and finally with economic growth. These findings suggest that the 
structure of a concentrated stock market indicates insufficient funds for emerging, innovative firms; 
discourages entrepreneurship; and is ultimately detrimental to economic growth.  
The third chapter revisits Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi’s (2009) observation that 
the average nominal share price of NYSE and AMEX stocks has been approximately $25 since 
the Great Depression and this “nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American 
phenomenon.”  
We challenge their last conclusion. We term the tendency of stock prices to remain stable 
as “anchoring” hypothesis. Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the common human 
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tendency to rely excessively on the first piece of information offered (the ‘anchor’) when making 
decisions. Because anchoring is such a common human trait, we are skeptical that the United States 
is the only country whose stock markets exhibit this phenomenon. 
Using a larger data set of nominal stock prices of individual firms from 38 countries around 
the world, we compile some evidence in support of the existence of an anchor price in most 
countries. The nominal price fixation does not appear to be primarily a U.S. or North American 
phenomenon, but rather a global phenomenon.  In other words, anchors are norms, a point made 
in Weld et al (2009), and norms exist in all countries.  
The fourth chapter investigates the executive pay gap between public and private firms.  
We examine whether the supply in the executive labor market, the institutional protection on 
shareholder’s rights against misappropriation by managers, and the introduction of stricter rules 
on monitoring and disclosure cause to widen the executive pay gap, noting the observation that 
each country has different environment in terms of labor market situation and legal, institutional 
background. This framework of research design enables us to test two competing hypotheses in 
agency theory: the entrenchment hypothesis and the competitive executive labor market hypothesis.  
Conflicts of interest between executives and shareholders in modern public firms suggest 
two probable scenarios. First, the entrenchment hypothesis predicts that diffused ownership in 
public firms hinders shareholders from appropriately controlling the firm’s managers who then 
become powerful enough to set their own compensation high, regardless of executive labor market 
factors. This situation is more pronounced when legal, institutional instrument and monitoring 
system to protect shareholder’s rights is not in place in the country. Second, the competitive 
executive labor market hypothesis asserts that the firm’s managers are controlled through relevant 
monitoring and incentive scheme and that executive pays are determined by market forces and risk 
and burden they bear.      
We find that the executive pay gap between public and private firms escalates when there 
is less supply in potential competent executives, when shareholder’s power is stronger, and when 
a stricter rule on monitoring and disclosure is enacted. These findings largely support the view of 
the competitive executive labor market hypothesis but are inconsistent with the argument of the 
entrenchment hypothesis.  
The fifth chapter summarizes and concludes this study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: STOCK MARKET CONCENTRATION, ENTERPRENEURSHIP, 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH     
 
Because of their role in financing new ideas, financial markets keep alive the process of “creative 
destruction”—whereby old ideas and organizations are constantly challenged and replaced by 
new, better ones. Without vibrant, innovative financial markets, economies would invariably ossify 
and decline.                                                                                     (Rajan and Zingales, 2003, p. 1) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
One of the most important functions of financial markets is to nurture entrepreneurship by 
facilitating funding for new, innovative firms. An effectively functioning stock market allocates 
capital efficiently, providing sufficient funds to emerging, productive firms, which in turn breeds 
competition and innovation, and ultimately fuels economic growth. However, the existing 
literature has not established a robust relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth (Zingales, 2015).
1
 Previous studies have typically used stock market 
capitalization over GDP, or the size of a stock market, as a proxy for stock market development. 
But the size measure may not be a good proxy for the functional efficiency of a stock market. Nor 
is stock market capitalization a precise measure of the size or quantity of funds raised in the stock 
market, because it accounts for both the issuance of stocks and the past performance (retained 
earnings) of firms, and reflects expectations of their future performance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
In this chapter, I propose a new measure of stock market functionality which I term “stock 
market concentration” and examine its relationship with capital allocation efficiency, initial public 
offerings (IPOs), innovation, and economic growth, using data from 47 countries worldwide 
relating to the period 1989–2013. The extent of stock market concentration is computed annually 
as the sum of the stock market capitalizations of the largest five or ten firms divided by the total 
stock market capitalization of a country’s domestic stock exchanges. The idea is that a 
concentrated stock market dominated by a small number of large firms is likely to indicate the 
impediment to access to necessary funds for small new firms. My empirical goal for the new 
measure of stock market functional efficiency in this study is broadly twofold: to investigate the 
                                                          
1 For example, Levine and Zervos (1998) find that stock market capitalization over GDP is not robustly correlated 
with economic growth, capital accumulation, or productivity improvements. 
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relationship between stock market functionality and economic growth, and to examine the channel 
through which the former affects the latter. 
Stock market concentration is also related to the fate of the largest businesses in an 
economy because the rise and persistence of the largest firms intensifies the level of concentration. 
Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2008) find that big business stability is negatively associated with future 
economic growth. Their finding suggests that the long–lasting prosperity of the largest firms 
implies that old, large firms in a country are not challenged and replaced by small new firms, 
resulting in a slow creative destruction process and economic growth, confirming Schumpeter’s 
(1912) idea. Schumpeter (1912) also asserts that well–functioning financial markets are important 
in the real economy because they facilitate the creative destruction process by allocating funds to 
small new firms with innovative ideas for coping with old, large ones. Thus, according to 
Schumpeter (1912), whether stock market concentration captures the prosperity of the largest firms 
or is an inverse proxy for stock market functionality, it is expected to be negatively associated with 
future economic growth.   
I begin the analysis by investigating the relationship between stock market concentration 
and capital allocation efficiency. This experiment is an important step because I should see a 
negative correlation between the two, to the extent that the concentration measure is a good proxy 
for the inverse level of stock market functionality. Following Wurgler (2000), I construct a 
measure that captures the efficiency of capital allocation at the industry level of each country. By 
regressing the growth rate of gross fixed capital formation (investment) in an industry on the 
growth rate of value added in that industry, I estimate the degree of efficiency in allocating capital; 
that is, the extent to which a country increases investment in its growing industries and decreases 
investment in its declining industries. I then run cross–sectional regressions of the capital 
allocation efficiency measure on stock market concentration. I find that stock market concentration 
is indeed negatively correlated with the proxy for capital allocation efficiency, suggesting that a 
highly concentrated stock market is less likely to allocate necessary capital to young, innovative 
firms that make efficient use of capital. 
Next, I examine the relationship between stock market concentration and economic growth. 
Following the approach of King and Levine (1993), which relies on the “post hoc ergo propter hoc” 
(after this, therefore, because of this) argument, I regress real per capita GDP growth rates in year 
t on stock market concentration in year t–5 or t–10. Using lagged values of stock market 
5 
 
concentration allows me to investigate the long–term effects of concentration on economic growth 
and to partially address concerns over reverse causality bias. Additionally, I run two–stage least 
squares and country fixed–effects regressions to further address endogeneity concerns.  
I find that stock market concentration is a good predictor of economic growth in the 
subsequent five or even ten years and has large economic implications.
2 For example, a one 
standard deviation decrease (0.186) in stock market concentration by the top five firms in a basic 
regression predicts an increase of approximately 0.74 percentage points in real per capita GDP 
growth rates in five years. This effect is economically significant considering that the average real 
per capita GDP growth rate in the sample is 2.26%. The magnitude of the impact is more 
substantial if the effects are accumulated. Also worth noting is that the negative effect of stock 
market concentration on economic growth is more severe when a society is more bureaucratic or 
corrupt, implying that a severely concentrated stock market is more problematic if it is locked in 
with bad institutions. 
I also examine the relationship of stock market concentration with IPOs and innovation. I 
hypothesize that stock market concentration adversely affects future economic growth through a 
negative effect on entrepreneurship by constricting the financing and innovative activities of new, 
innovative firms. Although a large body of literature investigates the relationship between finance 
and economic growth, the specific channels through which finance affects growth remain 
relatively unknown. Identifying the channels also affirms—at least partly—the causal link from 
finance to growth. 
To the extent that the structure of a concentrated stock market suggests the difficulty faced 
by new, innovative firms in accessing the stock market and obtain necessary financing, I expect a 
country with high stock market concentration to have fewer IPO and innovative activities, which 
in turn slows its economic growth. To test this hypothesis, I run panel regressions of the IPO and 
innovation variables in year t on stock market concentration in year t–5 and find that stock market 
concentration is indeed negatively associated with IPO and innovation proxies. In the final 
empirical approach, I employ two–stage regressions to check the link between stock market 
concentration, access to funds by innovative entrepreneurs, and economic growth. I first estimate 
                                                          
2 Stock market concentration in year t is not negatively correlated with contemporaneous (year t) economic growth 
but is negatively correlated with future (year t+5, t+10) economic growth. This finding may loosely imply a causal 
effect of stock market concentration on economic growth. 
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IPO and innovation activities at a certain level of stock market concentration by regressing them 
on concentration. Then I run real per capita GDP growth rates on the estimated IPO and innovation 
activities, finding that they are significantly correlated with economic growth. These results 
reaffirm that a dysfunctional stock market prevents small, new, but innovative firms from 
accessing the funds they require, which in turn hurts economic growth.  
Whether finance makes a significant difference to economic growth is a classic debate. 
There are two opposing views on the relationship between finance and growth. The first is that 
financial markets are critical to economic growth; a well–functioning financial market facilitates 
the financing of new ideas by innovative entrepreneurs, which promotes the innovation that boosts 
a country’s economic growth (Schumpeter, 1912; Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Miller, 
1998). The other view is that the financial system is a mere sideshow, responding passively to the 
demands created by economic development (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988). Distinguishing 
between the two views has enormously important implications for policymakers, particularly in 
developing economies. Extensive studies on this important issue assert that financial development 
promotes economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza, 2000; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004).
3
 However, these studies 
focus mainly on the credit market and we still lack concrete evidence indicating that stock market 
development contributes to economic growth. Additionally, in the wake of the global credit crisis 
of 2008, several studies have questioned the benefits of financial (credit) market development, 
even suggesting that too much finance (credit) may not only not promote growth, but can even 
hurt it (Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza, 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Schularick and Taylor, 
2012; Beck, Degryse, and Kneer, 2014; Mian and Sufi, 2014).  
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it introduces a new measure of 
the functional efficiency of the stock market, which is more relevant to theories on the role of 
finance. The existing literature focuses primarily on size measures (i.e., stock market capitalization 
over GDP for the stock market and credit amount over GDP for the credit market). Studies tend to 
assume implicitly that the development of a financial market is commensurate with its size. Once 
                                                          
3 These articles are based on country–level analysis. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) add evidence on the positive 
finance–growth nexus using state–level data for the United States. Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide industry–level 
evidence. Demirgüç–Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) suggest that firm–level 
growth is associated with financial development. Levine (2005) provides a good survey of the literature on finance 
and growth. 
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this assumption is broken, there is no theoretical reason to maintain that a large financial market 
boosts economic growth. Second, this study provides evidence, with the new measure, indicating 
the positive role of a well–functioning stock market on the real economy. A large body of literature 
has paid attention to the credit market; the role of the stock market has not been studied extensively 
(Zingales, 2015). Third, this study suggests a probable channel through which finance affects 
growth. Its analysis shows that once a stock market is concentrated—indicating the difficulty of 
providing funds to small new firms—competition and innovation are discouraged. Such a situation 
is ultimately detrimental to economic growth.
4
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2. elaborates on the data collected for the 
analysis, the variable constructions, and provides summary characteristics. Sections 2.3. and 2.4. 
examine the relationships between stock market concentration and both capital allocation 
efficiency and economic growth. Subsequently, Section 2.5. explores the relationships between 
stock market concentration and IPOs and innovation. Finally, Section 2.6. concludes. 
 
2.2. Data and Summary Characteristics 
2.2.1. Data and variables  
Appendix A describes the data sources and the variable definitions used in the paper. To 
create stock market concentration variables, I first search for the stock market capitalization (stock 
price times the number of shares outstanding) of all firms listed on domestic stock exchanges in 
each country at the end of each year, as registered on Datastream. I sort the firms by market 
capitalization to identify the largest five or ten in each country in each year. I then divide the sum 
of the stock market capitalization of the largest five or ten firms by the total stock market 
capitalization of their country’s domestic stock exchanges and term the variables Mkt. Con. (top 5 
(10) firms).  
I compute stock market concentration from 1989 because it is from this year that reliable 
data are available on the market capitalization for both developed and developing economies. The 
computation ends in 2008 because I use five–year preceding values of stock market concentration 
                                                          
4 The inference that the function of financial markets is especially related to new, small firms’ financing is in accord 
with Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001). Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide the evidence 
that financial development promotes growth in the number of new firms rather than increasing the average size of 
existing ones. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that bank concentration facilitates credit access to small young firms, 
even though bank concentration itself depresses economic growth in general by constricting the funds provided to old 
firms.  
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in the regressions of real per capita GDP growth rates—the main dependent variable—for which 
data are available up to 2013. Countries must have at least 40 listed firms in each year throughout 
the sample period to be included in the final sample. This restriction results in the variables being 
constructed for a sample of data for 47 countries from 1989 to 2008. I then collect data for these 
47 countries from the same period on other financial development measures commonly used in the 
literature from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank: total market 
capitalization for firms listed on domestic stock exchanges over GDP (Mkt. Cap. / GDP), the value 
of shares traded on domestic stock exchanges over market capitalization (Turnover / Cap.), and 
domestic credit provided to the private sector over GDP (Credit / GDP).  
I create dependent variables for four different categories: economic growth, capital 
allocation efficiency, IPOs, and innovation. The proxy for economic growth is the annual per 
capita GDP growth rate (    ( ), %) in real terms, which is computed as: 
 
    ( ) = (  (               ) −   (                 ))  × 100,  (1) 
 
where per capita GDP is in constant 2005 U.S. dollars and is collected from the WDI of the World 
Bank. The variable is constructed for 1994–2013, the period following that of stock market 
concentration data with a five–year time lag.  
I follow Wurgler (2000) in collecting data and measuring the elasticity of capital allocation 
as a proxy for the capital allocation efficiency of each country. The data come from the Industrial 
Statistics Database of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
5
 The 
2013 version of the data source provides industry–level data on the amount of investment and 
value created by 151 manufacturing industries of 135 countries for 1991–2010, approximately 
overlapping with the period for data on real per capita GDP growth rates (UNIDO, 2014). 
The elasticity of capital allocation (  ) is estimated using the following regression:   
 
   
    
      
 =      +        
    
      
 +       ,                                   (2) 
                                                          
5 The official title of the CD–ROM for the data used is “Industrial Statistics Database at the 3– and 4–digit level of 
ISIC Code (Revision 3)” or “INDSTAT4 2013 ISIC Rev.3.” I use data at the three–digit International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) code level, following Wurgler (2000).  
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where      and      are gross fixed capital formation and value added in industry i of country c in 
year t, respectively. In regressing the growth rate of fixed capital formation (investment) in an 
industry on the growth rate of value added in that industry, I expect the coefficient (  ) to capture 
the degree of efficiency in allocating capital. That is, the coefficient should capture the extent to 
which a country increases investment in its growing industries and decreases investment in its 
declining industries. 
I apply the same data screening process elaborated by Wurgler (2000). First, I require a 
country to have at least 50 industry–year pairs of fixed capital formation and added value. Second, 
I exclude data for which the absolute value of fixed capital formation growth or value–added 
growth is greater than one. Third, I also dismiss industry observations for which the value added 
is less than 0.1% of the country’s total value added in each year. This screening process results in 
data for 32 countries of the countries in the basic data set.  
Following La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), I create two variables 
as proxies for IPO activity: IPO Amount / Pop. and IPO No. / Pop.
6
 IPO Amount (No.) / Pop. is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the IPO proceeds (the number of IPOs) in a year 
divided by a country’s population.
7
 These variables capture the amount of financing by new firms 
and the number of new firms entering the market scaled by population. 
To collect and screen the IPO data, I refer to Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2013). First, I 
collect all equity issuance data flagged as original IPOs from the SDC Platinum Global New Issues 
Database of Thomson Reuters.
8
 Then I exclude international issuances, including American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs), and IPO data flagged as private placements. I also delete IPO data 
related to real estate investment trusts and investment funds (Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes: 6722, 6726, 6798, 6799), investment advice companies (6282), and special purpose 
finance companies (6198). In addition to the restrictions imposed by Doidge et al. (2013), I drop 
                                                          
6 La Porta et al. (1997) employ only one variable as a proxy for IPOs (the number of IPOs divided by a country’s 
population). 
7 The log transformation makes the dependent variables conform more to the normal distribution. I add one before 
taking the log because there are no IPOs in some country–year observations. I make the same adjustment when creating 
patent proxies.  
8 The database is frequently used in cross–country studies on IPOs; however, Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach 
(2006) and Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2010) note that the international IPO data in the SDC Platinum Global 
New Issues Database are incomplete before 1991. I assume that most IPO activities for the sample countries are 
contained in the database because the sample period in this study starts in 1994; however, due caution is deemed 
necessary. 
10 
 
government–related IPOs (SIC codes in the 9000s) because a government agency’s decision to 
pursue an IPO may not be affected by the functional efficiency of the stock market. Ultimately, 
this leaves me with IPO data for 46 of the countries in the basic data set for 1994–2013, the same 
period for the data on real per capita GDP growth rates. 
Typically, cross–country studies on innovation use data on patents filed with the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as a proxy for innovation (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009; 
Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). Following Hsu et al. (2014), I utilize four innovation proxies derived 
from the number of patents submitted by individuals or non–government entities and approved by 
the USPTO, and the quality measures of the patents. The data are collected from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Database, which provides detailed data on patents 
relating to the period 1976–2006. I aggregate various patent data at the country level in each year. 
Patent / Pop. is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patent applications 
(subsequently approved) in a year divided by a country’s population. Citation / Pop. is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of citations received by the patents in a year divided by a 
country’s population. Because citations can be received beyond 2006, the number of citations is 
adjusted for the truncation using the weighting factors from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), as 
in Hsu et al. (2014). Generality / Pop. is the natural logarithm of one plus the generality level of 
the patents in a year divided by a country’s population. Generality measures the number of 
technology classes of patents that cite the submitted patent. Originality / Pop. is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the originality level of the patent in a year divided by a country’s population. 
Originality measures the number of technology classes of patents as cited by the submitted patent. 
Whereas Patent / Pop. represents the quantity of patents, the other three variables correspond to 
the quality of the patents that supplement the former. Because the measures are related to the 
patents approved by the USPTO, data on the United States are excluded. The result is a sample of 
patent variables that matched the 43 countries in the basic data set from 1994 to 2006.  
 
2.2.2.  Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 2–1 presents the average value of the financial market development 
proxies and the dependent variables of four different categories for 47 countries during the sample 
period. First, the average value of stock market concentration displays quite large variations even 
among developed countries. The Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms) values of Finland, Ireland, and the 
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Netherlands are 0.51 (0.61), 0.58 (0.73), and 0.53 (0.69), respectively, whereas those of Canada, 
Japan, and the United States are only 0.14 (0.22), 0.13 (0.20), and 0.09 (0.14), respectively. Among 
developing economies, the Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms) values of Hungary and Kenya are 
conspicuously large at 0.76 (0.86) and 0.54 (0.74), respectively, whereas those of Brazil and China 
are quite low, at 0.09 (0.12) and 0.13 (0.18), respectively. Figure 2–1 presents the average stock 
market concentration of the largest five (ten) firms for the sample countries during 1989–2008, 
allowing visualization of the significant variations in the stock market concentration of these 
countries. 
(SEE FIGURE 2–1) 
Panel A of Table 2–1 shows that the size of the financial markets of the sample countries 
varies significantly. The Mkt. Cap. / GDP of Hong Kong is the highest at 3.01. In contrast, that of 
Bangladesh is merely 0.04. The Credit / GDP is 1.96 for Japan but only 0.17 and 0.18 for Argentina 
and Romania, respectively. 
One may expect stock market concentration to be highly negatively correlated with stock 
market size or liquidity. That is, it is more likely that large companies will dominate a smaller or 
less liquid stock market, resulting in greater stock market concentration. However, Table 2–1 
shows many contrary cases. For example, Hong Kong has very large stock markets in relation to 
the size of its economy (Mkt. Cap. / GDP: 3.01) and they are very concentrated (Mkt Con (top 
5(10) firms): 0.40 (0.53)). Switzerland also has stock markets that are large (Mkt. Cap. / GDP: 
1.73) and concentrated (Mkt Con (top 5(10) firms): 0.46 (0.58)). The stock markets in the 
Netherlands are fairly large (Mkt. Cap. / GDP: 0.88) and liquid (Turnover / Cap.: 1.03), but also 
concentrated (Mkt Con (top 5(10) firms): 0.53 (0.69)).  
The sample countries’ economies present different levels of economic growth, capital 
allocation efficiency, IPOs, and innovation. For example, China’s economy grew almost 9% per 
capita annually for two decades, whereas that of Italy grew a mere 0.41% per capita annually 
during the same period. In terms of capital allocation efficiency, the elasticities of France and Italy 
are 1.07 and 1.16, respectively, whereas that of Indonesia is only 0.07. With respect to IPO activity, 
Australia and Hong Kong show the most dynamism when scaled by their populations. In terms of 
innovation, Japan and Switzerland present the highest number of patent applications and citations 
scaled by population. Meanwhile, IPO and innovation activities in countries such as Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are dormant. 
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Panel B of Table 2–1 reports the correlations between the key variables: financial market 
development measures and the dependent variables in four categories. The variables tagged with 
“at t–5” (Mkt. Con. (top 5(10) firms), Mkt. Cap. / GDP, Turnover / Cap., and Credit / GDP) are 
those observed five years earlier than the dependent variables. 
A few interesting features are worth noting. Mkt. Con (top 5(10) firms) are only weakly 
negatively correlated with Mkt. Cap. / GDP (–0.04 and –0.07, respectively) and Turnover / Cap. 
(–0.03 and –0.05, respectively). This feature suggests that stock market concentration is a unique 
stock market characteristic that is different from the stock market’s size or liquidity. The most 
interesting point of the correlation matrix is that the stock market concentration variables are 
negatively associated with future per capita GDP growth, the elasticity of capital allocation, and 
the proxies for IPOs and innovation—representing the main finding of this paper. Intriguingly, the 
size variables, Mkt. Cap. / GDP and Credit / GDP, are negatively correlated with per capita GDP 
growth even though they are positively correlated with the IPO and innovation proxies. I now 
investigate these findings in greater detail using multivariate regression models. 
(SEE TABLE 2–1) 
 
2.3. Stock Market Concentration and Capital Allocation Efficiency 
In this section, I regress capital allocation efficiency on stock market concentration in order 
to confirm that the concentration measure is a good proxy for the inverse level of stock market 
functionality. Specifically, I test whether a more concentrated (less diversified) stock market 
allocates capital less efficiently. The measure of stock market concentration could inversely reflect 
the level of allocation efficiency to the extent that a highly concentrated stock market is less likely 
to allocate the necessary capital to young, emerging firms.  
Table 2–2 reports the results of cross–sectional regressions of the efficiency measure 
(elasticity) of capital allocation on stock market concentration and the other financial market 
characteristics, while controlling for per capita GDP. These regressions are analogous to the basic 
regression model in Wurgler (2000). I calculate the elasticity of capital allocation from 1991 to 
2010 for 32 countries.
9
 I average per capita GDP for the same period, and average the 
                                                          
9 The following 15 countries lack data and are excluded in the regressions: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and Thailand.  
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concentration and other financial market characteristics for the period for which the data are 
available, 1989–2008.
10
   
Table 2–2 shows that the financial market size variables, Mkt. Cap / GDP (stock market) 
and Credit / GDP (credit market), are not significantly positively associated with the capital 
allocation efficiency for the sample period. The coefficient of Turnover / Cap., the liquidity 
measure of the stock market, in specification (4) is significantly positive but loses significance 
when the stock market concentration variables are included. In contrast, Table 2–2 shows that 
stock market concentration is significantly and negatively correlated with the elasticity of capital 
allocation, even when the other financial market variables are included—although the significance 
of the coefficients of Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) is marginal. Overall, this result confirms the 
hypothesis that a more concentrated stock market is associated with less efficient capital allocation. 
It also assures that the stock market concentration measure is a fairly good proxy for the inverse 
level of stock market functionality to the extent that a better–functioning stock market allocates 
funds more efficiently.   
(SEE TABLE 2–2) 
 
2.4. Stock Market Concentration and Economic Growth   
2.4.1. Regressions of real per capita GDP growth rates on stock market concentration 
A common finding in the literature on finance and growth is that the effect of finance on 
growth occurs over a long period of time. Comparisons of contemporaneous financial development 
measures and economic growth are thus seldom meaningful. I therefore regress the economic 
growth of country c in year t on stock market concentration and other financial development 
measures in year t–5 by controlling for macroeconomic variables shown by the literature to affect 
economic growth. Using lagged values of stock market concentration allows for an investigation 
into the long–term effects of concentration on growth and partially addresses concerns over reverse 
causality bias. Specifically, I estimate the following regression model: 
 
                                ℎ ,  =    +        .    (    5 (10)      ) ,     
                                                          
10 I want to see if the current level of stock market concentration is correlated with future capital allocation efficiency 
to establish the causal relationship, but the duration of the data is short and does not permit this line of enquiry. The 
period for the data on concentration falls approximately into the same period as that for the elasticity measure but 
precedes it by two years. 
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Following the literature, I add the following control variables to the regressions: Initial per 
capita GDP, the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1993; Initial Education, the natural 
logarithm of the average number of years of education received by individuals aged 25 and older 
in 1990; Gov. Spending / GDP, general government consumption divided by GDP; Inflation, 
inflation rates represented by the GDP deflator; and Openness / GDP, the sum of the export and 
import of goods and services divided by GDP.
11
 Following Petersen (2009), the estimated standard 
errors in the regressions are clustered by both country and year to draw statistical implications.
12
 
Table 2–3 presents the output of the panel regressions of real per capita GDP growth rates 
on the five–year lagged variables of stock market concentration, other stock market characteristics, 
and the level of credit provided in a country. The signs of the macroeconomic variables are in line 
with the findings of previous studies. Initial per capita GDP and Gov. Spending / GDP are 
negatively associated with future per capita GDP growth, confirming the converging effect of 
economic growth and the crowding–out effect of government spending. Meanwhile, the initial 
levels of human capital (Initial Education) and trade openness (Openness / GDP) of a country are 
positively related to future growth, implying the positive effect of human capital and the openness 
of an economy on growth.  
I find that stock market size (Mkt. Cap. / GDP) is not positively and significantly associated 
with economic growth five years later. This finding is consistent with Levine and Zervos (1998), 
who do not find robust correlation between stock market size and economic growth. However, 
unlike Levine and Zervos (1998), the liquidity measure (Turnover / Cap.) here is not significantly 
correlated with future growth, even though the signs of the coefficients are all positive. Even more 
intriguing is that Credit / GDP is negatively related to future economic growth, consistent with 
recent papers suggesting that a credit amount exceeding a certain level is disadvantageous to 
                                                          
11 The data on Initial Education are available only once in the ten years before the 2000s in the United Nations’ 
International Human Development Indicators. Therefore, I use the 1990 data as an alternative measure of the initial 
education level at the beginning of the regression period.  
12 Standard errors based on double clustering generate more conservative t–statistics than for only country–level 
clustering in all regressions in this paper. However, the double–clustering correction method does not produce stable 
standard errors and t–statistics of year or country dummies when included in the regressions. I subsequently use the 
country–level clustering correction method in year and country fixed–effects regressions. 
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economic growth.
13
 The issue of the appropriate credit level for the size of an economy is the 
subject of serious debate, particularly after the financial crisis of 2008, because more credit does 
not always seem to benefit an economy.
14   
The stock market concentration variables are consistently and statistically significant 
regardless of whether the other stock market characteristics of size and liquidity are included in 
the regressions. Stock market concentration also has large economic implications. A one standard 
deviation decrease (0.186) in the level of stock market concentration by the top five firms, Mkt. 
Con. (top 5 firms), in a basic regression (specification (1)) predicts an increase of approximately 
0.74 percentage points in real per capita GDP growth rates in five years (–0.186 × –3.98). This 
effect is economically significant considering that the average real per capita GDP growth rate in 
the sample is 2.26%. The magnitude of the impact becomes more substantial if the effects are 
accumulated. 
I run a series of robustness tests. First, I include year fixed–effects with standard errors 
clustered by country in the regressions. Second, I rerun the regressions excluding China because 
it is a definite outlier in a scatter plot of stock market concentration versus real per capita GDP 
growth rates. Third, I winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels to formally address the 
concern of outliers and repeat the regression analysis. Fourth, I include bureaucracy and corruption 
indices retrieved from the World Competitiveness Center of the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) in the regressions to control for the effect of institutions on 
economic growth.
15
 Finally, I regress real per capita GDP growth rates on the ten–year lagged 
values of stock market concentration, the other stock market characteristics, and credit measures 
with other contemporaneous macroeconomic variables (Appendix B). Both stock market 
concentration variables are significant at the 1% level in all of these additional tests.  
(SEE TABLE 2–3) 
 
2.4.2.  Endogeneity tests 
                                                          
13 For example, Arcand et al. (2012) find that the credit provided to the private sector over GDP (%) has a negative 
impact on economic growth as long as it exceeds 100%. 
14 An extreme case is Iceland. The credit provided to the private sector over GDP (%) in 2006 and 2007 were 320% 
and 248%, respectively, whereas the average values in the sample countries in this paper in the same period were 97% 
and 100%, respectively. Iceland’s banking sector was blamed for providing excessive credit to its economy when the 
country was hit by the worldwide financial crisis in 2008. 
15 The indices are available from 1995. The regression period thus runs from 1995 to 2013. 
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Using lagged values of stock market concentration in the regressions partially addresses 
concerns over reverse causality bias. However, if unknown time–invariant country characteristic 
variables are correlated with both stock market concentration and future economic growth—
causing a spurious relationship between the two variables—the endogeneity concern remains. 
Thus, in this section, I run two–stage least squares regressions using instrument variables and 
country fixed–effects regressions.  
2.4.2.1.  First–stage regressions 
In order to employ two–stage least squares regressions, I search for exogenous instrument 
variables that are possibly correlated with stock market concentration but are not related to real 
per capita GDP growth rates other than through the effect of concentration. As a preliminary step, 
I delve into factors that may be correlated with stock market concentration. I look into the probable 
factors that can be subsumed under physical, economic, institutional, and financial grounds and 
formally test in a regression format whether these factors are correlated with stock market 
concentration.  
First, as shown in Figure 2–1, large countries tend to have less concentrated stock markets. 
Even firms with large stock market capitalization may represent only a small portion of the entire 
economy of a large country. I include real GDP deflated by a GDP deflator and the territory size 
of a country as proxies for a country’s economic and physical size.  
Second, the trade theory of comparative advantage asserts that small, open countries 
choose specialization and concentration because of optimal economies of scale (Dornbusch, 
Fischer, and Samuelson, 1977; Dixit and Norman, 1980). Strategically, these countries may have 
a few large companies rather than many small and medium–sized businesses, which leads to higher 
stock market concentration. To capture this economic feature, I consider a country’s export of 
goods and services over its population as a proxy for the level of its dependence on exports relative 
to its population. 
Third, I examine the possibility that economic institutions affect the extent of a country’s 
stock market concentration. For example, a bureaucratic, corrupt government may provide 
business favors to large companies for political ends, which would elevate the level of 
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concentration. I include Gov. Spending / GDP in the regressions as a proxy for government clout 
and the bureaucracy index gauged by the World Competitiveness Center of the IMD.
16
 
Fourth, La Porta et al. (1997) find that civil law countries with poorer investor protections 
have the least developed capital markets. To the extent that the stock market concentration 
variables capture the (inverse) functionality level of a stock market, the stock market concentration 
is correlated with a country’s legal origin and level of investor protections. Thus, I include French, 
German, and Scandinavian dummies that are equal to one if a country’s commercial laws originate 
from French, German, or Scandinavian civil law traditions, and zero otherwise.  
I also include the anti–self–dealing index that measures the extent of minority shareholder 
protections.
17
 The regressions also contain Mkt. Cap. / GDP, Turnover / Cap., and Credit / GDP 
in consideration of the possibility that the other financial characteristics may provoke higher stock 
market concentration. Additionally, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that foreign institutional 
investors have a strong preference for large companies. Therefore, I add to the regressions a 
country’s foreign portfolio equity inflows scaled by its GDP.  
Table 2–4 shows that various factors, not just a single element, influence the level of stock 
market concentration.
18
 A larger country characterized by high total GDP or vast territory tends to 
have lower stock market concentration as predicted. International trade theory asserts that a small, 
open economy represented by Export / Pop. has higher stock market concentration. French and 
German civil law traditions, in contrast to English common law, and weaker minority investor 
protection (lower anti–self–dealing index) induce higher stock market concentration, as affirmed 
by the law and finance literatures. Portfolio equity inflows from foreign investors also increase 
stock market concentration. Together, all of these factors explain more than 50% of the variation 
in stock market concentration. Table 2–4 presents interesting findings itself and serves as the first–
stage regressions in two–stage least squares regressions.  
(SEE TABLE 2–4) 
 
2.4.2.2. Second–stage instrument and country fixed–effects regressions 
                                                          
16 The center also provides a corruption index, but it is highly correlated with the bureaucracy index. I only include 
the bureaucracy index due to the multicollinearity concern. 
17 The anti–self–dealing index is retrieved from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
18 The bureaucracy index is available only from 1995 and for 41 countries. The anti–self–dealing index is available 
for 46 countries.   
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Among the factors that are correlated with stock market concentration, as shown in Table 
2–4, I select territory size and legal origin as exogenous instruments. There is little reason to expect 
that larger country size or English common law origin relates directly to higher economic growth 
rates. Subsequently, I formally test the exogeneity of these instruments.  
Specifications (1) to (4) in Table 2–5 present the output of the second–stage instrumental 
variable regressions. In regression specifications (1) and (2), a country’s territory size is utilized 
as an instrument. In regression specifications (3) and (4), both the territory size and the English 
legal origin dummy are used. The F–test in the first–stage regressions strongly suggests that the 
instruments are relevant, rejecting the hypothesis of weak instruments. More importantly, Table 
2–5 shows the negative relationship between stock market concentration and future real per capita 
GDP growth rates in all specifications. In specifications (3) and (4), following Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2011), I inspect the exogeneity of the instruments on the dependent variable 
using over–identification tests because the number of instruments used is greater than the number 
of instrumented variables. The Hansen J–test does not reject the hypothesis that at least one of the 
instruments is exogenous to the dependent variable.  
I also run country fixed–effect regressions to further mitigate the endogeneity concern. 
Specifications (5) and (6) in Table 2–5 present the results.
19
 The signs of the coefficients of all of 
the variables are similar to those of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in Table 
2–3. Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms) are significantly negatively associated with future real per capita 
GDP growth rates in the regressions when formally controlling for time–invariant country effects. 
(SEE TABLE 2–5) 
 
2.4.3. Stock market concentration and stability  
Because stock market concentration is derived from firms’ stock market capitalizations and 
involves a firm’s current performance and future prospects, stock market concentration by the 
largest firms represents the fate of big businesses and, thus, is closely related to the stability 
measure of Fogel et al. (2008). They show that the stability of the largest businesses in a country 
(or, reversely, their turnover) is negatively (positively) associated with the country’s economic 
growth. Their finding supports the idea expressed by Schumpeter (1912) that “creative 
                                                          
19 The double–clustering correction method in Petersen (2009) does not produce stable standard errors and t–statistics 
of country dummies, even though the stock market concentration variables are significant at the 5% level in an 
unreported table. I thus present a country–level clustering correction method in these regressions.  
19 
 
destruction”—the process through which technological innovation evolves by disavowing a 
battered, current regime and building a novel, new system—is critical to economic development.  
I investigate whether the stock market concentration measure is differentiated from the 
stability measure. I construct the stability measure by counting the number of firms that remain in 
the top five (ten) list of firms in both the current year and five years ago and divide this number 
by five (ten). This measure lies between zero and one, the latter corresponding to perfect stability 
of the biggest five (ten) firms.  
The stability measure in this paper differs from that in Fogel et al. (2008) in a number of 
ways. First, they define a large business as the union of firms or business groups. Second, in their 
study, the proxy for business size is the number of employees. Third, they consider that big 
businesses are stable if they subsequently remain in the top business list or their employment grows 
no slower than the country’s GDP. Given the difference in measurement, it would be meaningless 
to compare the stability and concentration measures directly. In this experiment, I simply check 
whether stock market concentration captures a different aspect—stock market functionality—and 
not only the stability of the largest businesses in a country.  
In Table 2–6, I add to the regressions the stability measure, in addition to other variables 
analyzed in Table 2–3.
20  For specifications (1) to (3), the stock market concentration and stability 
measures are derived using the top five firms, and using the top ten firms for (4) through (6). The 
stability measures are negatively associated with real per capita GDP growth rates, whether 
constructed with the top five or ten firms, confirming the findings in Fogel et al. (2008). The stock 
market concentration variables remain significant when included with the stability measures in 
specifications (3) and (6), suggesting that stock market concentration represents a different aspect 
of a financial market or an economy, not just the prosperity of the largest businesses. Moreover, 
both stock market concentration and the stability of large businesses are related to negative 
economic consequences.  
(SEE TABLE 2–6) 
 
2.4.4.  Stock market concentration and institution  
So far, the evidence indicates a negative relationship between stock market concentration 
                                                          
20 The sample period in Table 2–6 is 1994–2008 because the stability measure drawn from stock market concentration 
is available until 2008 and is not a lagged variable. 
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and economic growth. However, the negative effect of concentration is not necessarily even in all 
countries; assuming the diminishing benefit of marginal funds, the role of finance may be much 
more critical in developing countries with poorer economic institutions than in developed countries. 
Thus, I conjecture that the negative impact of stock market concentration on growth might be more 
severe in a highly concentrated stock market in a bureaucratic, corrupt country. I examine this 
hypothesis in the following analysis.  
Table 2–7 reports the results of the regressions of real per capita GDP growth rates on stock 
market concentration, where the sample countries in each year are partitioned into two groups with 
respect to bureaucracy and corruption indices.
21
  The regressions are run separately for each group, 
and the other financial development measures and control variables in Table 2–2 are included in 
all regressions but are not shown in order to save space. In the first regression sets, in which the 
countries are divided by the bureaucracy index, stock market concentration is negatively associated 
with future economic growth regardless of the level of bureaucracy. However, the group with a 
higher level of bureaucracy (lower bureaucracy index) has more negative coefficients for the stock 
market concentration variables compared with the group with a lower level of bureaucracy (higher 
bureaucracy index). The coefficients of Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms) of the group with a higher 
level of bureaucracy are more than twice as large in absolute value as those of the lower 
bureaucracy group (–6.74 (–6.21) versus –2.45 (–2.40)). The differences in the magnitude of the 
coefficients are statistically significant. 
The regressions in which the countries are partitioned by the corruption index show a 
similar pattern. The stock market concentration coefficients of the group with a higher corruption 
level (lower corruption index) are more negative than those with lower corruption level (higher 
corruption index). Overall, Table 2–7 confirms the speculation that the negative impact of stock 
market concentration on economic growth is more severe if a society is more bureaucratic or more 
corrupt.  
(SEE TABLE 2–7) 
 
2.5. Stock Market Concentration, IPOs, and Innovation 
                                                          
21 The sample period in Table 2–6 is 1995–2013 because the bureaucracy and corruption indices are available from 
1995. The indices are also only available for 41 countries. The countries excluded in this experiment are Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  
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In this section, I regress the proxies for IPOs and innovation on stock market concentration. 
I also apply two–stage regressions where economic growth is regressed on IPO and innovation 
activities estimated by the level of stock market concentration. These analyses identify the specific 
channel through which a concentrated stock market demotes growth.  
2.5.1.  Stock market concentration and IPOs 
A concentrated stock market structure may indicate that new, innovative firms struggle to 
access the stock market and obtain the financing they need. Therefore, countries with high stock 
market concentration experience few IPOs of new firms. To test this hypothesis, I run panel 
regressions of the two IPO proxies of IPO Amount / Pop. and IPO No. / Pop. on stock market 
concentration. The macroeconomic conditions for the 46 countries in the basic data set are 
controlled for in the regressions for 1994–2013.
22
  As in the regressions of real per capita GDP 
growth rates, the stock market concentration variables are lagged by five years to determine the 
long–term effects on IPO activity and to remedy the reverse causality bias.  
Table 2–8 shows that the two size measures (Mkt Cap. / GDP and Credit / GDP) and the 
liquidity proxy (Turnover / Cap.) do not induce more vigorous IPO activity in the future. It also 
indicates that the stock market concentration variables are significantly negatively associated with 
both IPO activity proxies.  
In specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8), I include the anti–self–dealing index because the law 
and finance literature emphasize the importance of institutions enforcing minority shareholders’ 
rights on vigorous financing activities including IPOs.
23
 Stronger protection of minority investors’ 
rights is shown to promote IPOs as predicted by the law and finance literature. More importantly, 
the stock market concentration variables remain significantly negative in those regressions.  
In an unreported analysis, I employ other proxies for IPOs, as in Doidge et al. (2013): IPO 
proceeds over the one–year lagged GDP and IPO count over the one–year lagged number of listed 
firms. Regressing these two IPO proxies on stock market concentration generates output that is 
                                                          
22 IPO data for Peru are missing in the data source and, thus, are excluded in this experiment.  
23 The anti–self–dealing index for Bangladesh is not available in Djankov et al. (2008); the country is excluded from 
the regressions. 
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qualitatively the same.
24
 The variables are still negative when controlling for time–invariant 
country effects (Appendix C).
25  
(SEE TABLE 2–8) 
 
2.5.2.  Stock market concentration and innovation 
King and Levine (1993b) prove theoretically that a better financial system improves the 
probability of successful innovation. Hsu et al. (2014) find empirical evidence that stock market 
development promotes technological innovation but also that credit market development 
discourages innovation. In this subsection, I investigate whether stock market concentration 
depresses innovation. 
If young, innovative firms find it difficult to access necessary financing in a concentrated 
stock market, fewer innovations are expected under such a stock market structure. To test this 
hypothesis, I run panel regressions of the innovation proxies on stock market concentration with a 
five–year lag—again controlling for macroeconomic variables—for 43 countries in the basic data 
set for 1994–2006.
26   
Table 2–9 presents the results of the regressions. Interestingly, Mkt. Cap. / GDP is 
negatively associated with all four innovation proxies, which indicates that having a large stock 
market does not boost a country’s innovation activity in the long run. As previously seen with IPO 
activity, future innovation activity is not promoted by liquidity (Turnover / Cap.) or credit amount 
(Credit / GDP), according to the regression analysis. Finally, both stock market concentration 
variables (Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms)) are significantly negatively associated with not only 
quantity but also quality proxies of innovation.  
I rerun the regressions of the innovation proxies only in manufacturing industries, as in 
Hsu et al. (2014), because innovation and attaining patents is more critical in manufacturing 
                                                          
24 Stock market concentration variables are significant at the 1% level in all regressions. I report the regressions of 
IPO proceeds and count scaled by a country’s population because the other dependent variables in this paper are scaled 
by population. 
25 I exclude the anti–self–dealing index in the regressions as I expect the country dummies to soak up all the effects 
of time–invariant institutional variables. 
26 Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Romania are excluded because they are missing from the patent files of the NBER. 
Additionally, the United States is also excluded in consideration of home bias. The regressions end in 2006 because 
the data permit analysis up to this year. 
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industries than other sectors.
27 An unreported table of the regressions presents results that are 
qualitatively similar to Table 2–9. The concentration variables are also still significantly negative 
when controlling for country fixed–effects (Appendix D).  
(SEE TABLE 2–9) 
 
2.5.3.  Two–stage regressions 
In this subsection, I apply two–stage regressions in order to establish the link between stock 
market concentration, IPO and innovation activities, and economic growth. First, I run the 
regressions of IPO and innovation proxies at t on stock market concentration at t–5 to determine 
the IPO and innovation activities estimated with respect to a certain level of stock market 
concentration. Second, I run the regressions of real per capital GDP growth rates on the IPO and 
innovation activities estimated from the first–stage regressions. Table 2–10 presents the results of 
the second–stage regressions.
28  In regression specifications (1) through (4) ((5) through (8)), IPO 
and innovation activities are estimated with Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms) at t–5, respectively. 
The table shows that IPOs (IPO Amount / Pop. and IPO No. / Pop.) and innovation 
activities (Patent / Pop. and Citation / Pop.) estimated from the level of stock market concentration 
are significantly positively associated with real per capita GDP growth rates. In an untabulated 
table, I regress economic growth on the raw proxies of IPOs and innovation and do not see robust 
correlations. Meanwhile, the results in Table 2–10 show the link of growth with IPOs and 
innovation projected with concentration. This finding suggests that a concentrated stock market 
constricts IPOs and innovation by new firms, which is critical to economic growth. 
(SEE TABLE 2–10) 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
The primary function of any financial system is to faciliate the efficient allocation of capital 
and economic resources (Merton and Bodie, 1995). A developed financial market should allocate 
more capital to more productive, innovative firms. Finance researchers have commonly used 
                                                          
27 I use a data file matching three–digit class codes of the USPTO with two–digit SIC codes provided by Hsu et al. 
(2014) to identify manufacturing industries.  
28 The sample includes country–year observations for 46 countries during 1994–2013 for specifications (1), (2), (5), 
and (6), and for 43 countries during 1994–2006 for (3), (4), (7), and (8).  
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financial market size in investigating the relationshp between finance and growth. They assume 
implicitly that financial market size is commensurate with financial market development. However, 
a larger financial market is not necessarily functionally more efficient. For instance, a sizeable 
stock market may simply allocate more capital to large, doddering firms than to small, emerging 
ones. This merely causes the stock market to appear larger in terms of capitalization even though 
it does not allocate funds efficiently. Appropriate measures that capture the functional efficiency 
of any financial market may need to be established first when the nexus between finance and 
growth is investigated. 
In this chapter, I have introduced a new measure of stock market functionality—stock 
market concentration—and explored the relationship between stock market functionality and 
economic growth. I have also investigated the channel through which stock market concentration 
affects growth. I provide evidence that stock market concentration is negatively associated with 
capital allocation efficiency, IPOs, innovation, and finally with economic growth. These findings 
suggest a viable channel through which concentration hurts economic growth: stock market 
concentration prevents new Davids from accessing the funds required for innovative 
entrepreneurship to compete with old Goliaths. 
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Figure 2–1: Average Stock Market Concentration of Each Country 
Figure 2–1 plots stock market concentration computed using the top 5 (10) firms of each country averaged for 1989–2008.  
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Table 2–2: Summary Statistics and Correlations of the Main Variables 
Panel A: Average Value by Country 
Panel A illustrates the average value (except for Elasticity) of the main variables used for analyses of the sample of 47 countries. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. “IPO amount / Pop.,” “Patent / Pop.,” and “Citation / Pop.” are figures before taking the logarithm. “Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms),” “Mkt. Cap. / GDP,” 
“Turnover / Cap.,” and “Credit / GDP” are averaged during 1989–2008. “Per capita GDP growth” and “IPO Amount / Pop.” are averaged during 1994–2013. 
“Patent / Pop.” and “Citation / Pop.” are averaged during 1994–2006. The elasticity (of capital allocation) is estimated for 1991–2010.  
 
Country 
Mkt. Con. 
(top 5 firms) 
Mkt. Con. 
(top 10 firms) 
Mkt. 
Cap. 
/ GDP 
Turnover 
/ Cap. 
Credit 
/ GDP 
Per capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Elasticity 
IPO 
Amount 
/Pop. 
IPO 
No. 
/Pop. 
Patent 
/Pop. 
Citation 
/Pop. 
Argentina 0.33 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.17 2.49 . 1.35 0.03 0.20 0.57 
Australia 0.27 0.39 0.86 0.59 0.84 2.00 0.80 103.34 4.10 26.13 215.82 
Austria 0.40 0.58 0.22 0.45 1.03 1.48 0.69 28.37 0.29 27.83 119.92 
Bangladesh 0.34 0.48 0.04 0.51 0.29 4.23 . 0.05 0.01 . . 
Belgium 0.40 0.57 0.56 0.29 0.72 1.32 0.49 28.79 0.44 34.42 224.88 
Brazil 0.09 0.12 0.42 0.51 0.36 2.33 . 5.92 0.02 0.21 0.36 
Canada 0.14 0.22 0.85 0.59 1.23 1.64 . 62.09 3.11 60.39 736.90 
China 0.13 0.18 0.42 1.26 1.06 8.56 . 13.64 0.11 0.11 0.42 
Colombia 0.39 0.58 0.21 0.09 0.31 2.17 . 4.78 0.01 0.05 0.15 
Denmark 0.36 0.48 0.49 0.64 0.96 1.11 0.48 22.77 0.69 55.62 334.23 
Egypt 0.38 0.49 0.47 0.30 0.49 2.45 . 1.73 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Finland 0.51 0.61 0.87 0.76 0.70 2.11 0.76 36.84 0.90 125.30 1,344.53 
France 0.23 0.37 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.14 1.07 43.09 0.65 45.11 304.76 
Germany 0.28 0.42 0.38 1.23 1.06 1.36 0.98 28.55 0.37 91.05 595.82 
Greece 0.34 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.72 0.38 30.57 0.81 0.41 1.61 
Hong Kong 0.40 0.53 3.01 0.53 1.49 2.54 . 124.83 4.92 19.44 187.07 
Hungary 0.76 0.86 0.21 0.64 0.37 2.32 0.11 2.24 0.06 1.68 4.98 
India 0.25 0.36 0.43 1.05 0.30 5.18 0.68 0.76 0.14 0.12 0.32 
Indonesia 0.39 0.55 0.26 0.48 0.36 2.39 0.07 1.74 0.06 0.01 0.11 
Ireland 0.58 0.73 0.57 0.52 1.24 1.13 0.39 19.68 0.20 17.44 86.71 
Israel 0.40 0.50 0.66 0.51 0.84 1.72 0.87 9.44 0.21 36.49 126.21 
Italy 0.36 0.49 0.33 0.82 0.71 0.41 1.16 39.22 0.25 17.83 103.67 
Japan 0.13 0.20 0.80 0.71 1.96 0.76 0.45 55.20 0.90 222.54 2,184.21 
Kenya 0.54 0.74 0.23 0.06 0.28 1.35 . 1.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
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Korea 0.31 0.40 0.47 2.00 0.72 4.08 0.69 51.50 1.23 63.37 540.84 
Malaysia 0.24 0.34 1.63 0.42 1.17 3.04 0.58 21.94 1.56 0.47 2.71 
Mexico 0.34 0.45 0.26 0.33 0.22 1.49 0.38 3.02 0.02 0.21 1.40 
Morocco 0.51 0.71 0.38 0.17 0.44 3.20 0.27 3.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Netherlands 0.53 0.69 0.88 1.03 1.23 1.47 0.33 34.85 0.24 68.78 452.48 
New Zealand 0.42 0.54 0.39 0.39 1.03 1.68 0.65 28.96 0.79 15.70 104.33 
Norway 0.48 0.59 0.39 0.85 0.67 1.52 0.64 91.09 1.76 32.67 232.33 
Pakistan 0.42 0.54 0.21 2.21 0.26 2.07 . 0.22 0.01 . . 
Peru 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.11 0.22 4.76 . . . 0.01 0.00 
Philippines 0.34 0.50 0.54 0.25 0.36 2.52 0.38 0.99 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Poland 0.47 0.62 0.21 0.42 0.29 3.56 0.76 17.79 0.49 0.08 0.18 
Portugal 0.55 0.77 0.30 0.53 1.01 1.01 0.92 26.05 0.17 0.43 1.53 
Romania 0.49 0.56 0.12 0.20 0.18 4.22 0.66 2.67 0.03 . . 
Singapore 0.40 0.57 1.59 0.56 0.94 3.29 0.32 77.57 6.21 43.76 546.30 
South Africa 0.16 0.25 1.63 0.28 1.23 1.33 . 1.47 0.03 0.95 4.43 
Spain 0.33 0.46 0.58 1.22 1.06 1.29 0.78 20.44 0.12 2.89 14.44 
Sri Lanka 0.30 0.43 0.15 0.14 0.25 4.60 . 0.79 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Sweden 0.31 0.43 0.87 0.94 1.03 1.87 0.46 57.19 0.87 125.77 1,194.36 
Switzerland 0.46 0.58 1.73 0.87 1.62 1.04 . 92.63 0.51 164.70 1,038.76 
Thailand 0.30 0.43 0.54 0.78 1.13 2.85 . 7.96 0.30 0.08 0.54 
Turkey 0.35 0.52 0.22 1.35 0.20 2.83 0.64 5.19 0.09 0.04 0.56 
United Kingdom 0.22 0.32 1.21 0.89 1.33 1.62 0.71 68.74 1.33 31.10 263.67 
United States 0.09 0.14 1.08 1.37 1.60 1.52 0.88 96.43 0.89 . . 
Total 0.35 0.48 0.66 0.68 0.81 2.26 0.61 32.45 0.84 34.78 290 
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Panel B: Correlations 
Panel B presents the Pearson’s correlations among the main variables. The sample includes country–year observations for 47 countries during 1994–2013 except 
for the Elasticity of Capital Allocation, which is estimated for 1991–2010, and “Patent / Pop.” and “Citation / Pop.”, whose data are collected for 1994–2006. The 
asterisks denote statistical significance at or below the 5% level. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[1] Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 1.00           
[2] Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5 0.97* 1.00          
[3] Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.04 –0.07* 1.00         
[4] Turnover / Cap. at t–5 –0.03 –0.05 0.04 1.00        
[5] Credit / GDP at t–5 –0.20* –0.21* 0.52* 0.25* 1.00       
[6] Per Capita GDP Growth –0.14* –0.16* –0.11* –0.04 –0.23* 1.00      
[7] Elasticity of Capital Allocation –0.29* –0.30* –0.03 0.21* 0.18* –0.07 1.00     
[8] IPO Amount / Pop. –0.24* –0.25* 0.25* 0.03 0.33* 0.21* 0.22* 1.00    
[9] IPO No. / Pop. –0.18* –0.18* 0.36* –0.05 0.26* 0.15* 0.03 0.74* 1.00   
[10] Patent / Pop. –0.13* –0.18* 0.16* 0.01 0.45* –0.11* 0.19* 0.47* 0.43* 1.00  
[11] Citation / Pop. –0.20* –0.24* 0.11* –0.04 0.40* –0.09* 0.19* 0.47* 0.45* 0.97* 1.00 
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Table 2–2: Cross–Sectional Regressions of Elasticity of Capital Allocation on Stock Market Concentration  
Table 2–2 presents the results of cross–sectional regressions in which the elasticities of the capital allocation of each country (  ) are regressed on stock market 
concentration. The elasticity of capital allocation is estimated from the following regression during 1991–2010: 
   
    
      
 =      +        
    
      
 +      . 
where      and      are the investment and the value added in each country–industry–year observation, respectively. The sample includes 32 countries. Per capita 
GDP is averaged for 1991–2010 and the financial development measures, including Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms), are averaged for 1989–2008. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) –0.66**     –0.87*  
 (–2.11)     (–2.01)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms)  –0.56*     –0.73 
  (–1.83)     (–1.66) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP   –0.08   –0.16 –0.16 
   (–0.76)   (–1.24) (–1.28) 
Turnover / Cap.    0.20**  0.11 0.11 
    (2.44)  (1.22) (1.12) 
Credit / GDP     –0.01 –0.12 –0.10 
     (–0.07) (–0.57) (–0.47) 
Per Capita GDP 0.07** 0.07** 0.08** 0.06* 0.08 0.10* 0.09* 
 (2.15) (2.14) (2.09) (1.75) (1.63) (1.90) (1.81) 
Constant 0.19 0.25 –0.13 –0.08 –0.12 0.09 0.18 
 (0.56) (0.72) (–0.35) (–0.27) (–0.29) (0.24) (0.49) 
No. of Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R2 0.236 0.229 0.134 0.204 0.121 0.348 0.334 
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Table 2–3: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration 
Table 2–3 presents the results of the panel regressions in which per capita GDP growth rates are regressed on stock market concentration at t–5. This sample 
includes country–year observations for 47 countries during 1994–2013. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 –3.98***    –4.27***  
 (–3.44)    (–3.42)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5  –3.88***    –4.23*** 
  (–3.57)    (–3.61) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5   –0.50  –0.63 –0.72* 
   (–1.41)  (–1.62) (–1.78) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5    0.16 0.21 0.18 
    (0.77) (1.09) (0.98) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 –1.39*** –1.45*** –0.66 –0.99** –1.14*** –1.16*** 
 (–3.24) (–3.62) (–1.14) (–2.06) (–2.98) (–3.21) 
Initial Per Capita GDP –0.54 –0.53* –0.54 –0.55 –0.54* –0.52* 
 (–1.64) (–1.69) (–1.49) (–1.49) (–1.69) (–1.74) 
Initial Education 1.07** 0.91* 1.11** 1.17** 1.15** 0.97* 
 (2.23) (1.95) (2.43) (2.42) (2.23) (1.93) 
Gov. Spending / GDP –7.51* –6.70* –11.57*** –10.77*** –8.40** –7.67* 
 (–1.93) (–1.68) (–2.89) (–2.59) (–2.24) (–1.96) 
Inflation –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 
 (–1.34) (–1.33) (–1.27) (–1.30) (–1.37) (–1.35) 
Openness / GDP 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.43*** 0.23 0.88*** 1.00*** 
 (3.69) (3.84) (3.14) (1.40) (4.41) (4.37) 
Constant 8.53*** 9.01*** 7.48*** 7.41*** 8.40*** 8.95*** 
 (4.31) (4.55) (3.67) (3.68) (4.47) (4.78) 
No. of Observations 834 834 834 832 832 832 
R2 0.170 0.178 0.142 0.137 0.181 0.192 
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Table 2–4: First–Stage Regressions: Regressions of Stock Market Concentration 
Table 2–4 presents the results of panel regressions in which stock market concentrations are regressed on various 
factors. The sample includes country–year observations for 47 countries during 1989–2008. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both year and country. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total GDP –0.06*** –0.08*** –0.06*** –0.07*** 
 (–5.05) (–5.46) (–3.47) (–3.70) 
Territory Size –0.01* –0.02* –0.03*** –0.04*** 
 (–1.67) (–1.77) (–3.42) (–3.21) 
Export / Pop. 2.49 3.28 0.32 0.99 
 (1.39) (1.63) (0.20) (0.56) 
Gov. Spending / GDP 0.56* 0.67** 0.16 0.09 
 (1.92) (2.24) (0.51) (0.26) 
Bureaucracy   0.01 0.00 
   (0.69) (0.26) 
French 0.10*** 0.13***   
 (3.75) (3.94)   
German 0.11*** 0.11**   
 (2.61) (2.51)   
Scandinavian 0.04 0.02   
 (0.83) (0.34)   
Anti–Self–Dealing   –0.22*** –0.25*** 
   (–3.23) (–3.37) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP –0.00 –0.02 –0.02 –0.04 
 (–0.02) (–0.66) (–0.89) (–1.62) 
Turnover / Cap. 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03* 0.03 
 (3.20) (3.14) (1.84) (1.40) 
Credit / GDP –0.03 –0.01 –0.02 –0.00 
 (–0.76) (–0.31) (–0.49) (–0.12) 
Portfolio Inflows / GDP 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 
 (4.79) (4.41) (4.98) (4.69) 
Constant 2.05*** 2.58*** 2.32*** 2.83*** 
 (7.14) (7.75) (5.22) (5.95) 
No. of Observations 788 788 524 524 
R2 0.497 0.536 0.551 0.582 
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Table 2–5: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration: Endogeneity Tests 
Table 2–5 presents the results of the instrumental variable (specifications 1 to 4) and country fixed–effect (specification 5 and 6) regressions of per capita GDP 
growth on stock market concentration at t–5. The instruments used are the logarithm of a country’s physical size in square kilometers in specifications 1 and 2, and 
country size and dummy for English common law origins in specifications 3 and 4. The sample includes country–year observations for 47 countries during 1994–
2013. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both year and country (instrumental 
variable regressions) and by country (country fixed–effects regressions). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
Instrumental Variable Regressions Country Fixed–Effects Regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 –6.47*  –4.23**  –3.66**  
 (–1.91)  (–2.25)  (–2.41)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5  –4.97**  –3.59**  –3.79*** 
  (–1.99)  (–2.37)  (–2.77) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.71 –0.76* –0.63 –0.69* –1.05** –1.06** 
 (–1.63) (–1.78) (–1.63) (–1.74) (–2.19) (–2.21) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.01 0.02 
 (1.20) (1.02) (1.08) (0.95) (0.04) (0.12) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 –1.37*** –1.23*** –1.14*** –1.09*** –1.77*** –1.74*** 
 (–3.68) (–3.70) (–2.63) (–2.73) (–3.21) (–3.22) 
Initial Per Capita GDP –0.54* –0.52* –0.54* –0.52*   
 (–1.80) (–1.84) (–1.72) (–1.74)   
Initial Education 1.15** 0.94* 1.15** 1.00**   
 (2.03) (1.84) (2.28) (2.03)   
Gov. Spending / GDP –6.72 –6.96 –8.43** –8.27** –59.16*** –57.53*** 
 (–1.17) (–1.31) (–2.01) (–1.96) (–3.39) (–3.33) 
Inflation –0.04 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 –0.05 –0.05 
 (–1.46) (–1.42) (–1.42) (–1.40) (–1.37) (–1.39) 
Openness / GDP 1.11** 1.09*** 0.88*** 0.91*** 2.68** 2.70** 
 (2.54) (2.73) (3.35) (3.43) (2.57) (2.60) 
Constant 8.93*** 9.23*** 8.39*** 8.71*** 11.49*** 11.66*** 
 (4.11) (4.12) (4.57) (4.58) (5.19) (5.39) 
No. of Observations 832 832 832 832 832 832 
R2 0.171 0.190 0.181 0.190 0.336 0.338 
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Hansen J–Statistic   0.81 0.76   
(p–value)   (0.37) (0.38)   
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Table 2–6: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration and Stability Measure  
Table 2–6 presents the results of panel regressions in which the per capita GDP growth rate is regressed on stock market concentration, a stability measure. 
Specifications 1 to 2 and 3 to 4 use stability and stock market concentration measures of the top 5 and 10 firms, respectively. The sample includes country–year 
observations for 47 countries during 1994–2008. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered 
by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
Concentration and Stability Measures  
Computed Using Top 5 Firms 
Concentration and Stability Measures  
Computed Using Top 10 Firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stability –1.26*  –0.90 –2.96**  –2.37** 
 (–1.87)  (–1.52) (–2.31)  (–2.08) 
Mkt. Con. at t–5  –2.39** –2.06**  –2.79*** –2.19*** 
  (–2.28) (–2.13)  (–2.76) (–2.63) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.72 –0.84 –0.76 –0.70 –0.90 –0.78 
 (–1.22) (–1.34) (–1.20) (–1.16) (–1.39) (–1.18) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5 0.51** 0.54** 0.54** 0.46* 0.53** 0.49** 
 (2.10) (2.34) (2.32) (1.91) (2.37) (2.16) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 –0.51 –0.73 –0.74 –0.46 –0.80* –0.75* 
 (–0.93) (–1.49) (–1.58) (–0.89) (–1.69) (–1.66) 
Initial Per Capita GDP –0.45 –0.48 –0.45 –0.43 –0.46 –0.42 
 (–1.35) (–1.43) (–1.39) (–1.41) (–1.47) (–1.46) 
Initial Education 1.24** 1.15** 1.18** 1.16** 1.02* 1.02* 
 (2.35) (2.13) (2.19) (2.28) (1.90) (1.93) 
Gov. Spending / GDP –6.76 –5.16 –5.40 –6.26 –4.28 –4.42 
 (–1.46) (–1.09) (–1.18) (–1.40) (–0.89) (–0.97) 
Inflation –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 
 (–1.54) (–1.57) (–1.57) (–1.58) (–1.54) (–1.58) 
Openness / GDP 0.68*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.74*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 
 (3.83) (3.81) (3.80) (4.07) (3.79) (3.97) 
Constant 6.26*** 6.64*** 6.67*** 7.19*** 7.09*** 7.75*** 
 (3.29) (3.49) (3.62) (3.76) (3.83) (4.32) 
No. of Observations 599 599 599 599 599 599 
R2 0.127 0.132 0.136 0.145 0.143 0.159 
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Table 2–7: Panel Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Stock Market Concentration Partitioned by 
Corruption and Bureaucracy Indices 
Table 2–7 presents the results of panel regressions in which per capita GDP growth rates are regressed on stock market 
concentration at t–5, and the observations are divided into two groups with respect to the corruption and bureaucracy 
indices. The sample includes country–year observations for 47 countries during 1995–2013. The other financial 
development measures and control variables in Table 3–3–2–2 are included in all regressions but are not shown to 
save space. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The test of equality refers to the test of the equality of the coefficients of the two groups. 
 
 (Bureaucracy Level) 
Test of 
Equality 
 High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 
 
–6.74***  –2.45**  –4.29*** 
(–4.13)  (–2.57)  (–3.34) 
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5 
 
 –6.21***  –2.40*** –3.81*** 
 (–3.86)  (–2.92) (–2.67) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No. of Observations 359 359 351 351  
R2 0.219 0.232 0.153 0.157  
 (Corruption Level) 
Test of 
Equality 
 High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 
 
–6.06***  –2.46**  –3.60** 
(–2.98)  (–2.06)  (–2.16) 
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5 
 
 –5.53***  –2.48** –3.05* 
 (–2.86)  (–2.31) (–1.66) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No. of Observations 359 359 351 351  
R2 0.227 0.236 0.170 0.174  
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Table 2–8: Panel Regressions of IPO Activities on Stock Market Concentration 
Table 2–8 presents the results of panel regressions in which measures of IPO activities are regressed on stock market concentration at t–5. The sample includes 
country–year observations for 46 countries during 1994–2013. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
IPO Amount / Pop. IPO No. / Pop. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 –3.19***  –2.72***  –1.13***  –0.89***  
 (–4.22)  (–3.61)  (–4.46)  (–3.50)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5  –2.80***  –2.40***  –0.99***  –0.78*** 
  (–3.99)  (–3.43)  (–4.28)  (–3.35) 
Anti–Self–Dealing   1.09** 1.07**   0.59*** 0.58*** 
   (2.47) (2.36)   (2.73) (2.63) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.11 –0.15 –0.17 –0.20 –0.01 –0.03 –0.03 –0.05 
 (–0.55) (–0.78) (–0.81) (–0.98) (–0.17) (–0.38) (–0.51) (–0.67) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5 –0.08 –0.09 –0.07 –0.08 –0.05 –0.05 –0.04 –0.04 
 (–0.59) (–0.68) (–0.49) (–0.58) (–0.94) (–1.05) (–0.72) (–0.80) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 –0.24 –0.21 –0.37 –0.35 –0.16* –0.16 –0.25** –0.24** 
 (–0.77) (–0.69) (–1.22) (–1.16) (–1.68) (–1.60) (–2.28) (–2.24) 
Per Capita GDP 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 0.85*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 
 (6.32) (6.16) (6.48) (6.31) (4.08) (3.92) (4.24) (4.08) 
Gov. Spending / GDP –11.74*** –11.42*** –11.98*** –11.68*** –2.36** –2.25** –2.13** –2.04** 
 (–4.29) (–4.11) (–4.43) (–4.26) (–2.51) (–2.31) (–2.42) (–2.24) 
Inflation –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** 
 (–3.77) (–3.41) (–3.89) (–3.55) (–3.07) (–2.71) (–3.20) (–2.87) 
Openness / GDP 0.29* 0.33** 0.14 0.18 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 (1.82) (2.08) (0.90) (1.14) (4.24) (4.25) (3.34) (3.33) 
Constant –2.72*** –2.40*** –3.24*** –2.97*** –0.73*** –0.62** –1.14*** –1.05*** 
 (–3.05) (–2.61) (–3.31) (–2.90) (–2.75) (–2.28) (–3.05) (–2.71) 
No. of Observations 820 820 806 806 820 820 806 806 
R2 0.391 0.392 0.396 0.397 0.442 0.444 0.480 0.481 
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Table 2–9: Panel Regressions of Innovation on Stock Market Concentration 
Table 2–9 presents the results of panel regressions in which measures of innovation are regressed on stock market concentration at t–5. The sample includes 
country–year observations for 43 countries during 1994–2006. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
Patent / Pop. Citation /Pop. Generality / Pop. Originality / Pop. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 –2.19**  –4.73***  –2.66***  –1.84**  
 (–2.11)  (–3.46)  (–3.86)  (–2.04)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5  –2.08**  –4.38***  –2.44***  –1.76** 
  (–2.14)  (–3.38)  (–3.70)  (–2.09) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.43** –0.46** –0.92*** –1.00*** –0.69*** –0.73*** –0.39** –0.42*** 
 (–2.37) (–2.59) (–3.53) (–3.98) (–3.78) (–4.07) (–2.44) (–2.65) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5 –0.17 –0.18 –0.48* –0.51* –0.30** –0.32*** –0.16 –0.18 
 (–0.82) (–0.90) (–1.66) (–1.81) (–2.47) (–2.65) (–0.99) (–1.07) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.48 0.60 0.60 
 (1.16) (1.17) (0.87) (0.89) (1.37) (1.41) (1.32) (1.33) 
Per Capita GDP 0.95*** 0.93*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.76*** 0.75*** 
 (6.18) (5.96) (6.40) (6.15) (4.70) (4.48) (5.74) (5.51) 
Gov. Spending / GDP –0.55 –0.22 –3.71 –3.07 –2.24 –1.90 –0.19 0.10 
 (–0.13) (–0.05) (–0.65) (–0.53) (–0.71) (–0.59) (–0.05) (0.03) 
Inflation –0.02** –0.02** –0.03** –0.02** –0.01** –0.01* –0.01** –0.01* 
 (–2.22) (–2.09) (–2.23) (–2.04) (–2.15) (–1.91) (–2.02) (–1.89) 
Openness / GDP 0.18 0.23 0.48** 0.57*** 0.20 0.25* 0.12 0.16 
 (0.96) (1.14) (2.49) (2.72) (1.62) (1.85) (0.74) (0.93) 
Constant –6.24*** –5.97*** –7.88*** –7.32*** –2.86*** –2.56*** –5.08*** –4.85*** 
 (–5.55) (–5.10) (–5.17) (–4.67) (–3.81) (–3.37) (–5.13) (–4.70) 
No. of Observations 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 
R2 0.570 0.575 0.523 0.532 0.435 0.445 0.538 0.544 
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Table 2–10: Second–Stage Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth on Estimated IPO and Innovation Activities 
Table 2–10 presents the results of the second–stage regressions in which per capita GDP growth is regressed on IPO and innovation activities that are estimated 
from the first–stage regressions. IPO and innovation proxies are regressed on stock market concentration at t–5 and control variables in the first–stage regressions 
to obtain the estimated IPO and innovation activities at a certain level of stock market concentration. The sample includes country–year observations for 46 
countries during 1994–2013 for specifications (1), (2), (5), and (6), and for 43 countries during 1994–2006 for specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8). In (1) through 
(4) ((5) through (8)), IPO and innovation activities are estimated with Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) firms) at t–5. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
IPO and Innovation Activities are Estimated 
with Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 
IPO and Innovation Activities are Estimated 
with Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IPO Amount / Pop. 1.40***    1.49***    
 (3.31)    (3.61)    
IPO No. / Pop.  3.83***    4.15***   
  (2.90)    (3.15)   
Patent / Pop.   1.60**    1.67***  
   (2.41)    (2.80)  
Citation /Pop.    0.67*    0.76** 
    (1.94)    (2.32) 
Initial Per Capita GDP –1.75*** –1.30*** –1.98*** –1.34** –1.77*** –1.32*** –2.02*** –1.43*** 
 (–3.98) (–3.58) (–2.91) (–2.47) (–4.30) (–3.85) (–3.30) (–2.83) 
Initial Education 0.81* 0.88** 0.23 0.29 0.65 0.74* 0.08 0.15 
 (1.94) (2.04) (0.57) (0.74) (1.58) (1.75) (0.18) (0.37) 
Gov. Spending / GDP 8.81 1.37 1.42 1.76 9.88 2.19 1.48 2.10 
 (1.41) (0.28) (0.24) (0.30) (1.57) (0.44) (0.25) (0.36) 
Inflation 0.02 –0.00 0.01 –0.01 0.02 –0.00 0.01 –0.01 
 (0.68) (–0.06) (0.26) (–0.42) (0.77) (–0.00) (0.32) (–0.33) 
Openness / GDP 0.09 –0.81** 0.45* 0.42 0.08 –0.90** 0.45 0.42 
 (0.43) (–1.98) (1.65) (1.55) (0.38) (–2.21) (1.64) (1.55) 
Constant 12.05*** 11.24*** 16.52*** 11.85*** 12.27*** 11.47*** 17.01*** 12.59*** 
 (5.83) (5.39) (3.32) (3.07) (6.27) (5.73) (3.77) (3.48) 
No. of Observations 826 826 477 477 826 826 477 477 
R2 0.160 0.151 0.096 0.081 0.167 0.158 0.107 0.092 
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CHAPTER THREE: NOMINAL STOCK PRICE ANCHORS: A GLOBAL 
PHENOMENON? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the common human tendency to rely 
excessively on the first piece of information offered (the ‘anchor’) when making decisions. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe an experiment in which a group of students, who were 
given 5 seconds to evaluate the product of eight numbers, estimated that 1X2X3X4X5X6X7X8 
was 512 but 8X7X6X5X4X3X2X1 was 2,250. The first digit, the anchor, mattered.
29 
Anchors also matter in finance. In an intriguing paper, Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and 
Benartzi (2009) find that the average nominal price for a share of stock in the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) has been approximately $25 since the 
Great Depression. The price has not even kept pace with the rate of inflation. However, they find 
that 16 other countries did not share this peculiar trait.  Hence, they conclude that “the nominal 
price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American phenomenon.” 
The goal of this paper is to revisit their conclusion. Because anchoring is such a common 
human trait, we are skeptical that the United States is the only country whose stock markets exhibit 
this phenomenon. To find out whether the nominal price fixation is indeed a North American 
phenomenon, we extend the analysis by Weld et al. (2009) to international markets. We collect the 
nominal stock prices of firms, in both the local currency and the U.S. dollar, at the end of June in 
each year for 38 countries from 1981– 2010.  
A few interesting, sometimes, surprising facts stand out. First, a large variation is observed 
in the mean or median level of nominal stock prices across countries. The mean (median) of the 
nominal price level in Switzerland, for example, is $925 ($348.9) a share whereas that of Hong 
Kong is only $0.6 ($0.1). The mean (median) share price in the U.S. is $51.3 ($21.9).
30
  It is clear 
that a single, global anchor does not exist. 
                                                          
29 Epley and Gilovich (2001) establish the existence of both anchoring and heuristic adjustment in the classic Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) experiments. 
30 The mean nominal price of $51.3 for U.S. stocks in our sample differs from the mean price of $25 in Weld et al. 
(2009) for many reasons. Our sample covers only the stocks in NYSE from 1981–2010, whereas their sample covers 
all NYSE and AMEX stocks from 1933–2007. A more important difference is that they exclude Berkshire Hathaway 
from the sample, whereas we include it. The mean price drops to $26.2 without Berkshire Hathaway in our sample. 
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Second, surprisingly, we find that the median nominal stock price in dollar terms is 
remarkably flat and stable throughout the sample period for all countries, suggesting that although 
firms generate positive returns on average, their nominal share prices are held roughly constant.  
In fact, the level of current nominal stock prices in 2010 was remarkably similar to the level of 
nominal stock prices 29 years earlier. 
Third, a firm’s nominal stock price has a tendency to revert to its initial stock price level. 
When we partition our sample firms into tercile groups by their nominal stock price levels every 
year and keep track of the tercile groups to which they belong, we find that a majority of firms in 
almost all countries remains in their initial nominal stock price tercile group.  
We test this last observation formally using a regression model. We hypothesize that the 
initial stock price of a listed firm, an IPO price, may well serve as an anchor for future nominal 
stock prices and may be the most important determinant of nominal share prices. To the extent that 
investors/managers tend to rely heavily on the first piece of pricing information offered, the anchor 
price is likely to affect how managers “control” the future nominal stock price with corporate 
actions such as stock splits, dividend payouts, and reverse stock splits. Given the paucity of IPO 
price data, we use the initial nominal stock price of a firm when it first entered our sample period 
as a proxy for anchor price. We run a cross–sectional regression of a firm’s nominal stock prices 
in dollar terms on its initial stock price controlling for country and industry fixed effects and a firm 
size and its institutional ownership in each year during the sample period. The cross–sectional 
regression results show that the initial stock price is the single most important variable that explains 
the current nominal stock price. No other variables, whether they are firm–specific, industry–
specific, or country–specific, matter much. When we replace a firm’s initial nominal stock price 
with the initial public offering (IPO) price for the limited sample for which we can obtain IPO 
price data, we find remarkably similar results. Our empirical results indicate that the nominal price 
fixation is a global phenomenon.  
Finally, we show that nominal stock prices tend to revert back to their anchors due to 
corporate actions such as stock splits, dividend payouts, or even reverse stock splits. This suggests 
that corporate managers seem to manage the nominal stock prices to revert to the anchor. The 
introduction of the euro in January of 1999 offers a natural experiment that further corroborates 
this finding. We find a much higher proportion of euro firm managers than non–euro firm 
managers in Europe taking corporate actions to bring down their nominal share prices just before 
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and after the introduction of the euro. It appears that the introduction of the euro brought in a ‘new’ 
anchor for euro firms, which triggered euro firm managers to adjust their nominal stock prices. 
Our findings have links, directly and indirectly, with many literatures.  The direct link is 
with Weld et al. (2009), who find that firms proactively use corporate actions like stock splits to 
keep their prices within a narrow trading range. Why? They conclude that it must be norms and 
traditions.  In our paper, we show that this phenomenon is global, and we therefore conclude that 
norms and traditions exist in all countries, not just in the U.S., as Weld et al. (2009) suggested.  
These norms and traditions, we find, are firm–specific.  Our paper also has a direct link to Dyl and 
Elliott (2006), who find that firms tailor their share prices around a specific range to reflect the 
desires of owners. 
The norm uncovered by the above two papers as well as our paper is the existence of an 
anchor price that firms try to target their nominal share price at.  Our paper, therefore, has an 
indirect link to the anchoring literature.  The underlying theme in this body of literature is that 
financial market participants make decisions based on a variety of anchors or reference points. 
George and Hwang (2004) observe that investors use the 52–week high as an “anchor” against 
which they value stocks.  Hirota and Sunder (2007) show in a laboratory experiment that if 
investors do not have dividend anchors, price bubbles tend to arise. Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) 
show that the 52–week high is used as a reference point for valuing corporations in mergers and 
acquisitions.  Li and Yu (2012) find that the predictability of the market index also demonstrates 
this 52–week high effect. Farrell, Krische, and Sedatole (2012) report that employees evaluating 
the value of their stock options use three simple anchors, one of which is simply the current stock 
price. Cen, Hilary, and Wei (2013) investigate the role of anchoring bias on financial analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. They find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s 
forecast earnings per share are lower (higher) than the industry median. Chang, Luo, and Ren 
(2014) observe that cum–day prices are the dominating anchor for ex–day stock valuation. Dougal, 
Engelberg, Parsons, and Van Wesep (2014) find that the path of credit spreads since a firm’s last 
loan influences the level at which it can currently borrow, indicating that even in a market as highly 
competitive as syndicated loans, behavioral biases play a role. Our study shows that the anchor of 
an initial nominal stock price that occurred as long as three decades ago still has a surprising effect 
on the current nominal stock price. 
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Incidentally, anchoring exists not just in financial markets but also in many other markets.
31
  
That leads to our last question. Why do firms use anchors? The anchoring literature, both in finance 
and other fields, suggests that it may be because their investors use anchors, and firms are just 
catering to their investors.  So our paper has important ramifications for the catering hypothesis 
(Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009)) literature as well as the investor recognition literature 
(Merton (1987)). 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2. describes our data sources, sample 
construction, and summary statistics. Section 3.3. analyzes the trends in nominal stock prices.  
Section 3.4. shows that the most important determinant of a nominal stock price is its historical 
nominal stock price. Section 3.5. investigates the role of corporate actions in managing the nominal 
stock price. Section 3.6. examines how the exogenous shock of introducing the euro in 1999 has 
exogenously affected anchors and the corporate actions undertaken to handle this.  Section 3.7. 
presents conclusions. 
 
3.2.  Data 
3.2.1. Nominal stock price 
We start with the 49 countries analyzed in La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), 
countries where the stock markets are reasonably large.  We then drop nine countries that have 
fewer than 40 firms on average or whose macro–economic data are not available in the World 
Bank database. These nine countries are Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. We also exclude Finland and Mexico because they have less 
than 10 yearly observations of nominal stock prices prior to their currency regime changes, on 
which we will elaborate later.  We collect, for the remaining 38 countries, nominal stock prices of 
firms listed on each country’s main organized exchange, in both the local currency and the U.S. 
dollar, at the end of June in each year from 1981 to 2010. We define the main organized exchange 
in a country as the exchange that holds the largest total stock market capitalization of the listed 
firms in that country. For example, the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, 
                                                          
31 Flood and Mussa (1994) discuss how important inflation anchors are in generating price–stability in monetary 
policy. Exchange rates serve as anchors (Edwards (1992)). Precedents in legal theory are nothing but anchors (see, for 
example, Diamond, Rose, Murphy, and Meixner (2011)). In labor economics, the concept of career anchors, first 
explored by Schein and Maanen (1990), is becoming a fruitful field of study. In marketing, it has been determined 
that the purchase decision and the sell decision use different anchors (see, Simonson and Drolet (2004)). In real estate, 
prior price discounts are often used as anchors in the housing choice decision (Arbel, Ben–Shahar, and Gabriel (2014)). 
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respectively, are the main exchanges in the United States and the United Kingdom. The nominal 
stock price data are obtained from Datastream. We require that our sample firms have at least 10 
consecutive yearly observations of nominal stock prices and market capitalizations. This 
restriction results in a sample of 21,285 firms from these 38 countries.  
The first four columns of Table 3–1 show the list of countries in the sample, the sample 
period in each country, the number of firms, and the name of the local currency. There is a large 
variation in the number of sample firms covered across countries ranging from a minimum of 44 
firms in Brazil to a maximum of 2,816 firms in the United States. For most countries, the sample 
period is 20 to 30 years. The last four columns of Table 3–1 present the mean and the median of 
the nominal stock prices in the local currency and in the US dollar for each country during the 
sample period. Table 3–1 also shows that the mean share price is much higher than the median 
share price in all countries. In quite a few cases, the mean price is several times higher than the 
median price, suggesting positively skewed distributions in nominal stock prices. An extreme case 
is Chile, where the mean price (3,813,682 pesos) is 13,620 times greater than the median price 
(280 pesos). There appears to be a few stocks with unusually high nominal stock prices in each 
country, and for this reason, we focus on the median prices in the analyses that follow. 
(SEE TABLE 3–1) 
We note that some of our sample countries have experienced regime changes with respect 
to their local currencies. For example, nine European countries in our sample adopted the common 
currency euro in 1999.
32  Turkey revalued its currency in 2005. In the Datastream database, the 
nominal stock prices in a country are recorded in the currency after the regime change (i.e., the 
euro for all euro–currency countries, and the new lira for Turkey). Old nominal stock prices prior 
to the regime change are converted by Datastream to new nominal stock prices using the 
conversion rate on the date of the regime change. For example, all local currency nominal prices 
in the euro area before January of 1999 were converted to and presented in euros using the fixed 
exchange rate set for each country on December 31, 1998. Similarly, Turkish lira before January 
1, 2005 was converted to and presented in the new currency using a fixed conversion rate set on 
December 31, 2004. 
If anchors exist in nominal stock prices, the last two currency regime changes are likely to 
                                                          
32 The number of euro countries in our sample becomes ten as Greece adopted the euro in January 1, 2001. 
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have disrupted the existing anchors. For this reason, they offer us a natural experiment to observe 
what happens before, during, and after the change. 
 
3.2.2. Other variables 
To check whether the stock price at the time of the initial public offering (IPO) serves as 
an anchor, we obtain a firm’s IPO price; 2,788 IPO prices in the 1991–2000 period are matched 
with our sample firms. We choose the sample period of 1991–2000 because IPO data in Global 
New Issues of SDC Platinum are incomplete before 1991
33
 and we require that the sample firms 
have at least 10 yearly observations of nominal stock prices after an IPO. 
We obtain the firms’ institutional ownership and industry classification data from 
Datastream. Institutional ownership is ownership defined as the proportion of shares exceeding 5% 
of the total shares outstanding held by institutional investors (such as pension funds and investment 
companies) among all shares outstanding. Datastream provides its own industry classification 
codes, which are based on Financial Times Stock Exchange’s (FTSE’s) industry classification. We 
use 19 different industry categories for our sample firms.  
We also collect from Datastream the total return index of each stock that captures the actual 
growth in the value of a share held over the previous year to the current year adjusted for all capital 
distributions, including cash dividends, stock splits, stock dividends, etc. The difference between 
the growth of the nominal share price and the growth of the total return index is due to corporate 
actions. We analyze this difference in a later section. 
 
3.3. Trends in Nominal Stock Prices 
3.3.1. Time–series trends of nominal stock prices 
In this section, we investigate the time–series trends of nominal stock prices. To obtain an overall 
picture of the trend in nominal stock prices, we examine the median nominal stock prices of the 
firms in our sample during the 1981–2010 period. To eliminate the potential effect of entry and 
exit of firms on the nominal stock price trend, and to eliminate stocks that have mid–period anchor 
changes (stocks from euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and Turkey), we include only 1,657 firms that had existed for 
                                                          
33 Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) and Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2010) note this. 
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the entire sample period. To obtain a single numeraire currency, we convert nominal stock prices 
in the local currency to the U.S. dollar using the 2000 U.S. dollar exchange rate (i.e., a fixed 
exchange rate). Using a fixed exchange rate removes the effect of exchange rate fluctuations. 
Figure 3–1 shows the trends. Panel A of Figure 3–1 depicts the trends of the median 
nominal stock prices and the median total return stock prices of the sample firms. The median 
nominal stock price in year t is the median of the dollar–denominated nominal stock prices of the 
sample firms in year t. The median total return stock price is the median of the adjusted stock 
prices, where the adjusted stock price reflects the actual growth in the value of a share held over 
the sample period assuming dividends are reinvested. We also present trends in the equal– and 
value–weighted total dollar–denominated index returns constructed from total returns of 1,657 
firms. Both indices are scaled at one U.S. dollar in 1981.  
The three time–series generated using the firms’ total returns and the indices continuously 
increase until 2008, suggesting that the actual total returns of the firms are positive during the 
sample period. However, the median nominal stock price is remarkably flat and stable throughout 
the sample period. This suggests that although firms generate positive returns, their nominal share 
prices are held roughly constant. The 2010 level of nominal stock prices is remarkably similar to 
the level of nominal stock prices that existed in 1981. The time series pattern of nominal stock 
prices is remarkably similar to the evidence presented by Dyl and Elliot (2006) in their analyses 
of U.S. firms’ nominal stock prices. Using 1,019 firms with continuous annual price data available 
for the period from 1976 through 2001, they show that the average nominal price of these firms 
changes remarkably little over the 26–year period when the S&P 500 Composite index 
appreciated by 1,063% and the NYSE Composite Index appreciated by 1,238%. 
Panel B of Figure 3–1 compares the level of the median nominal share price with the same 
three time–series of total return indices in Panel A adjusted for inflation. We use the U.S. consumer 
price index as the deflator. The figure shows that the three inflation–adjusted time series are still 
rising and are still above the median nominal stock price time series, suggesting that nominal stock 
prices do not even keep pace with inflation. This last conclusion is the same as that of Weld et al. 
(2009).  
 (SEE FIGURE 3–1) 
We now investigate this phenomenon of a stable median nominal stock price at the firm 
level.  The underlying motivation is simple.  One may observe a stable median nominal price level 
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even when no anchors exist in individual nominal prices.  This is possible because upward trends 
of some nominal stock prices may cancel out downward trends in other nominal stock prices such 
that one observes no trends in the mean or the median.  
 
3.3.2. Reversion of stock prices to initial price level: tercile analysis 
In this section, we examine whether a firm’s stock price tends to revert to its initial stock 
price level.  For each country in each year, we partition our sample firms into tercile groups based 
on their nominal stock price levels. We then keep track of a firm’s nominal price movements and 
the tercile groups to which it belongs year by year. 
Such an analysis can tell us how many firms remain within their initial tercile group over 
time.  If a large firm–specific shock hits a firm, whether positive or negative, its nominal stock 
price will likely deviate from its initial tercile group. If the firm’s manager allows this deviation, 
the nominal stock price will leave its initial tercile group. On the contrary, if the firm’s manager 
does not allow this deviation but “manages” the nominal share price by corporate actions such as 
stock splits, stock dividends, and reverse stock splits, the nominal stock price will revert back to 
the tercile group to which it initially belonged. 
Table 3–2 presents the results.
34  The column labeled “< 50%” refers to the number of firms 
that stay within their initial tercile group for less than 50% of their sample years. Similarly, the 
columns labeled “50% <= & <75%” and “>=75%” denote the number of firms that stay within 
their initial tercile group, respectively, between 50% and 75% and more than 75%, of their sample 
years.  
 The last row of the table shows that the nominal stock prices of 7,712 sample firms around 
the world stay in their initial tercile group for more than 75% of the time. These 7,712 firms 
comprise 39.6% of the total sample of 19,465 firms. If we calculate the percentage of firms that 
stay in their initial tercile group more than 50% of the time, the percentage rises to 62.9% (=23.3% 
+ 39.6%). When we examine this statistic country by country, we find that the majority of firms 
                                                          
34 In Table 3–2 and later tables, and in Figure 3–1, we exclude from our analysis observations after the introduction 
of the euro (January 1999) of euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain) and after currency devaluation of Turkish lira (January 2005).  This is because old anchors got 
disrupted after these regime changes.  Later, we use these anchor disruptions as a natural experiment. In Table 3–2, 
the number of firms drops to 19,465 from 21,285 in Table 3–1 as we drop the after-regime-change observations and 
again require firms to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations before the regime change.   
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stay in their initial tercile group more than half of the time for all countries except Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Thailand. 
(SEE TABLE 3–2) 
In sum, Table 3–2 shows that a majority of our sample firms remain in their initial nominal 
stock price tercile group most of the time. This finding further confirms our conjecture that most 
firms seem to have anchors. In the next section, we formally test the role of anchors in explaining 
nominal stock prices using a regression framework.  
 
3.4. Determinants of Nominal Stock Price: the Role of Anchor 
3.4.1. The role of the anchor price in predicting current nominal stock price level 
In this section, we investigate the role of an anchor in explaining nominal stock prices. We 
hypothesize that the initial stock price of a listed firm, an IPO price, may well serve as an anchor 
for future nominal stock prices.  This may occur if investors/managers tend to rely heavily on the 
first piece of price information offered, the IPO price, as ‘the anchor’.  Given the paucity of IPO 
price data, we use the initial nominal stock price of a firm when it first entered our sample period 
as a proxy for anchor price.  
To test whether initial stock prices are anchors, we examine the determinants of nominal 
stock prices using cross–sectional regressions, and check whether initial stock prices serve as the 
main determinant of the current nominal stock price levels, controlling for other important factors. 
We rely on prior literature to identify these other important factors.  Dyl and Elliott (2006), Baker, 
Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009), and Weld et al. (2009) show a strong cross–sectional relationship 
between a firm’s size and its nominal share price. Weld et al. (2009) also find an industry effect 
on nominal share prices in the U.S. stock markets. Ferreira and Matos (2008) report that 
institutional investors have a strong preference for the stocks of large firms with good governance 
around the world. Chang and Luo (2010) find that stocks with low R–squared have low prices, are 
more difficult to value, are subject to noise trading, and attract individual investors.  Hence, we 
include the firm’s stock market capitalization and institutional ownership in the regressions as the 
main control variables. We also include industry dummies to control for the industry effect on the 
nominal stock price level. 
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Macroeconomic variables may affect the firm’s nominal stock price level. Different levels 
of institutional development and cultural background in various countries may also influence the 
nominal stock price level. There is a large body of law and finance literature that show that the 
degree of investor protection affects many aspects of financial markets.
35
 When investor rights are 
well protected, small firms can have easy access to capital markets. When institutions are well 
developed, IPOs are actively pursued, and small firms with a low price level can be listed. This 
literature suggests that the degree of investor protection will be positively related to the 
proliferation of low–priced stocks.  
Cross–cultural differences can also explain nominal stock price levels across countries. For 
instance, Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions theory predicts that some countries tend to 
accommodate more uncertainty and risk, which may explain the significant presence of penny 
stocks in some countries that score low on the uncertainty avoidance index.
36
 There is also a 
growing body of literature in which a country’s religion affects investors’ risk preferences, which 
again may affect the presence of lottery–type, low–priced stocks in some countries.
37
  Instead of 
controlling for all these country–specific variables, we include the country dummy in our 
regressions. The country dummy variable captures time–invariant fixed effects as well as 
macroeconomic conditions at the country level. It should soak up the effects of not only the 
macroeconomic, institutional, and cultural aspects of a country but also other time–invariant 
features that we may have overlooked.  
One concern in the regression analysis is exchange rate changes.  To alleviate this concern, 
we convert the local currency prices to U.S. dollar prices with the exchange rates of June 2000, 
(i.e., fixed exchange rates).  Alternatively, we can add the gain and loss due to foreign currency 
translation in the regressions to control for it directly. The untabulated results using the latter 
approach remain similar.  
Table 3–3 presents the results of the cross–section OLS regressions of the firms’ nominal 
stock prices on country, industry, and firm characteristics and their initial nominal stock prices.  
                                                          
35 Many authors have contributed to this literature, but, according to our view, the most influential have been a series 
of papers by La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny. Their 1998 paper provides a good overview. 
36 Hofstede’s five culture dimensions are: (i) individualism–collectivism; (ii) uncertainty avoidance; (iii) masculinity–
femininity; (iv) power distance; and (v) long–term orientation. 
37 See, for example, Barberis and Huang (2008), Hilary and Hui (2009), Kumar (2009), and Kumar, Page, and Spalt 
(2011). 
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We run these cross–sectional regressions every year for 29 years, rather than pooled cross–section 
time–series regressions, and report the summary statistics of the coefficient estimates and the R–
squared.  We do this because we have a concern that the nominal stock price might be non–
stationary, and this would nullify the interpretations obtained in any panel regressions. Cross–
section regressions are free from any problems associated with the non–stationarity of the variable. 
While we do not utilize time–series feature of the data using panel regression approach, the cross–
sectional regressions can help us understand the role of an initial stock price or an IPO price as an 
anchor in explaining nominal stock prices.
38
 Instead of presenting all the 29 regression results in 
Table 3–3, we show aggregate cross–section regression outputs where coefficients and t–statistics 
are the weighted average derived from the cross–sectional regressions with the number of 
observations in each regression being the weight. We show the weighted average rather than the 
simple average of the coefficients, t–statistics, and R2, because the number of observations 
increases with time in general in our sample. Of all regressions, the numbers of coefficients that 
are positively and negatively significant at 10% level or less, respectively, are in square brackets. 
We also report R2 of the weighted–average, the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile 
at the bottom of the table.  
The initial stock prices are collected when the firms are initially included in the sample. 
The regressions cover the period of 1982 to 2010 because we need to use the 1981 price 
observation of each firm as the initial stock price. For firms that entered in our sample after 1981, 
the regressions are run one year after they enter. The (initial) nominal stock prices are winsorized 
at 1% and 99% levels to remove the effect of outliers. The stock market capitalization and the 
institutional ownership of each firm are winsorized in the same manner and lagged by one period.  
In Panel A of Table 3–3, we run the regressions using all sample firms regardless of their 
sample period. In column (1), we regress the nominal stock prices only on firms’ initial stock 
prices at the beginning of the sample. The overall coefficient estimates on initial stock price are 
positive and highly significant in all the 29 yearly cross–sectional regressions.  The weighted 
                                                          
38 For robustness, we do run a modified panel regression, and its results (unreported) are qualitatively similar to our 
cross–sectional results.  The modifications are as follows:  We first conduct a unit root test at the individual firm level. 
If a firm’s stock price does not have a unit root, the nominal stock prices may or may not be mean–reverting (i.e., have 
an anchor). If it has a unit root, the volatility of the nominal stock prices around the time trend is not finite, and it does 
not have an anchor. We include only the firms that have no unit roots in their nominal stock prices into the sample of 
panel regression analysis. 
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average (median) R2 is remarkably high at 0.60 (0.63).  This means that about 60% of the variation 
in the current nominal stock price can be explained by just one piece of time–invariant information: 
the initial nominal price at the beginning of the sample.  In 2010, for example, the information on 
the initial stock price is 29 years old, and yet, it has such high explanatory power to explain the 
variation in 2010 nominal stock prices. When we additionally include country fixed effects in 
column (2), the weighted average (median) R2 rises slightly to 0.64 (0.67). When we add industry 
fixed effects as regressors in column (3), the weighted average (median) R2 does not change.  In 
column (4), we just use firm size (measured as market value of equity of each firm) and the initial 
stock price as explanatory variables.  The estimates on the firm size are significant and positive at 
the 10% significance level or less for 27 times among 29 regressions, indicating that larger firms 
tend to command higher nominal share prices, an observation also made by Weld et al. (2009). 
However, the weighted average (median) R2 hardly changes; it is at 0.60 (0.63). In column (5), we 
include all variables available in addition to the initial stock price.  The weighted average (median) 
R2 is 0.64 (0.67).  In columns (6) and (7), we repeat columns (1) and (5), respectively, using the 
sample period of 2003–2010, during which we have the firms’ institutional ownership data 
available. Including the institutional ownership variable in addition to the other variables in 
column (7) does not increase the weighted average (median) R2 significantly compared to column 
(6) where only the initial stock price is included as a regressor (0.48 (0.52) from 0.44 (0.48)). The 
estimates on the institutional ownership are overall positive and significant for about half of the 
regressions.  
One concern with the results in Panel A of Table 3–3 is that the initial stock price at the 
beginning of the sample in Panel A may be too near its current nominal stock price, and this may 
drive the results.  In Panel B of Table 3–3, we restrict our dependent variable of nominal stock 
prices such that they are 10 or more years away from their initial stock prices.
39
  Even after we do 
this, we notice that in column (1) of Panel B, the initial stock price alone explains almost half of 
the variation in the nominal stock prices (weighted average (median) R2 of 0.44 (0.49)). Adding 
firm–level variables and country and industry fixed effects as regressors does not help boost the 
explanatory power, similar to the results in Panel A.  
                                                          
39 In Panel A of Table 3–4, the average time gap between the nominal stock prices and the initial stock prices is 9.76 
years. The gap becomes larger and is 15.61 years in Panel B.     
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In sum, the regression results in Table 3–3 show that the initial stock price, our proxy 
variable for anchor price, is the single most important variable that explains current nominal stock 
prices and that none of the other variables, whether they are firm–specific, industry–specific, or 
country–specific, matters much.  
(SEE TABLE 3–3) 
Table 3–4 presents the results of regressions similar to those used in Table 3–3 but with 
the firms’ IPO prices replacing their initial nominal stock prices. To the extent that IPO price 
serves as a better proxy for anchor price, we should expect a stronger result. The downside of using 
the IPO sample is that we have a much smaller sample size due to the lack of IPO prices for 
international firms.  The average sample size drops from 10,971 firms to 1,952 firms.  But the 
results of Panels A and B in Table 3–4 using IPO data are remarkably similar to those of the 
corresponding panels in Table 3–3. We find that the single most important variable that explains 
the current nominal stock price of a firm is its IPO price and that adding other firm–level and 
country–level variables do not add much power to explain the variation in nominal stock prices. 
 (SEE TABLE 3–4) 
 
3.4.2. Speed of nominal price adjustment to anchor price 
In this section, we estimate the speed of adjustment (SOA) of a firm’s nominal stock price 
in getting back to its anchor price.  We borrow the test methodology from Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008), who study the speed of leverage adjustment to the target leverage ratio. Similar to 
the regression model employed in Lemmon et al. (2008), we assume that nominal price change is 
a product of speed of adjustment and anchor price (“target price” in the terminology used by 
Lemmon et al. (2008)). We assume that anchor prices are determined by initial stock price, country, 
year (time), industry and firm fixed effects. Specifically, we run the following regression model 
of nominal stock prices.  
 
∆                 =    +                       +    +    +    +    –                      
      +                      +    +    +    +     −                       +      (1) 
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where υ , τ , ι , and ϕ   are country, year (time), industry, and firm fixed effects. Initial 
price and Nominal price refer to the firm’s initial stock price and nominal stock price, respectively. 
Initial price1f and Nominal price1 ft–1 (Initial price2f and Nominal price2 ft–1) are set to zero when 
the firm’s nominal stock price at t–1 is less than or equal to (greater than) its initial stock price. 
Ideally, we would like to measure the speed of adjustment partitioning the nominal stock prices 
depending on whether they are higher or lower than the anchor price, but since we do not know 
the anchor price, we partition the sample based on whether the nominal stock prices are higher or 
lower than their initial stock prices. 
The main parameters of interest are    and   , and β and β .    captures the speed of 
adjustment when the nominal price is above the initial price, whereas    captures the speed of 
adjustment when the nominal price is below or equal to the initial price. If    and    are positive, 
nominal stock prices approach the target price and these prices are mean–reverting. If they are 
negative, nominal stock prices move away from the target price and they are explosive. β and β   
measure the extent to which the initial stock price has an effect on the anchor price determination. 
If current nominal stock prices target only the initial stock prices, then the coefficient will be one. 
As for the computation of standard errors of   ,   , β , and β , we use the delta method, a first–
order approximation of the Taylor expansion, following Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008).
40
  
Table 3–5 presents the results of this test. The SOA estimates,    , are positive and 
significant in all regression models, indicating that nominal stock prices are indeed mean–reverting 
when the nominal stock prices are higher than the initial nominal stock price.  The coefficient 
estimates of the initial stock price (β ) are also significant and positive. This result implies that a 
firm’s initial nominal stock price level is an important anchor in guiding the level of its future 
nominal stock prices even when we control for the stock prices in the previous year.  In fact, the 
estimate of β  in column (1) in which we include only the firm’s initial price in the specification 
of the target price is 0.89. This estimate is very close to 1, and it suggests that the initial nominal 
price is a very strong anchor for the current nominal price.  The estimates of β  are all significantly 
positive, although their magnitude drops in columns (2), (3), and (4), where we add country, year, 
and industry fixed effects, but still are close to 1.  Finally, when we include only firm fixed effects 
                                                          
40 Calculating standard errors of the variables is not trivial; they are presented in the form of the variance of the product 
of two variables. This is not equal to the product of the variance of each variable: V(xy) ≠ V(x) × V(y). In computing 
V(f(x)) where f(X) = xy, we use the delta approximation of the Taylor expansion: f(x) ≈ f(a) + f′(a)(x – a). Then V(f(x)) 
= E[f(x) – f(µ)]2 = E[f(µ) + f′(µ)(x – µ) – f(µ)]2 = f′(µ) 2 E[x – µ]2 = f′(µ) 2 V(x).  
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in column (5), the estimate of the speed of adjustment jumps to 0.26. This result implies that time–
invariant firm–specific factors such as the initial level of a firm’s nominal stock price are the most 
important determinants of future nominal stock price levels. 
The SOA estimates,   , are also positive and significant in all regression models, indicating 
that nominal stock prices are indeed mean–reverting when they are lower than the initial nominal 
stock price.  Their magnitude does not decrease with the inclusion of country, year, and industry 
fixed effects.  However, the estimates of    are much smaller than those of   , and the estimates 
of β   become insignificant when country, year, and industry fixed effects are included.  This 
finding suggests that firms adjust their nominal stock prices more promptly toward their anchor 
prices when their nominal stock prices are high relative to the anchor price than when the stock 
prices are low relative to the anchor. It also suggests that the effect of the initial nominal price on 
future nominal stock prices is larger when the nominal stock prices are higher than when they are 
lower than the initial stock price. 
In sum, the results of the speed of price adjustment to the anchor indicate that a firm’s 
nominal stock price does mean–revert to its anchor price, and the main determinant of an anchor 
price is the firm’s initial stock price. 
(SEE TABLE 3–5) 
 
3.5. Corporate Actions and Anchoring 
The previous sections show that nominal stock prices tend to stay in their initial tercile 
group, and their initial stock prices in the remote past or their IPO prices are the best predictor of 
the firms’ current nominal stock prices. Formal tests show that these prices mean–revert to their 
initial nominal prices, particularly if the deviation from the initial stock price is high.  
In this section, we examine how the firms manage their nominal stock prices to target an 
anchor. Assuming that average stock returns are positive, nominal stock prices would increase 
with their accumulated earnings if the number of shares outstanding was left untouched and/or 
there were no payouts. Corporate actions such as stock splits and dividend payouts are the usual 
managerial instruments in curbing the explosion of the stock price when it becomes too high, 
whereas reverse stock splits are the main tool in preventing the implosion of the stock price when 
it becomes too low.  
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Ideally, we would like to document the actual corporate actions that force the nominal 
prices to change, but such data are not easily available to compile in an international setting. As 
an alternative approach, we proceed in the following way. We first compute the extent of deviation 
from the firms’ initial nominal stock price in the beginning of year t as in equation (2):  
 
Deviation (D) =
         –             
             
            (2) 
 
We then classify stocks in each country into three groups based on the extent of the 
deviation in the beginning of year t.  A firm belongs to group 1, 2, or 3 if D is less than –0.5, if D 
is between –0.5 and 0.5, or if D is greater than 0.5, respectively. Stocks in group 1 have their t–1 
share prices that are well below (where “well below” is defined as 50% or less) their anchors, 
stocks in group 2 have their t–1 nominal share prices that are close to their anchors, and stocks in 
group 3 have their t–1 nominal share prices that are much higher (where “much higher” is defined 
as 50% or more) than their anchors.  
 We then compute change in the nominal stock price (%) from t–1 to t as: 
 
Change in nominal stock price (%) =
                 ∗(               )
        
 × 100  (3) 
 
where total returnt is the actual growth in the value of a share held from year t–1 to year t adjusted 
for all capital distributions including dividends. Because corporate actions such as stock splits, 
dividend payouts, and reverse stock splits are likely causes for the difference between the actual 
total return of a share and the return on its nominal share prices, the change in (3) will be 0 if there 
are no such corporate actions. Based on this observation, we make the following assumption. If 
the change is over x% (or below –x%), this change is caused by corporate actions that force the 
nominal stock price to increase (decrease). Without corporate actions, a positive or negative x% 
change in nominal stock price is highly unlikely.  To be conservative, we assume x to be 20%. 
We now provide evidence that corporate actions may cause the nominal share price to 
mean–revert to an anchor.  Table 3–6 presents the number and percentage of nominal stock price 
changes due to corporate actions per country from July 1981 to June 2010 for firms that have at 
least 10 consecutive yearly observations. The first four columns of Table 3–6 list the name of the 
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country and the number of firm–year observations in each group, partitioned by the extent of the 
deviation of the nominal price from the initial price as explained in (2). The next six columns show 
the number of firm–year observations whose nominal stock prices are forced to increase by 
corporate actions and their percentages by each group, as explained in (3). The last six columns 
show the number of firm–year observations whose nominal stock prices are forced to decrease by 
corporate actions and their percentages by each group as explained in (3).  
The results in the last row of Table 3–6 shows that when the firms’ nominal stock prices 
fall by more than 50% compared to their initial stock prices (group 1), 2.25% of these firms 
increase their nominal share prices by corporate actions.  However, when the firms’ nominal stock 
prices rise by more than 50% compared to their initial stock prices (group 3), only 0.26% of these 
firms increase their nominal share prices.  This figure is almost 10 times lower.  We also see that 
when the firms’ nominal stock prices rise by more than 50% compared to their initial stock prices 
(group 3), 8.60% of these firms decrease their nominal share prices.  However, when the firms’ 
nominal stock prices fall by more than 50% compared to their initial stock prices (group 1), only 
4.17% of these firms decrease their nominal share prices by deliberate actions.  This figure is less 
than half. 
When we examine this pattern country by country, in 36 out of 38 countries, corporate 
actions increase nominal prices more often when their nominal stocks are considerably lower than 
their initial stock prices. In 34 out of 38 countries, corporate actions decrease nominal prices more 
often when their nominal stocks are considerably higher than their initial stock prices. 
We also note that the decrease in nominal stock price due to corporate actions such as stock 
splits and large dividend payouts is more frequent than the increase due to, for example, reverse 
stock splits. Firms tend to adjust their stock prices more promptly toward the initial price, or the 
anchor, when they are greater than the anchor. When the prices are lower than the anchor, the 
adjustment is slower.  This finding is consistent with the results in Table 3–5, which shows that 
the speed of adjustment to the initial nominal stock price is faster when the current nominal price 
is higher than the initial stock price, but the speed of adjustment is slower when the current nominal 
price is lower than the initial stock price. The fact that dividend payouts and stock splits are easier 
to do than reverse stock splits may drive the asymmetry. Further, negative dividends are not 
possible. 
(SEE TABLE 3–6) 
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3.6. Nominal Stock Price after Euro Introduction 
As of January 1, 1999, nominal stock prices in nine European Union members in our 
sample were converted to the euro using the fixed exchange rate set for each country on December 
31, 1998.
41
  This currency regime change, which entails the change of nominal price units, is a 
shock to old anchors.  This external shock offers us a natural experiment to investigate what 
happens before, during, and after the change.
42
  So far, in our analysis, we have excluded the euro 
countries after the introduction of the euro from the sample because their old anchors were 
disrupted.  In this section, we include them to find out what their new anchors are. 
In Figure 3–2, we draw the time–series pattern of the nominal stock prices for firms in euro 
countries and firms in non–euro European countries separately. The figure shows the trend of 
median nominal stock prices presented for the period 1987 to 2010.  We use the 2000 euro as the 
numeraire currency.  We partition the sample into two 12–year periods: 1987 to 1998 before the 
euro introduction and 1999 to 2010 after the euro introduction. We require that the firms be present 
during the entire 24–year period.  Therefore, we have 350 firms from the euro countries and 463 
firms from non–euro European countries.
43
 Plotted in Figure 3–2 are each sub–group’s average 
median nominal prices in each year for each sub–period.  
Figure 3–2 shows that the median of non–euro European firms’ nominal stock prices are 
quite stable throughout the entire sample period. This is similar to what we observe in Figure 3–1. 
However, the average of the median nominal stock prices of euro area firms, whose stock prices 
are being measured in euro instead of their local currency after January 1, 1999, dropped 
dramatically after the euro introduction. The average median nominal prices in the euro area 
dropped more than half (€25.0 from €61.4), whereas that of the non–euro European countries 
stayed almost the same.  
(SEE FIGURE 3–2) 
                                                          
41 The nominal stock prices of firms in Greece were converted to euro as of January 1, 2001. 
42 The reaction of the nominal stock prices to the regime change is an important empirical question, but beyond the 
scope of this study.  
43 We exclude firms from Greece that adopted the euro in 2001 to clearly compare before and after the initial 
introduction of the euro in 1999. Non–euro European countries are: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. 
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In Figure 3–3, we plot the trend of median absolute difference in nominal stock prices 
between euro firms and matching non–euro European firms. All nominal prices are at the end of 
June in each year and are measured in the 2000 euro term. We match 350 firms from euro countries 
in Figure 3–2 with non–euro European firms in Figure 3–2 with respect to industry and firm size. 
A matching firm is selected such that it has the closest market capitalization in the same industry 
as of the end of June in 1998. Figure 3–3 shows that the median absolute difference in nominal 
stock price between firms in euro countries and their matching firms in non–euro European 
countries significantly drops right after the euro introduction, narrowing the gap between euro 
firms and their comparable non–euro European neighbors. This suggests that the new anchors for 
the euro firms, whose old anchors got disrupted by the introduction of the euro in the beginning of 
1999, may possibly be the nominal prices of similar European firms that are outside the euro area. 
(SEE FIGURE 3–3) 
An interesting question is whether corporate actions facilitated the drop in the nominal 
stock price in the euro area.  To answer this, we examine the number and percentage of firms 
whose nominal stock prices in local currency decrease due to corporate actions.  We use the same 
methodology as in Table 3–6.  However, here we focus on firms that took corporate actions to 
reduce the nominal prices. 
Table 3–7 presents the statistics by year for euro and non–euro European countries, for 
firms that had been present during the entire period of July 1998 to June 2010. Thus we have 1,068 
firms for euro countries and 1,037 firms for non–euro European countries for this experiment. 
Columns 3 and 5 in Table 3–7 present the percentage of firms that took corporate actions to 
decrease the nominal share prices for euro countries and non–euro European countries, 
respectively. We notice that a much higher percentage of the euro firms decreases their stock prices 
by corporate actions right after the euro introduction (1999 and 2000).  These percentages in 1999 
and 2000 are 11.0% and 15.2%, respectively, and they are much higher than the corresponding 
percentages for the non–euro European firms in 1999 and 2000 (5.6% and 7.3%, respectively). It 
is interesting to observe that after these two years, there appears to be little difference between the 
percentages of euro and non–euro European firms that reduce their nominal share prices by 
corporate actions.   
The results in Table 3–7, along with Figure 3–2 and 3–3, seem to suggest that more firms 
in the euro area intentionally decreased their stock prices after the regime change. Why did this 
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happen? We believe that currency regime changes are likely to disrupt existing anchors present in 
nominal prices that investors/managers have been accustomed to. The introduction of the euro is 
likely to have made the ‘old’ anchor disappear and brought in a ‘new’ anchor for euro firms. It is 
plausible that the new anchors will be nominal prices of other European firms that are not in the 
euro area. One looks for one’s neighborhood for a ‘norm’. Realizing that their nominal prices in 
the new currency will be much higher than the nominal prices of non–euro European firms, euro 
firm managers brought down their stock prices by corporate actions like stock splits or dividend 
payouts. In other words, euro firm managers adjust their stock prices to a ‘new’ anchor, the 
nominal stock prices of other non–euro European firms. We see this happening in Figures 3–2 and 
3–3.  This is consistent with the overall story in Table 3–5, where we observe that corporate actions 
deliberately bring down the nominal share prices if they are higher than the anchor.  Here the new 
anchor was nominal prices of other European firms that were not in the euro area. 
(SEE TABLE 3–7) 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we revisit Weld et al.’s (2009) observation that the average nominal share 
price of NYSE and AMEX stocks has been approximately $25 since the Great Depression and this 
“nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. or North American phenomenon.” Using a larger data 
set of nominal stock prices of individual firms from 38 countries around the world, we compile 
some evidence of the existence of an anchor price in most countries. The nominal price fixation 
does not appear to be primarily a U.S. or North American phenomenon, but rather a global 
phenomenon.  In other words, anchors are norms (a point made in Weld et al (2009), and norms 
exist in all countries.  
We also find that the best predictor of a firm’s current stock price is its initial nominal stock 
price, suggesting that subsequent nominal stock prices tend to revert back to their initial nominal 
prices. The reversion, we document, is stronger if nominal prices are higher than the anchor than 
when they are lower than the anchor. 
Further tests indicate that corporate actions, such as stock splits, dividend payouts, and 
even reverse stock splits, are responsible for this curious phenomenon. We see this quite 
dramatically during the introduction of the euro in 1999, where corporate actions in euro firms 
adjusted very fast to the disappearance of old anchors and the birth of new anchors. 
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We do not answer why firms anchor.  It is a puzzle.  We leave it to future research to 
explore the motivations of corporations to anchor their nominal share price.  
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Figure 3–1: Trends of median nominal and median total return stock price, equally– and value–weighted total 
return index 
Panel A shows the trend of median nominal and median total return stock prices denominated in 2000 U.S. dollar, 
equally– and value–weighted total return index for the period 1981 to 2010 for 1,657 firms that had been present 
during the whole sample period. Euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and Turkey are excluded. The median total return price is the median of the adjusted 
stock prices where the adjusted stock price reflects the actual growth in value of a share held over the sample period 
assuming dividends are reinvested. Equal– and value–weighted total return indices are constructed using 1,657 firms’ 
adjusted stock prices where value–weighted is weighted by firms’ market capitalizations. Both indices are scaled as 1 
U.S. dollar in 1981.  Panel B shows the trend of median nominal and deflated median total return stock prices, deflated 
equally– and value–weighted total return index.  The last three series are deflated by the consumer price index of the 
U.S.  
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B. Median nominal stock price in comparison with inflation–adjusted total return stock price and indices 
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Figure 3–2: Trend of median nominal stock price of euro and non–euro European countries in euro 
The figure shows the trend of median nominal stock prices in 2000 euro at the end of June in each year for 1987 to 
2010, partitioned into two 12–year periods (1987 to 1998, and 1999 to 2010), for firms that had been present during 
the entire 1987 to 2010 period. Firms are divided into two groups: 350 firms from the euro countries (excluding Greece 
which adopted the euro in Jan. 2001) and 463 firms from non–euro European countries. Euro countries are Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Non–euro European countries are 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. The “average” is the average of each year’s median nominal 
price for each sub–group for each sub–period.  
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Figure 3–3: Trend of median absolute difference in nominal stock price in euro between firms in euro countries 
and their matching firms in non–euro European countries 
The figure shows the trend of median absolute difference in nominal stock prices between euro firms and matching 
non–euro European firms. All nominal prices are at the end of June each year and are measured in the 2000 euro term. 
The sample firms in the figure have to have been present during the entire 1987 to 2010 period. 350 firms from euro 
countries in Figure 3–2 are matched with non–euro European firms in Figure 3–2 with respect to industry and firm 
size. A matching firm is selected such that it has the closest market capitalization in the same industry as of the end 
of June in 1998. Euro countries include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain (excluding Greece which adopted the euro in Jan. 2001). Non–euro European countries include Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.  
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Table 3–1: Mean and median of nominal stock prices per country 
This table shows the mean and median of nominal stock prices at the end of June in each year from 1981 to 2010. To 
be included in the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations.  
 
Country Period 
No. of 
firms 
Local currency USD 
Name Mean Median Mean Median 
Argentina 94 ~ 10 80 Argentine peso 4.6 2.0 2.4 1.0 
Australia 81 ~ 10 1,154 Australian dollar 2.2 0.4 1.6 0.3 
Austria 86 ~ 10 114 Euro* 143.7 47.5 164.5 55.1 
Belgium 81 ~ 10 206 Euro* 249.5 72.6 287.1 79.3 
Brazil 94 ~ 10 44 Real 90.3 25.0 55.8 13.5 
Canada 81 ~ 10 1,351 Canadian dollar 9.3 3.1 7.3 2.4 
Chile 90 ~ 10 208 Chilean peso 3,813,682 280.0 7,748.5 0.6 
Colombia 95 ~ 10 51 Colombian peso 5,436.4 1,500.0 2.8 0.8 
Denmark 87 ~ 10 224 Danish krone 1,609.8 335.0 248.9 51.2 
Egypt 97 ~ 10 95 Egyptian pound 58.3 24.4 12.6 5.0 
France 81 ~ 10 966 Euro* 109.5 40.9 125.9 45.5 
Germany 81 ~ 10 846 Euro* 134.9 36.5 152.3 41.4 
Greece 88 ~ 10 279 Euro* 8.5 4.0 11.0 4.8 
Hong Kong 81 ~ 10 736 Hong Kong dollar 4.4 1.0 0.6 0.1 
India 90 ~ 10 1,524 Indian rupee 51.0 9.2 1.4 0.2 
Indonesia 91 ~ 10 264 Rupiah 2,849.2 850.4 0.7 0.1 
Ireland 86 ~ 10 71 Euro* 4.3 2.0 5.1 2.3 
Israel 86 ~ 10 559 New shekel 128.7 6.9 43.1 1.9 
Italy 81 ~ 10 312 Euro* 6.7 3.1 8.4 3.9 
Japan 81 ~ 10 2,343 Yen 10,720.2 706.0 93.1 5.8 
Malaysia 86 ~ 10 721 Ringgit 3.4 1.9 1.2 0.5 
Netherlands 81 ~ 10 233 Euro* 118.6 24.7 127.3 27.2 
New Zealand 99 ~ 10 66 
New Zealand 
dollar 2.3 1.4 1.4 0.8 
Norway 81 ~ 10 180 Norwegian krone 166.1 88.5 24.0 12.7 
Pakistan 93 ~ 10 301 Pakistani rupee 63.6 18.0 1.2 0.3 
Peru 92 ~ 10 126 Nuevo sol 149.6 1.6 48.3 0.6 
Philippines 90 ~ 10 209 Philippine peso 41.5 1.8 1.2 0.0 
Portugal 88 ~ 10 116 Euro* 10.2 6.5 12.4 7.9 
Singapore 83 ~ 10 369 Singapore dollar 2.3 0.9 1.4 0.5 
South Africa 81 ~ 10 463 Rand 22.6 5.0 5.4 1.0 
South Korea 85 ~ 10 785 Won 21,307 12,450 22.8 13.7 
Spain 87 ~ 10 170 Euro* 23.9 13.5 30.2 16.2 
Sweden 82 ~ 10 325 Krona 98.6 63.0 13.4 8.2 
Switzerland 81 ~ 10 298 Swiss franc 1,397.9 510.0 925.0 348.9 
Thailand 89 ~ 10 385 Baht 76.6 22.7 2.7 0.6 
Turkey 92 ~ 10 272 Turkish lira** 16.1 4.2 123.0 5.2 
United 
Kingdom 81 ~ 10 2,023 British pound 3.3 1.2 5.4 2.0 
United States 81 ~ 10 2,816 US dollar 51.3 21.9 51.3 21.9 
Total 81 ~ 10 21,285    135.9 4.0 
 * Local currencies before January 1999 (2001) were converted to euro using fixed exchange rates set  
    on December 31, 1998 (2000 for Greece). 
** Old currencies before January 2005 were converted to new currencies using fixed conversion rates 
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Table 3–2: Percentage of firms whose stock prices in local currency remain in their initial tercile groups per 
country 
This table presents the number and percentage of firms whose stock prices remain in their initial tercile groups for a 
certain percentage of the time for which they are in the sample. The nominal stock prices for each year are determined 
at the end of June in each year for the period 1981 to 2010. Observations after the introduction of the euro (Jan. 1999) 
of euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and 
after currency devaluation of Turkish lira (Jan. 2005) are excluded. To be included in the sample, firms are required 
to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations. Nominal stock prices for each country in each year are partitioned 
by tercile groups and are assigned into a tercile group. The initial tercile group for a firm is the tercile group that it 
belongs to when it is initially included in the sample period. The column labeled “< 50%” refers to the number (or the 
percentage) of firms that stay within their initial tercile group less than 50% of their sample years. Similarly, the 
columns labeled “50% <= & <75%” and “>=75%” denote the number (or the percentage) of firms that stay within 
their initial tercile group between 50% and 75%, and greater than 75%, of their sample years.  
 
Country Period 
Number of firms 
B/A (%) 
all (A) 
that remain in their initial 
tericle group during sample period (B) 
< 50% 
50% <= 
& < 75% 
>= 75% < 50% 
50% <= 
& <75% 
>= 75% 
Argentina 94 ~ 10 80 33 22 25 41.3 27.5 31.3 
Australia 81 ~ 10 1,154 390 298 466 33.8 25.8 40.4 
Austria 86 ~ 98 51 17 11 23 33.3 21.6 45.1 
Belgium 81 ~ 98 110 32 18 60 29.1 16.4 54.5 
Brazil 94 ~ 10 44 16 15 13 36.4 34.1 29.5 
Canada 81 ~ 10 1,351 440 310 601 32.6 22.9 44.5 
Chile 90 ~ 10 208 44 28 136 21.2 13.5 65.4 
Colombia 95 ~ 10 51 11 9 31 21.6 17.6 60.8 
Denmark 87 ~ 10 224 94 69 61 42.0 30.8 27.2 
Egypt 97 ~ 10 95 39 21 35 41.1 22.1 36.8 
France 81 ~ 98 437 148 93 196 33.9 21.3 44.9 
Germany 81 ~ 98 355 97 86 172 27.3 24.2 48.5 
Greece 88 ~ 98 71 14 18 39 19.7 25.4 54.9 
Hong Kong 81 ~ 10 736 341 171 224 46.3 23.2 30.4 
India 90 ~ 10 1,524 602 415 507 39.5 27.2 33.3 
Indonesia 91 ~ 10 264 138 62 64 52.3 23.5 24.2 
Ireland 86 ~ 98 53 19 6 28 35.8 11.3 52.8 
Israel 86 ~ 10 559 202 118 239 36.1 21.1 42.8 
Italy 81 ~ 98 180 44 34 102 24.4 18.9 56.7 
Japan 81 ~ 10 2,343 818 503 1,022 34.9 21.5 43.6 
Malaysia 86 ~ 10 721 342 171 208 47.4 23.7 28.8 
Netherlands 81 ~ 98 177 76 37 64 42.9 20.9 36.2 
New Zealand 99 ~ 10 66 6 15 45 9.1 22.7 68.2 
Norway 81 ~ 10 180 66 47 67 36.7 26.1 37.2 
Pakistan 93 ~ 10 301 91 62 148 30.2 20.6 49.2 
Peru 92 ~ 10 126 31 38 57 24.6 30.2 45.2 
Philippines 90 ~ 10 209 69 38 102 33.0 18.2 48.8 
Portugal 88 ~ 98 69 18 19 32 26.1 27.5 46.4 
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Singapore 83 ~ 10 369 142 84 143 38.5 22.8 38.8 
South Africa 81 ~ 10 463 121 100 242 26.1 21.6 52.3 
South Korea 85 ~ 10 785 413 190 182 52.6 24.2 23.2 
Spain 87 ~ 98 94 31 18 45 33.0 19.1 47.9 
Sweden 82 ~ 10 325 134 78 113 41.2 24.0 34.8 
Switzerland 81 ~ 10 298 113 83 102 37.9 27.9 34.2 
Thailand 89 ~ 10 385 200 88 97 51.9 22.9 25.2 
Turkey 92 ~ 04 168 82 31 55 48.8 18.5 32.7 
United Kingdom 81 ~ 10 2,023 741 432 850 36.6 21.4 42.0 
United States 81 ~ 10 2,816 999 701 1,116 35.5 24.9 39.6 
Total 81 ~ 10 19,465 7,214 4,539 7,712 37.1 23.3 39.6 
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Table 3–3: Cross–section regressions of nominal stock prices on firm’s IPO prices 
This table presents the result of cross–section regressions of firms’ nominal stock prices at the end of June in each 
year for the period from 1982 to 2010 on country/firm characteristics and their IPO prices. The coefficients and t–
statistics in parentheses (which are based on White heteroscedasticity–corrected standard errors) are weighted 
averages derived from the cross–section regressions, the number of observations in the regressions being the weight. 
The number of coefficients that are positively and negatively significant at 10% level or less, respectively, are in 
brackets. Observations after the introduction of the euro (Jan. 1999) of euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and after currency devaluation of Turkish lira (Jan. 
2005) are excluded. To be included in the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations. 
IPO prices in local currency are converted to the U.S. dollar prices with exchange rates at the end of June 2000. The 
firm–level independent variables are lagged by 1 period and all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles. 
IPO price is the price offered by a firm in IPO expressed in 2000 US dollar. Log (market value of equity) is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s share price in 2000 million U.S. dollar multiplied by its number of shares outstanding. 
Institutional ownership is strategic ownership collected from Datastream which defines it as the proportion of shares 
exceeding 5 % of total shares outstanding held by institutional investors such as pension funds and investment 
companies among all shares outstanding (%). Industry classification is Datastream level 2 group (19 industries) based 
on FTSE’s industry classification benchmark. 
 
Variables 
Panel A: All sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IPO 0.84      0.81 
price (10.28)      (11.43) 
 [16,0]      [8,0] 
Log (market value  13.68    10.78 3.20 
of equity)  (3.76)    (3.52) (2.82) 
  [16,0]    [8,0] [7,0] 
Institutional      0.04 0.02 0.00 
ownership     (0.89) (0.42) (0.08) 
     [2,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
Constant 0.85 6.70 3.19 3.21 11.93 2.95 –0.78 
 (0.47) (5.30) (3.46) (5.87) (5.76) (0.82) (–0.18) 
 [11,2] [19,0] [16,0] [16,0] [8,0] [0,0] [0,0] 
Country fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
No. of regressions 19 19 19 19 8 8 8 
Average no. of firms 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 2,138 2,138 2,138 
R2: average 0.66 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.71 
      25th 0.46 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.61 
      median 0.61 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.75 
      75th 0.79 0.19 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.84 
Adj. R2: average 0.66 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.71 
Variables 
Panel B: Sample of nominal prices that are 10 or more years 
away from the IPO price 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IPO 0.76      0.77 
price (5.82)      (6.87) 
 [9,0]      [8,0] 
Log (market value  9.98    10.00 3.27 
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of equity)  (3.46)    (3.24) (2.35) 
  [10,0]    [7,0] [6,0] 
Institutional      0.03 0.02 0.01 
ownership     (0.72) (0.55) (0.55) 
     [2,0] [0,0] [1,0] 
Constant 0.76 3.16 4.71 3.17 9.25 4.07 –25.39 
 (1.17) (3.25) (2.83) (5.34) (5.05) (0.69) (–1.08) 
 [3,0] [9,0] [8,0] [10,0] [8,0] [0,0] [0,1] 
Country fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
No. of regressions 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 
Average no. of firms 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,353 1,353 1,353 
R2: average 0.61 0.20 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.69 
      25th 0.47 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.67 
      median 0.66 0.20 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.78 
      75th 0.72 0.26 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.82 
Adj. R2: average 0.61 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.68 
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Table 3–4: Cross–section regressions of nominal stock prices on firm’s initial stock prices 
This table presents the result of cross–section regressions of firms’ nominal stock prices at the end of June in each 
year for the period from 1982 to 2010 on country/firm characteristics and their initial nominal stock prices. The 
coefficients and t–statistics in parentheses (which are based on White heteroscedasticity–corrected standard errors) 
are weighted averages derived from the cross–section regressions, the number of observations in the regressions being 
the weight. The number of coefficients that are positively and negatively significant at 10% level or less, respectively, 
are in brackets. Observations after the introduction of the euro (Jan. 1999) of euro countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and after currency devaluation of Turkish lira (Jan. 
2005) are excluded. To be included in the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations. 
Stock prices in local currency are converted to the U.S. dollar prices with exchange rates at the end of June 2000. The 
firm–level independent variables are lagged by 1 period and all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles. 
Initial stock price for a firm is the stock price when it is initially included in the sample as expressed in 2000 US dollar. 
Log (market value of equity) is the natural logarithm of a firm’s share price in 2000 million U.S. dollar multiplied by 
its number of shares outstanding. Institutional ownership is strategic ownership collected from Datastream which 
defines it as the proportion of shares exceeding 5 % of total shares outstanding held by institutional investors such as 
pension funds and investment companies among all shares outstanding (%). Industry classification is Datastream level 
2 group (19 industries) based on FTSE’s industry classification benchmark.  
 
Variables 
Panel A: All sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Initial  0.62      0.43 
Stock price (31.06)      (14.37) 
 [29,0]      [8,0] 
Log (market value  3.35    2.53 1.61 
of equity)  (7.91)    (6.93) (6.11) 
  [29,0]    [8,0] [8,0] 
Institutional      0.08 0.12 0.05 
ownership     (3.05) (3.89) (2.04) 
     [6,0] [7,0] [5,0] 
Constant 7.19 20.98 34.04 13.04 14.99 –1.81 0.36 
 (18.04) (26.16) (5.28) (9.35) (16.45) (–0.84) (–0.13) 
 [29,0] [29,0] [28,0] [29,0] [8,0] [0,2] [0,2] 
Country fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
No. of regressions 29 29 29 29 8 8 8 
Average no. of firms 10,971 10,971 10,971 10,971 10,254 10,254 10,254 
R2: average 0.60 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.48 
      25th 0.54 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.41 
      median 0.63 0.01 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.52 
      75th 0.72 0.03 0.65 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.54 
Adj. R2: average 0.60 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.48 
Variables 
Panel B: Sample of nominal prices that are 10 or more years 
away from the initial nominal price 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Initial  0.50      0.26 
Stock price (16.50)      (5.15) 
 [20,0]      [8,0] 
Log (market value  2.73    2.17 1.74 
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of equity)  (8.18)    (6.39) (6.31) 
  [20,0]    [8,0] [8,0] 
Institutional      0.08 0.06 0.04 
ownership     (2.71) (2.08) (1.49) 
     [4,0] [5,0] [3,0] 
Constant 9.30 18.52 22.01 12.93 14.49 –0.08 0.62 
 (16.62) (19.88) (4.21) (8.06) (15.59) (–0.12) (0.09) 
 [20,0] [20,0] [19,0] [20,0] [8,0] [0,0] [0,1] 
Country fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
No. of regressions 20 20 20 20 8 8 8 
Average no. of firms 7,149 7,149 7,149 7,149 7,899 7,899 7,899 
R2: average 0.44 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.36 
      25th 0.37 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.34 
      median 0.49 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.37 
      75th 0.58 0.03 0.60 0.02 0.00 0.33 0.40 
Adj. R2: average 0.44 0.02 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.36 
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Table 3–5: Speed of adjustment of nominal stock prices 
This table presents the result of the following regression model of nominal stock prices at the end of June in each year 
for the period 1982 to 2010: 
 
∆                  =    +        ∗                 +    +    +    +    –                      
            +        ∗                 +    +    +    +     −                       +     
 
where υ , τ , ι , and ϕ   are country, year (time), industry, and firm fixed effects and Initial price and Nominal price 
refer to the firm’s initial stock price and nominal stock price at t–1, respectively. Initial price1f and Nominal price1 ft–1 
(Initial price2f and Nominal price2 ft–1) are set to zero when the firm’s nominal stock price at t–1 is less than or equal 
to (greater than) its initial stock price. To be included in the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive 
yearly observations. Observations after the introduction of the euro (Jan. 1999) of euro countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and after currency devaluation of Turkish 
lira (Jan. 2005) are excluded. Stock prices in local currency are converted to the U.S. dollar prices with exchange rates 
at the end of June 2000 and winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles. Industry classification is Datastream level 2 group 
(19 industries) based on FTSE’s industry classification benchmark. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level. Standard errors of γ , γ , β , and β  are derived using 
the delta method. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                      >                 
Speed of adjustment (  ) 0.10
*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.26*** 
 (10.25) (11.57) (11.42) (11.46) (33.65) 
Initial Stock price (  ) 0.89
*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63***  
 (10.14) (6.72) (6.59) (6.63)  
                     ≤                 
Speed of adjustment (  ) 0.06
*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.19*** 
 (13.18) (13.27) (13.21) (13.35) (18.29) 
Initial Stock price (  ) 0.23
*** 0.04 0.05 0.05  
 (7.54) (0.95) (1.04) (1.14)  
Constant 0.99*** 0.59** –3.18*** –3.48*** 5.34*** 
 (23.21) (2.50) (–9.21) (–9.62) (29.81) 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes No 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes 
No. of observations 318,181 318,181 318,181 318,181 318,181 
R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12 
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Table 3–6: Change (increase / decrease) in nominal stock price in local currency due to corporate actions per country 
This table presents the number and percentage of nominal stock prices in local currency that change (increase / decrease) due to corporate actions per country for 
July 1981 to June 2010, where firms’ nominal stock prices in each country are divided into 3 groups with respect to the deviation defined as:  
Deviation (D) =
         –             
             
 
 
A firm’s stock belongs to group 1, 2, or 3 if D is less than –0.5, if D is between –0.5 and 0.5 (inclusive), or if D is greater than 0.5, respectively. To be included in 
the sample, firms are required to have at least 10 consecutive yearly observations. Observations after the introduction of the euro (Jan. 1999) of euro countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and after currency devaluation of Turkish lira (Jan. 2005) are 
excluded. The nominal stock prices are yearly observations at the end of June in each year for 1981 ~ 2010. Change in nominal stock price due to corporate actions 
(%) is defined as: 
Change in nominal stock price (%) =
                 ∗(               )
        
 × 100 
 
where total returnt is the actual growth in value of a share held from t–1 to t adjusted for all capital distributions including dividends. If it is over 20% (or below –
20%), it is assumed there is an increase (decrease) in nominal stock price due to corporate actions such as reverse stock splits (stock splits or large dividend payouts).  
 
Country 
No. of firm/year observations Increase Decrease 
By Group (A) No. by Group (B) B / A (%)  No. by Group (C) C / A (%) 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Argentina 354 460 245 4 6 0 1.13 1.30 0.00 27 48 32 7.63 10.43 13.06 
Australia 5,353 5,600 5,029 364 98 25 6.80 1.75 0.50 173 186 200 3.23 3.32 3.98 
Austria 94 278 139 2 2 0 2.13 0.72 0.00 2 24 15 2.13 8.63 10.79 
Belgium 119 457 742 1 0 1 0.84 0.00 0.13 0 9 28 0.00 1.97 3.77 
Brazil 203 114 226 3 2 1 1.48 1.75 0.44 19 25 50 9.36 21.93 22.12 
Canada 5,119 7,257 6,986 255 107 77 4.98 1.47 1.10 111 209 395 2.17 2.88 5.65 
Chile 522 712 2,074 5 1 2 0.96 0.14 0.10 40 39 84 7.66 5.48 4.05 
Colombia 124 251 243 2 0 0 1.61 0.00 0.00 11 7 10 8.87 2.79 4.12 
Denmark 1,061 1,678 875 2 11 0 0.19 0.66 0.00 52 93 127 4.90 5.54 14.51 
Egypt 516 375 129 2 0 0 0.39 0.00 0.00 104 67 26 20.16 17.87 20.16 
France 696 2,076 1,826 3 2 1 0.43 0.10 0.05 27 162 169 3.88 7.80 9.26 
Germany 308 2,015 1,789 6 7 0 1.95 0.35 0.00 24 79 123 7.79 3.92 6.88 
Greece 109 264 261 0 1 0 0.00 0.38 0.00 12 58 54 11.01 21.97 20.69 
Hong Kong 5,244 3,764 2,517 336 55 18 6.41 1.46 0.72 257 315 210 4.90 8.37 8.34 
India 11,274 6,133 3,272 30 11 1 0.27 0.18 0.03 270 227 186 2.39 3.70 5.68 
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Indonesia 2,671 896 302 21 1 0 0.79 0.11 0.00 233 188 59 8.72 20.98 19.54 
Ireland 83 262 192 2 1 0 2.41 0.38 0.00 2 16 15 2.41 6.11 7.81 
Israel 3,169 2,989 2,421 33 3 3 1.04 0.10 0.12 110 165 105 3.47 5.52 4.34 
Italy 648 1,075 427 10 6 2 1.54 0.56 0.47 51 101 47 7.87 9.40 11.01 
Japan 13,097 19,276 14,531 36 18 3 0.27 0.09 0.02 182 372 214 1.39 1.93 1.47 
Malaysia 4,464 3,649 3,054 53 11 4 1.19 0.30 0.13 222 319 358 4.97 8.74 11.72 
Netherlands 452 962 927 1 0 1 0.22 0.00 0.11 10 56 127 2.21 5.82 13.70 
New Zealand 124 337 180 10 2 2 8.06 0.59 1.11 8 16 9 6.45 4.75 5.00 
Norway 948 998 555 18 2 0 1.90 0.20 0.00 67 85 92 7.07 8.52 16.58 
Pakistan 1,168 1,605 1,145 4 2 1 0.34 0.12 0.09 113 203 202 9.67 12.65 17.64 
Peru 557 603 486 4 0 1 0.72 0.00 0.21 74 98 97 13.29 16.25 19.96 
Philippines 1,265 983 910 28 36 31 2.21 3.66 3.41 84 104 79 6.64 10.58 8.68 
Portugal 362 231 16 1 0 0 0.28 0.00 0.00 28 24 3 7.73 10.39 18.75 
Singapore 2,078 2,575 928 18 1 2 0.87 0.04 0.22 133 217 98 6.40 8.43 10.56 
South Africa 1,482 2,019 2,848 43 6 3 2.90 0.30 0.11 88 156 187 5.94 7.73 6.57 
South Korea 4,058 4,390 5,178 247 33 12 6.09 0.75 0.23 257 377 420 6.33 8.59 8.11 
Spain 313 406 151 1 4 1 0.32 0.99 0.66 15 30 9 4.79 7.39 5.96 
Sweden 1,713 1,553 900 50 14 0 2.92 0.90 0.00 103 150 170 6.01 9.66 18.89 
Switzerland 1,920 2,151 940 4 0 0 0.21 0.00 0.00 100 117 106 5.21 5.44 11.28 
Thailand 4,476 1,266 373 31 4 2 0.69 0.32 0.54 299 181 59 6.68 14.30 15.82 
Turkey 387 460 833 1 0 2 0.26 0.00 0.24 161 247 432 41.60 53.70 51.86 
United Kingdom 7,118 11,397 13,304 279 46 30 3.92 0.40 0.23 172 418 865 2.42 3.67 6.50 
United States 6,716 23,909 15,222 125 49 15 1.86 0.20 0.10 128 1,726 2,465 1.91 7.22 16.19 
Total 90,365 115,426 92,176 2,035 542 241 2.25 0.47 0.26 3,769 6,914 7,927 4.17 5.99 8.60 
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Table 3–7: Number and percentage of decrease in nominal stock price in local currency due to corporate actions 
by year for euro and non–euro European countries 
This table presents the number and percentage of the firms whose nominal stock prices in local currency decrease due 
to corporate actions by year for euro (excluding Greece which adopted the euro in Jan. 2001) and non–euro European 
countries, for firms that had been present during the entire period of July 1998 to June 2010. A (%) and B (%) present 
the percentage of those firms, out of the total firms in each subgroup, which decrease their nominal stock price by 
corporate actions. Euro countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain (excluding Greece which adopted the euro in Jan. 2001). Non–euro European countries are Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. The nominal stock prices are yearly observations at the end of June in each year. 
Change in nominal stock price due to corporate actions (%) is defined as: 
 
Change in nominal stock price (%) =
                 ∗(               )
        
 × 100 
 
where total returnt is the actual growth in value of a share held from t–1 to t adjusted for all capital distributions 
including dividends. If it is below –20%, it is assumed there is a decrease in nominal stock price due to corporate 
actions such as stock splits or large dividend payouts. The t–statistics in parentheses are the result of the test of mean 
equality and are based on the assumption of unequal variances of the two subsamples. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Period 
Euro countries  
 (1,068 firms) 
Non–euro European countries  
(1,037 firms) 
A – B (%p) 
No. of firms A (%) No. of firms B (%) 
1998.7 ~ 1999.6 117 11.0 58 5.6 5.4 (4.49)*** 
1999.7 ~ 2000.6 162 15.2 76 7.3 7.9 (5.75)*** 
2000.7 ~ 2001.6 87 8.1 67 6.5 1.6 (1.49) 
2001.7 ~ 2002.6 48 4.5 35 3.4 1.1 (1.32) 
2002.7 ~ 2003.6 42 3.9 32 3.1 0.8 (1.06) 
2003.7 ~ 2004.6 53 5.0 51 4.9 0.1 (0.05) 
2004.7 ~ 2005.6 59 5.5 53 5.1 0.4 (0.42) 
2005.7 ~ 2006.6 69 6.5 70 6.8 –0.3 (–0.27) 
2006.7 ~ 2007.6 84 7.9 63 6.1 1.8 (1.61) 
2007.7 ~ 2008.6 44 4.1 37 3.6 0.5 (0.66) 
2008.7 ~ 2009.6 29 2.7 26 2.5 0.2 (0.30) 
2009.7 ~ 2010.6 25 2.3 43 4.1 –1.8 (–2.34)** 
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CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT CAUSES THE PAY GAP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE FIRM EXEUCUTIVES? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Managing a public firm entails broader and more difficult issues than working for a private 
firm as an executive or a chief executive officer (CEO). Public firm executives are required to deal 
with institutional investors, dispersed individual shareholders, the media, and analysts who track 
the share price of the firm. Additional legal and institutional responsibilities are also taken by 
public firm executives. They, for example, have to abide by the rules set by regulators to protect 
minority shareholders and face more rigid accounting and reporting standards. Public firms may 
pay talented executives higher than private firms as public firm executives would request higher 
compensation for bearing additional burden and higher risk.  
The central view of agency theory also suggests that more diffused ownership and thus the 
lack of direct monitoring on executives in public firms leads to performance– or equity–based 
compensation, generally resulting in higher pay (Jensen and meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; 
Murphy, 1985; Conyon, Core, and Guay, 2010; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy, 2012; 
and Gao and Li, 2015).   
This paper investigates the pay gap between public and private firm executives, utilizing a 
unique dataset of Capital IQ which provides the detailed information on executive compensation 
not just of public but also of private firms around the world. We test our hypothesis taking 
advantage of the fact that each country has different economic and institutional environments. 
Between–country analyses enable us to examine whether these economic, market–driven variables 
that make public firms hard to hire competent executives and institutional factors that put more 
burden and risks on public firm executives drive up the pay for public firm executives.    
If executive labor markets are competitive, those economic and institutional elements 
would well explain the executive pay gap between public and private firms (Abowd and 
Ashenfelter 1981; Garbaix and Landier, 2008; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; and Peters and Wagner, 
2014). On the contrary, if the labor markets are not competitive and the executive compensation 
is set by other factors rather than the market forces, the economic and institutional factors would 
not affect the pay level much or work against an economic equilibrium. For example, the 
entrenchment hypothesis predicts that powerful and rent–extracting executives make their own 
way in determining their pays thus the executive compensation mechanism deviates from the 
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equilibrium pay level (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen, 
Murphy, and Wruck, 2004; and Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011).    
Using a wide–ranging sample for the period of 2001 ~ 2012 for 22 countries that have 
enough information on both public and private firm executive pays, first of all, we find that public 
firm executives are paid more in terms of total compensation than private firm executives by 11%, 
controlling for various executive and firm characteristics that may affect the executive pay level.
44 
This public pay premium is even higher when we exclude the United States that takes up the largest 
portion of the sample and has been arguably blamed for exorbitantly high compensation for public 
firm CEOs. The public pay premium increases to 22% excluding the United States. 
We also find that the public pay premium is higher when well–educated, competent senior 
managers are less available in the labor market, when there exists stronger investor protection and 
shareholder power, and when improved disclosure requirements (i.e., introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) are enforced to public firms. These findings are robust 
whether we define total compensation, salary, salary plus bonus, or cash compensation as the 
compensation and whether we narrow down the definition of executives to top 5, top 3, chief 
financial officers (CFOs), or CEOs.
45
 
These findings support the view that executive labor markets are competitive and public 
firm executives receive higher pays when they are harder to be obtained by public firms or they 
are to assume higher risk. Meanwhile, empirical findings in this paper is largely inconsistent with 
the argument of entrenchment hypothesis that public firms are entrenched by powerful executives 
and CEOs who can control their pays; the pubic pay premium would not be much affected by the 
labor market situation and decrease under the stronger shareholder power and more stringent 
disclosure and scrutiny regime with the entrenchment proposition. The data shows otherwise.  
This paper is differentiated from related prior studies and add values to the existing 
literature in several ways. First, we investigate comprehensively the executive compensation level 
of international firms. Most of empirical studies on executive compensation so far have mainly 
focus on public firms in the United States and the study on international executive compensation 
is quite sparse due to the lack of reliable and comparable international data.  An exception, 
Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2012) study CEO pays of public firms for 14 countries 
                                                          
44 Hereafter, we dub the gap in executive pay between public and private firms as public pay premium. 
45 Top 5 (3) executives refer to the highest five (three) ranking executives including the CEO within a firm. 
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but their focus of interest was on the CEO pay level in the United States. They include 13 other 
countries in their analysis to investigate whether the CEO pay level in the United States is inflated 
in comparison. Our study is not just focused on the United States and covers a larger number of 
countries. In investigating the executive compensation level around the world, we let it more 
comparable by analyzing the executive compensation scaled by GDP per capita of a country where 
a firm operates. This measure controls the different level of economic development and exchange 
rates fluctuation in each country. Thus the findings in the paper can be generalized for the 
international executive labor markets.  
Second, we include private firm executive compensation in our analysis and use it as a 
natural benchmark to public firm compensation. Gao and Li (2015) investigate pay–for–sensitivity 
of public and private firms in the United States. Cole and Mehran (2013) find that the executive 
compensation of public firms in the United States has recently increased while the private firm 
executive pay has decreased in general. Both papers study the U.S. firms and do not investigate 
the determinants of executive pay gap between the two different groups of firms.  A small strand 
of studies that explores private firm executive compensation such as Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine 
(1999) and Leslie and Oyer (2009) focuses on a specific industry in the United States and their 
findings may hardly be generalized. Our study directly investigates the determinants of the 
executive pay gap between public and private firms.  
Third, this study complements existing studies on whether executives and CEOs in large, 
publicly held firms, especially in the United States, are unreasonably highly paid. Numerous 
studies such as Murphy (1999), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) confirm the conventional idea that pays of U.S. CEOs are quite excessive and rent–
extracting. However, more recent studies provide opposing evidence that suggests that executive 
labor markets are competitive and the pay contract mechanism somehow conforms to shareholder 
value maximization.  Conyon, Core, and Guay (2010) and Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy 
(2012) find the U.S. pay premium reflects the additional risk in terms of pay structure assumed by 
the CEOs. Peters and Wagner (2014) show that CEO pays are higher in the United States in 
industries where there exists higher turnover risk, suggesting that CEOs request higher pays if they 
face higher turnover risk. Our study adds additional evidence to support the latter view that 
executive labor markets are competitive and the executive pay contract mechanism is consistent 
with shareholder value maximizing.  
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2. describes two competing 
hypotheses we test. Section 4.3. elaborates on the data collected for the analysis, the variable 
construction, and summary characteristics. Sections 4.4. examine the pay gap of executive 
compensation between public and private firms and its determinants. Finally, Section 4.5. 
concludes. 
 
4.2.  Hypothesis 
4.2.1. Entrenchment hypothesis 
The agency problem in modern corporate finance theory caused by the separation of 
management and ownership in public firms have significant implications on the contract design of 
executive compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, diffused ownership in public 
firms makes it hard for shareholders to have optimal remuneration contract with executives and 
CEOs. Powerful, rent–extracting executives set their own pays regardless of contribution they 
make for firms and risks they are supposed to assume. 
Related to the agency problem, there has been a heated debate for decades on whether 
CEOs of large, publicly held firms in the United States are unjustifiably paid more than those in 
any other comparable countries. Many studies such as Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) assert that public firm CEOs in the United States have power and 
discretion enough to set their own compensation high, resulting in the executive compensation 
level deviating from the equilibrium level.  
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership concentration is negatively 
related to the level of executive compensation. Their finding suggests that institutional investors 
serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers, thus 
lowering executive pays.  
According to the entrenchment hypothesis, the pay gap between public and private firm 
executives would not be affected by the less supply of competent executives as powerful 
executives would set their pays high and secure their jobs regardless of the market condition. The 
hypothesis also predicts that the pay gap would decrease if shareholder power is stronger and more 
stringent monitoring system is in place. Conversely, public firm executives get paid high when the 
power of shareholders and the monitoring system are comparatively weak if public firms are 
entrenched by powerful, self–interest–seeking executives.  
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4.2.2. Competitive executive labor market hypothesis 
An alternative view to the contracting mechanism of executive compensation backed up 
by recent empirical and theoretical studies is that executive pays are competitively determined by 
market forces and reflect the risk that the managers assume. 
Conyon, Core, and Guay (2010) and Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2012) find 
the U.S. pay premium reflects the additional risk in terms of pay structure assumed by the CEOs 
in the United States.  Peters and Wagner (2014) show that, in the United States, CEO pays are 
higher in industries where there exists higher turnover risk, which implies that CEOs request higher 
pays if they assume higher turnover risk. They note that CEO pays and turnover risk would be 
negatively associated if powerful CEOs enjoy high compensation and job security at the same time. 
Their findings suggest that executive labor markets are competitive and that the risk assumed by 
executives are appropriately priced in their compensation, which leads to the competitive executive 
labor market hypothesis. 
In terms of theoretical views on the related issue, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) prove 
that increased disclosure posits executives under severer monitoring by shareholders thus under 
greater risk of getting fired. Firms pay more to competent managers to compensate for the 
termination risk, resulting in higher pay for executives in equilibrium under increased disclosure 
requirements.   
Thus the competitive executive labor market hypothesis predicts that the pay gap between 
public and private firm executives would increase if there is less supply in competent executives 
in the labor market. The hypothesis also directs that the pay gap would escalate if shareholder 
power in public firms is stronger or more stringent monitoring and disclosure system is enacted 
thus executives have to assume higher risk of termination of employment and have less opportunity 
for extracting private benefits.  
 
4.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
4.3.1. Data and variables construction  
Appendix E describes the data source and definition of the variables. We first collect 
detailed data on executive compensation and executive– and firm–level variables from Capital IQ. 
The dataset in this study begins in 2001 because the data for non–U.S. countries is quite sparse 
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before 2001 and it ends in 2012. We first require that firms and executives have non–missing 
characteristics that may affect the level of compensation. Then we drop the first and last pay 
observations of each executive due to the concern that those pays may not reflect the compensation 
for the whole year as executives may be newly hired or fired during the fiscal year, following 
Balsam et al. (2015). We observe multiple pays for some executives as they may take multiple 
positions at affiliated firms. We keep the highest compensation if multiple pays at the same year 
for an executive are detected. 
Some executives and CEOs receive quite low, symbolic pays.
46
 These pays do not reflect 
actual pays they are supposed to get with a regular remuneration contract. We drop pay 
observations if total compensation of an executive is less than GDP per capita of the country where 
the firm resides.
47  Finally, we drop observations of countries if the number of public firms or 
private firms in a country is less than 10 in total because we need to compare public firms with 
private firms in terms of executive compensation thus require a reasonable number of firms to 
compare for each country. We convert the data in local currencies to US dollars using exchange 
rates we retrieve from the World Bank. With the screening process described above, we have 
322,588 executive pays from 22 countries for 2001 ~ 2012 in the final dataset.  
The main dependent variable in this study is total compensation scaled by GDP per capita. 
Total compensation includes all pays awarded to executives regardless of the item name in the 
paycheck and is the most comprehensive definition of compensation.
48
 Later, we do experiments 
as robustness checks with other definition of compensation: salary, salary plus bonus, and cash 
compensation as complimentary measures of executive compensation. We notice that executive 
pay level across the countries is quite variant depending on the country’s economic development.
49
 
Thus we use pays scaled by GDP per capita of the country that the firms reside in as dependent 
variables. This scaled measure controls the different level of economic development and exchange 
rates fluctuations of each country. 
                                                          
46 Steve Jobs of Apple Inc., for example, had been paid 1 dollar a year since 1998 when he returned to the company. 
47 This restriction makes the dependent variable, the natural log of (total compensation over GDP per capita), is equal 
to or greater than zero.  
48 Specifically, total compensation includes, but is not limited to, salary, bonus, stock and option awards and grants, 
non–equity incentive plan, and director fees and bonus. 
49 As in Panel A of Table 4–1 below, the average executive compensation of Thailand is 36,909 US dollars whereas 
that of Germany is 1,621,882 US dollars. 
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Panel A of Table 4–1 presents the mean and median of total compensation of public and 
private firm executives by country during the sample period.
50
  Total Compensation is in 2012 US 
dollars and Total Compensation / GDP (total compensation scaled by GDP per capita of country) 
is before taking the logarithm in the table. In 21 (20) out of 22 countries, the mean (median) Total 
Compensation of public firms is higher than that of private firms.  When it is pooled for all 
countries, the mean (median) of public firms is 998,647 (376,749) dollars. Those numbers are 
41(7) % higher than the mean (median) of private firms which are 710,768 (351,985) dollars. The 
table also reveals that the mean executive compensation is much higher than the median 
compensation (the data is negatively skewed) which implies a relatively small number of 
executives, especially in public firms, receive quite high pays compared to other executives. Total 
Compensation / GDP that controls economic development and exchange rates in each country 
shows a similar but more distinct pattern. When it is pooled for all countries, the mean (median) 
of public firms is 39.16 (11.44). Those numbers are 118(42) % higher than the mean (median) of 
private firms which are 17.97 (8.05). 
Panel B and C of Table 4–1 present the distribution of the number of executive pays with 
respect to year and industry. In panel B, the number of executive compensation in 2012 is lower 
than previous years because the last executive pays in the sample are dropped as described above. 
In panel C, the largest number of observations belong to financial industry. Overall, both tables 
show that the sample is well distributed throughout years or industries.    
(SEE TABLE 4–1) 
We collect country–level variables that we conjecture would affect the executive pay gap 
between public and private firms. Appendix F presents country–level indices and IFRS Adoption 
dates by country. First, we consider two measures that may represent the situation of executive 
labor markets of each country. Manager deficiency is derived from an index that measures to what 
extent competent senior managers are readily available in the country. We multiply the index by 
–1 so that Manager deficiency assesses the deficiency of senior managers in the economy. Brain–
drain is also derived from an index that measures to what extent the emigration of well–educated 
and skilled people does not hinder competitiveness in the economy. We multiply the index by –1 
                                                          
50 At the bottom of the table, sum of public and private firms (18,655) is greater than the total number of firms 
(18,276) because some firms converted from public (private) to private (public) firms during the sample period. 
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again so that Brain–drain assesses the drain level of potential competent executives in the 
economy. Both indices are collected from International Institute for Management Development 
(IMD). These two indices are time variant measures and they are averaged during the sample 
period for each country in appendix F. 
We collect two indices that measure the extent of shareholder power from the World Bank. 
S/H suits ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating the greater power of shareholders to 
challenge the transaction of executives and sue them for misconduct. Transparency also ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating the higher level of corporate transparency that lets 
shareholders monitor executive's compensation and financial prospects with ease.  
We obtain IFRS Adoption Date from Balsam et al. (2015). Most countries in the sample 
have adopted the IFRS in the year 2005 whereas 5 countries including the United States have never 
adopted it. In order to gauge the effect of the stricter disclosure rule imposed on public firms, we 
create a dummy variable, IFRS which is equal to 1 in the years since a country adopted the IFRS 
or zero otherwise.  
 
4.3.2. Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 4–2 presents number of observations, mean, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
percentile of the variables. 4 executive compensation variables (Total compensation / GDP, Salary 
/ GDP, Salary & Bonus / GDP, and Cash compensation / GDP) before taking natural logarithm 
show that the mean is much greater than the median which implies that they are highly negatively 
skewed. Thus we take natural logarithm of those variables so that they conform more to the normal 
distribution.  
All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. Total assets is also significantly skewed which 
means there are a few large firms dominating the sample in terms of size. We take natural logarithm 
of the variable as well in the regression analysis. It is peculiar that the mean of ROA (%) is negative 
(–3.83) whereas the median is positive (3.14) which indicates a few firms generate considerably 
negative returns.  
Panel B–1 of Table 4–2 shows the correlation matrix among executive and firm level 
variables. Overall, correlations between the variables are reasonably low, which alleviate the 
concerns on collinearity. One exception is the correlation of  Ln (age) and Age 65 which is 0.72. 
We exclude these two variables in the later regression analysis but the results do not change. 
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Education, CEO, Ln (total assets), ROA (%), and Ln (firm age) are highly positively correlated 
with compensation variables whereas Female and Leverage (%) are negatively correlated with 
compensation variables.  
Panel B–2 of Table 4–2 displays the correlations among country level variables. The two 
variables related to the executive labor market, Manager deficiency and Brain–drain are quite 
correlated. Meanwhile, the two variables that measures investor protection and shareholder power, 
S/H suits and Transparency are not correlated much, which indicates they gauge different aspects 
of shareholder power against executives.  
Panel C of Table 4–2 shows the mean and median of firm level variables between public 
and private firms. It is worth noting that private firms in our sample are quite comparable to public 
firms in terms of size, or total assets. The mean (median) of total assets of private firms is just 12% 
(34%) less than that of public firms. It indicates that private firms in Capital IQ may not be the 
representatives of typical private firms in the world in terms of size.  But the fact that private firms 
in our dataset are fairly larger than typical private firms would work against us finding any 
significant difference in executive pays between public and private firms. The table shows that, 
compared to public firms, private firms in the sample are less profitable (lower return on assets), 
slower in sales growth, more levered, and younger whereas their capital expenditure scaled by total 
assets are not different from that of public firms.  
In the next section, we investigate whether public firms pay more to their executives and 
what economic and institutional factors drive the executive pay gap between public and private 
firms in the regression format.     
(SEE TABLE 4–2) 
 
4.4. Pay Gap between Public and Private Firms 
4.4.1. Overall pay gap 
In the regressions hereafter, all firm level variables are lagged by 1 year and all continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included 
and robust standard errors are clustered by country in drawing statistical implication in all 
regressions. Table 3 presents the results of the panel regressions in which natural logarithm of total 
executive pays scaled by country’s GDP per capita are regressed on public dummies and 
executives and firm characteristics. The main purpose of analysis with regressions in Table 4–3 is 
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to see if the coefficients of public dummy are significantly positive and economically large. Since 
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation over GDP per capita, e raised 
to the coefficient of public dummy (“public”) –1, or         –1 measures the executive pay gap 
between public and private firms.  
In the table, the signs of coefficients of control variables are consistent with the correlation 
analysis with two exceptions; the coefficients of ROA and CAPEX / Assets are significantly 
negative, which is counter–intuitive. This may be so due to the fact that the two variables are highly 
correlated with firm size, or total assets. The coefficients of ROA turn significantly positive and 
those of CAPEX / Assets become positive as well, though not significant, when Ln (total assets) is 
excluded in the regressions. The negative coefficients of ROA seems also to be driven by a small 
number of firms with negative return on assets.
51
 The coefficients of ROA turn again significantly 
positive when those firms with negative return on assets are dropped in the regressions.   
The table suggests that executives are paid higher when they are more educated, older thus 
more experienced, and when they are CEOs. On the contrary, female executives are significantly 
less paid than male executives. Executives older than 65 are less paid. The size, or total assets is 
significantly positively related to executive compensation, which is consistent with previous 
empirical findings in the literature. Firm leverage is, in general, negatively associated with 
executive pays whereas firm age is positively correlated with executive compensation. 
More importantly, the public dummy is significantly positively correlated with executive 
compensation across the regressions regardless of the definition of executives. In the regression 
model (1) where only country, industry, and year fixed effects are included, the public pay premium 
is about 28% (  .  –1). The premium decreases to 27% (  .  –1) and 12% (  .  –1), respectively, 
when executive characteristics in regression (2) and executive- and firm- level control variables in 
regression (3) are included. The models (4) through (9) where compensation of top 5 executives 
and CEOs are regressed show quite a similar pattern.  
(SEE TABLE 4–3) 
One may suspect that the result in Table 4–3 may be driven by the United States which 
takes up the largest portion in the sample and is known for quite high CEO pays of large, public 
                                                          
51 The mean of ROA (%) in the previous section is negative but the median is positive, which indicates that a small 
portion of firms with highly negative return on assets in the sample drives the mean as negative.  
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firms.
52
  In Table 4–4, we exclude the U.S. observations and rerun the regressions. The table 
strikingly shows that the public pay premium is even larger without the United States.  In 
regression (1) of Table 4–4 with only fixed effects, the public pay premium is almost 40% (  .  –
1). The premium remains economically large when executive characteristics in regression (2) and 
firm-level control variables as well as executive characteristics in regression (3) are included. 
Again, this result is robust whether we narrow down the definition of executives to top 5 executives 
or CEOs of firms.    
(SEE TABLE 4–4) 
 
4.4.2. Managerial supply 
In this sub–section, we test whether less supply of competent managers in an economy thus 
causing the situation that managerial talent is harder for a firm to obtain enlarges the executive pay 
gap between public and private firms. This prediction of positive correlation between less supply 
of managerial talent and executive compensation in public firms is consistent with the competitive 
executive labor market hypothesis.  
In the meantime, the entrenchment hypothesis asserts that the status of supply of qualified 
managers would not affect the executive pay level as powerful executives enjoy high pays while 
keeping their positions firmly regardless of the labor market situation. One may argue that 
entrenched executives would get also paid higher when there is less supply in managerial talent in 
the labor market because they will have stronger negotiating power. However, since their influence 
and control over their own compensation comes from poor corporate governance according to the 
entrenchment hypothesis, not by the labor market situation, the executive pay in public firms 
would be insensitive to the less supply of competent executives.  
In Table 4–5, all control variables at executive and firm levels and country, industry, and 
year fixed effects as in Table 4–3 are included in the regressions. And two proxies for the extent 
to which potential managerial talent in the country is less abundant are added in the regressions: 
Managerial deficiency and Brain–drain. These two variables are interacted with the public dummy 
to measure the effect of the two variables on public firm executive compensation. In the regression 
model (1), (3), and (5), ((2), (4), and (6)), respectively, Managerial deficiency (Brain–drain) and 
                                                          
52 Gao and Li (2015) report that the public pay premium in the United States is almost 30% (Table 3 in page 377) for 
this matter. 
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its interaction with the public dummy are included. In the regressions, the coefficients of 
Managerial deficiency are not significant. It seems that the extent of availability of managerial 
pool itself does not affect the general level of executive compensation. Meanwhile, the coefficients 
of Brain–drain are significant, which indicates that the exodus of potential managerial pool out of 
country increases the executive compensation level of private firms. More importantly, the 
interactions of the public dummy with Managerial deficiency and Brain–drain are all significantly 
positive across the regressions. This finding implies that less supply of managerial pool in an 
economy escalates executive pays in public firms more than private firms because public firms 
need managerial talent more desperately and public firms pay more to competent executives when 
they are harder to obtain.  It confirms the competitive executive labor market hypothesis.  
(SEE TABLE 4–5) 
 
4.4.3. Investor protection and shareholder power 
An important implication of the entrenchment hypothesis in terms of executive 
compensation is that executives are paid more when their power is stronger than shareholders’. 
And the power structure is formalized by corporate governance; good corporate governance 
practice induced by proper institutions enables shareholders to hold managers in check and put 
down their compensation in control.  Specifically, the entrenchment hypothesis predicts lower 
executive compensation if institutions support shareholders to more easily sue executives for their 
misconduct or provide more transparent corporate systems on executive’s compensation and 
financial prospects.  
On the contrary, the competitive executive labor market system expects higher executive 
pay in those cases above because executives request more pay due to the increased legal risk and 
burden and the decreased opportunity of misappropriation. This sub–section provides the results 
of tests on whether stronger shareholder power sustained by proper institutions increases the 
executive compensation level of public firms thus widens the executive pay gap between public 
and private firms.      
In Table 4–6, S/H suits (Transparency) and its interaction with the public dummy are 
included in the regression model (1), (3), and (5), ((2), (4), and (6)), respectively, with all control 
variables and fixed effects.
53  The coefficients of S/H suits and Transparency are not significant in 
                                                          
53 Country fixed effects are dropped as S/H suit and Transparency are time–invariant country–level indices. 
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any regression models. However, the coefficients of interactions of S/H suits and Transparency 
are significant across the regressions, which suggests that public firm executives are paid more in 
countries with stronger shareholder power and supports the competitive executive labor market 
hypothesis. This finding is contradictory to the entrenchment hypothesis.   
(SEE TABLE 4–6) 
 
4.4.4. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
In this sub–section, we investigate the effect of the introduction of the IFRS, more stringent 
monitoring and reporting standards, on the executive pay gap between public and private firms. 
The pay gap will be affected mainly through the effect of the IFRS on public firms because the 
IFRS has become mandatory to public firms since a country adopted it. A large body of literature 
reports effects on better monitoring and disclosure process under the IFRS than countries’ own 
accounting standards (Balsam, Gordon, and Li, 2015).    
Improved monitoring on firm’s performance and executives’ private transactions may have 
different implications on the executive pay. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional 
ownership concentration is negatively associated with the executive compensation level. Their 
finding suggests that large institutional investors serve as a monitoring role and stringent 
monitoring scheme implemented by institutional investors lowers the executive compensation 
level of public firms. The finding in their study is congruent to the view of the entrenchment 
hypothesis. Conversely, with the competitive executive labor market hypothesis, the executive 
compensation level of public firms would rise with more austere monitoring and disclosure 
requirements because public firm executives request higher pay due to the increased risk of 
employment termination and the decreased opportunity of misappropriation. 
Table 4–7 shows the results of regressions where the IFRS dummy and its interaction with 
the public dummy are included.  As in the regression analysis in Table 4–3, all executive- and 
firm-level characteristics and country, year, industry fixed effects are also included. In the table, 
first of all, the coefficients of the IFRS dummy are significantly negative across the board. This 
result can be translated that the executive pay level in private firms drops with the introduction of 
the IFRS.  More importantly, the coefficients of interaction between the public and IFRS dummies 
are significantly positive, showing that the more stringent monitoring and disclosure requirements 
increase the executive pay gap between public and private firms. This finding again confirms the 
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competitive executive labor market hypothesis and denounces the entrenchment hypothesis.   
(SEE TABLE 4–7) 
In Figure 4–1, we plot the time trend of public pay premium during the sample period. The 
pay premium in each year is calculated by interacting the public dummy with the year dummies in 
the regressions where all executive– and firm–level control variables and country, industry, and 
year fixed effects as in Table 4–3 are included. The solid line is the time trend of all sample firms 
whereas the dotted line is that without the U.S. firms. The figure shows the definitive pattern of 
the emergence of the public pay premium around the year of 2005 when the most of countries in 
the sample adopted the IFRS. The pattern of the emergence of public pay premium is more 
prominent without the U.S. firms that never adopted the IFRS. The two time trends do not show 
any upward or downward drifts after 2005.   
The pattern in Figure 4–1 also complements the finding of Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and 
Murphy (2011) who reports that the CEO pay gap of public firms between U.S. and 13 other 
developed countries has dropped dramatically around 2005 and 2006; most countries except for 
the United States among the sample countries in Fernades et al. (2011) adopted the IFRS at the 
end of 2005. It may be the case that the reason why they observe the recent decrease in the pay 
gap between the U.S. and 13 other countries is that public firms in the IFRS adoption countries 
increased their executive pays around 2005.   
(SEE FIGURE 4–1) 
 
4.4.5. Robustness tests 
So far, we analyze the public pay premium with total compensation which is the most 
comprehensive definition of executive compensation as it includes all pays in the paycheck. 
However, it might be a noisy measure if some firms, especially private firms, do not report 
precisely somewhat arbitrary items such as non–cash incentives.       
In Table 4–8, we extend the definition of executive compensation and executives for 
robustness checks. The table presents coefficients and t–statistics of interacted terms of public 
dummy with Manager deficiency, Brain–drain, S/H Suits, Transparency, and IFRS respectively 
with the expanded definition of compensation and executives. Compensation is defined as salary, 
salary and bonus, and cash compensation. Executives are defined as all executives, top 5 and 3 
highest ranking executives, CFOs, and CEOs. The coefficients and t–statistics are based on the 
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results of panel regressions in which natural logarithm of salary, salary and bonus, or cash 
compensation scaled by country’s GDP per capita are regressed on public dummy, its interactions 
with Manager deficiency, Brain–drain, S/H Suits, Transparency, and IFRS, respectively, and all 
executive- and firm-level characteristics. Industry and year dummies are included in all regressions. 
Country dummies are included except for the regressions on S/H Suits and Transparency and their 
interactions with the public dummy. 
The table presents that the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive and significant 
in all regressions except for some regressions on S/H Suits and Transparency. The result is quite 
robust regardless of the definition of executive compensation and executives.  
(SEE TABLE 4–8) 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the executive pay gap between public and private firms.  We 
examine whether the supply in the executive labor market, the institutional protection on 
shareholder’s rights against misappropriation by managers, and the introduction of stricter rules 
on monitoring and disclosure cause to widen the executive pay gap, noting the observation that 
each country has different environments in terms of labor market situation and legal, institutional 
background. This framework of research design enables us to test two competing hypotheses in 
agency theory: the entrenchment hypothesis and the competitive executive labor market hypothesis.  
Conflicts of interest between executives and shareholders in modern public firms suggest 
two probable scenarios. First, the entrenchment hypothesis predicts that diffused ownership in 
public firms hinders shareholders from appropriately controlling the firm’s managers who then 
become powerful enough to set their own compensation high, regardless of executive labor market 
factors. This situation is more pronounced when legal, institutional instrument and monitoring 
system to protect shareholder’s rights is not in place in the country. Second, the competitive 
executive labor market hypothesis asserts that the firm’s managers are controlled through relevant 
monitoring and incentive scheme and that executive pays are determined by market forces and risk 
and burden they bear.      
We find, in this study, that the executive pay gap between public and private firms escalates 
when there is less supply in potential competent executives, when shareholder’s power is stronger, 
and when a stricter rule on monitoring and disclosure is enacted. These findings largely support 
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the view of the competitive executive labor market hypothesis but are inconsistent with the 
argument of the entrenchment hypothesis.  
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Figure 4–1: Trend of public pay premium 
Figure 4–1 plots time tend of public pay premium. In order to compute public pay premium for each year, the public 
dummy is interacted with each of year dummies controlling for executive and firm characteristics as in the regression 
model (3) in Table 3. The premium is calculated by epublic × year dummy – 1. The solid line is the time trend of all sample 
firms whereas the dotted line is that without the U.S. firms. 
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Table 4–1: Distribution of Total Executive Compensation 
“Total Compensation” is in 2012 US dollars.  “Total Compensation / GDP” is before taking the logarithm.  
 
Panel A: Mean and Median of Total Executive Compensation of Public and Private Firms by Country 
 
Country No of Firms No of Executive Compensation 
Mean   
Total Compensation 
Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private 
Australia 1,462 1,203 267 27,018 23,750 3,268 504,986 527,454 341,701 
Canada 1,674 1,196 493 24,733 19,966 4,767 635,355 706,399 337,795 
China 406 384 142 8,079 7,453 626 198,104 203,010 139,686 
Denmark 44 32 12 372 280 92 829,727 869,056 710,032 
Finland 106 93 17 1,040 963 77 626,443 621,267 691,177 
France 241 215 34 3,640 3,333 307 1,251,465 1,285,956 877,002 
Germany 330 284 48 4,428 3,943 485 1,621,882 1,709,960 905,814 
Hong Kong 879 848 76 14,864 14,364 500 490,327 494,259 377,374 
India 2,577 2,420 210 31,414 30,133 1,281 174,367 178,337 80,990 
Ireland 46 31 15 889 772 117 1,046,777 1,060,624 955,409 
Italy 195 169 30 2,758 2,407 351 1,158,362 1,206,315 829,520 
Malaysia 78 64 14 731 662 69 329,420 355,521 79,007 
Netherlands 133 89 46 2,001 1,501 500 1,272,836 1,429,104 803,718 
New Zealand 144 83 62 1,276 916 360 246,924 294,773 125,175 
Norway 141 92 54 2,249 1,624 625 576,045 619,797 462,361 
Slovenia 20 10 10 201 140 61 326,790 356,079 259,568 
South Africa 282 219 63 6,372 5,437 935 510,924 535,577 367,563 
Sweden 202 161 46 1,617 1,098 519 673,453 724,700 565,034 
Switzerland 181 166 15 1,495 1,445 50 1,358,900 1,386,055 574,145 
Thailand 265 253 13 3,465 3,400 65 36,909 37,163 23,594 
United Kingdom 1,267 857 428 23,323 18,283 5,040 809,163 880,857 549,084 
United States 7,603 5,566 2,125 164,313 137,615 26,698 1,350,951 1,433,336 926,300 
Total 18,276 14,435 4,220 326,278 279,485 46,793 957,361 998,647 710,768 
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country 
 Median 
Total Compensation / GDP Total Compensation Total Compensation / GDP 
Total Public (a) Private (b) ratio (a/b) Total Public Private Total Public (a) Private (b) ratio (a/b) 
Australia 10.30 10.73 7.19 1.49 266,884 273,980 228,270 5.40 5.48 4.78 1.15 
Canada 14.15 15.58 8.14 1.91 281,645 308,684 207,444 6.49 7.03 5.13 1.37 
China 51.17 51.95 41.96 1.24 83,654 86,083 62,046 21.65 21.87 18.58 1.18 
Denmark 13.24 13.87 11.31 1.23 690,933 714,333 549,214 11.08 11.61 9.31 1.25 
Finland 12.48 12.39 13.66 0.91 191,472 180,351 377,458 3.71 3.45 6.91 0.50 
France 28.75 29.52 20.47 1.44 612,676 632,500 450,094 13.88 14.21 10.70 1.33 
Germany 36.05 37.99 20.34 1.87 799,008 819,166 665,180 17.56 18.11 15.09 1.20 
Hong Kong 14.60 14.71 11.50 1.28 269,317 271,578 205,702 8.06 8.12 6.33 1.28 
India 149.91 153.13 74.20 2.06 74,297 76,358 36,826 63.34 65.27 34.05 1.92 
Ireland 18.30 18.59 16.40 1.13 808,502 849,073 421,191 14.34 14.96 8.06 1.86 
Italy 29.49 30.64 21.59 1.42 531,334 557,508 428,622 13.55 14.24 11.26 1.26 
Malaysia 40.24 43.14 12.42 3.47 154,884 173,144 61,821 20.01 22.73 10.14 2.24 
Netherlands 24.20 27.12 15.44 1.76 894,226 992,685 773,850 17.07 18.77 14.49 1.30 
New Zealand 7.42 8.84 3.81 2.32 96,403 131,108 58,298 2.83 3.89 1.70 2.29 
Norway 6.19 6.65 5.01 1.33 417,666 447,359 362,995 4.41 4.85 3.86 1.26 
Slovenia 12.74 13.90 10.09 1.38 249,562 280,056 216,956 9.75 11.12 8.53 1.30 
South Africa 76.55 80.00 56.49 1.42 325,901 343,351 266,813 50.73 53.28 41.52 1.28 
Sweden 12.24 13.18 10.26 1.28 366,169 351,287 376,901 6.69 6.45 6.84 0.94 
Switzerland 17.47 17.83 7.22 2.47 599,159 611,421 393,213 7.49 7.76 4.62 1.68 
Thailand 7.82 7.87 5.07 1.55 16,748 16,995 10,268 3.51 3.56 2.38 1.50 
United Kingdom 18.28 19.87 12.53 1.59 454,745 489,658 369,174 10.45 11.16 8.62 1.29 
United States 26.46 28.05 18.27 1.53 532,942 560,422 437,058 10.53 11.03 8.74 1.26 
Total 36.12 39.16 17.97 2.18 372,454 376,749 351,985 10.71 11.44 8.05 1.42 
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Panel B: Number of Total Executive Compensation of Public and Private Firms by Year 
 
Year 
No of Executive Compensation 
Total Public Private 
2001 16,378 11,914 4,464 
2002 18,882 13,786 5,096 
2003 21,197 15,798 5,399 
2004 23,754 18,155 5,599 
2005 25,390 21,105 4,285 
2006 28,064 24,290 3,774 
2007 32,316 29,013 3,303 
2008 34,792 31,277 3,515 
2009 37,700 33,507 4,193 
2010 38,230 34,479 3,751 
2011 37,419 34,656 2,763 
2012 12,156 11,505 651 
total 326,278 279,485 46,793 
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Panel C: Number of Total Executive Compensation of Public and Private Firms by Industry 
Industry classification is based on 23 industry categories in Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998). 
 
Industry No of Executive Compensation 
Total Public Private 
Mining/Construction 15,175 13,664 1,511 
Food 9,046 7,811 1,235 
Textiles/Print/Publish 15,408 12,865 2,543 
Chemicals 8,734 7,887 847 
Pharmaceuticals 14,393 13,097 1,296 
Extractive 13,115 11,737 1,378 
Manufacturing: Rubber/glass/etc. 7,521 6,443 1,078 
Manufacturing: Metal 9,122 8,202 920 
Manufacturing: Machinery 8,839 7,858 981 
Manufacturing: Electrical Equipment 10,213 8,969 1,244 
Manufacturing: Transport Equipment 7,405 6,681 724 
Manufacturing: Instruments 11,625 10,384 1,241 
Manufacturing: Miscellaneous  2,200 1,872 328 
Computers 33,035 27,389 5,646 
Transportation 17,324 14,642 2,682 
Utilities 10,040 8,168 1,872 
Retail: Wholesale 9,869 8,269 1,600 
Retail: Miscellaneous 13,207 10,825 2,382 
Retail: Restaurant 3,453 2,476 977 
Financial 41,393 36,026 5,367 
Insurance/Real Estate 8,264 7,107 1,157 
Services 25,506 20,141 5,365 
Others 31,391 26,972 4,419 
Total 326,278 279,485 46,793 
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Table 4–2: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
All variables are as defined in Appendix E. “Total Compensation / GDP,” “Salary / GDP,” “Salary & bonus / GDP,” 
“Cash compensation / GDP,” “Age,” “Total assets,” and “Firm age” are figures before taking the logarithm. “Total 
assets” are in million 2012 US dollars.  
 
Variables Level No. of observations Mean 25th Median 75th 
Total compensation / GDP Executive 326,278 36.12 5.13 10.71 27.93 
Salary / GDP Executive 284,786 14.79 4.12 6.52 11.65 
Salary & bonus / GDP Executive 284,786 19.87 4.64 7.97 16.34 
Cash compensation / GDP Executive 326,278 26.64 4.30 8.50 19.28 
Education Executive 326,278 0.91 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Female  Executive 326,278 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age Executive 326,278 59.07 53.00 58.21 65.00 
Age 65  Executive 326,278 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEO  Executive 326,278 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Total assets Firm 99,476 7,512 32 198 1,082 
ROA (%) Firm 99,476 –3.83 –0.60 3.14 7.02 
Sales growth (%) Firm 99,476 13.13 –2.48 9.04 26.08 
CAPEX / assets (%) Firm 99,476 5.81 0.93 2.89 6.81 
Leverage (%) Firm 99,476 356.35 19.93 53.31 128.30 
Firm age Firm 99,476 40.94 15.00 26.00 54.00 
Public  Firm 99,476 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Manager deficiency Country 241 –6.17 –6.95 –6.42 –5.60 
Brain drain Country 241 –5.63 –6.79 –5.78 –4.93 
S/H suits Country 22 7.71 7.00 7.75 9.00 
Transparency Country 22 6.73 6.00 6.75 8.00 
IFRS dummy Country 241 0.50 0.00 0.61 1.00 
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Panel B–1: Correlations 
Panel B–1 presents the Pearson’s correlations among the dependent variables and firm/executive level variables. All variables are as defined in Appendix E. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 
 Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[1] Ln (total compensation / GDP) 1.00                
[2] Ln (salary / GDP) 0.86 1.00               
[3] Ln (salary & bonus / GDP) 0.89 0.94 1.00              
[4] Ln (cash compensation / GDP) 0.96 0.92 0.95 1.00             
[5] public 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 1.00            
[6] Education 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.05 1.00           
[7] Female  –0.05 –0.07 –0.07 –0.05 –0.01 0.01 1.00          
[8] Ln (age) –0.05 0.03 0.05 –0.03 –0.02 –0.05 –0.10 1.00         
[9] Age 65  –0.06 0.04 0.05 –0.04 –0.02 –0.03 –0.08 0.72 1.00        
[10] CEO  0.22 0.23 0.21 0.24 –0.01 0.06 –0.09 0.06 0.06 1.00       
[11] Ln (total assets) 0.45 0.38 0.45 0.43 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.03 –0.12 1.00      
[12] ROA (%) 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.03 –0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 –0.05 0.38 1.00     
[13] Sales growth (%) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 –0.01 –0.05 –0.03 0.00 –0.06 0.01 1.00    
[14] CAPEX / assets (%) 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.00 –0.02 –0.02 –0.03 –0.02 0.02 –0.11 –0.02 0.12 1.00   
[15] Leverage (%) –0.04 –0.06 –0.06 –0.04 –0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 –0.03 –0.02 –0.08 1.00  
[16] Ln (firm age) 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.06 –0.03 –0.01 0.14 0.09 –0.04 0.41 0.22 –0.14 –0.16 0.05 1.00 
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Panel B–2: Correlations 
Panel B–2 presents the Pearson’s correlations among the country level variables. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix E.  
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
[1] Manager deficiency 1.00     
[2] Brain drain 0.75 1.00    
[3] S/H suits –0.40 –0.42 1.00   
[4] Transparency –0.06 –0.19 0.08 1.00  
[5] IFRS dummy 0.18 –0.04 0.36 0.05 1.00 
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Panel C: Firm Level Variables Comparison 
Panel C presents the comparison of firm level variables between public and private firms. All variables are as defined 
in Appendix E. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Test of mean difference is based on the 
assumption of unequal variance of two groups. Test of median difference is the Wilcoxon rank–sum test. 
 
 Variable  
Mean Median 
Public (1) Private (2) Diff ((1) – (2)) Public (3) Private (4) Diff ((3) – (4)) 
Total assets 4,330.78 3,817.50 513.28*** 212.83 141.00 71.83*** 
ROA (%) –1.27 –3.50 2.22*** 3.27 2.49 0.78*** 
Sales growth (%) 14.13 12.85 1.28*** 10.99 8.46 2.54*** 
CAPEX / assets (%) 5.57 5.53 0.05 2.90 2.84 0.06 
Leverage (%) 118.54 164.11 –45.57*** 51.23 64.78 –13.55*** 
Firm age 41.37 35.95 5.42*** 27.00 22.00 5.00*** 
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Table 4–3: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy 
Table 4–3 presents the results of the panel regressions in which natural log of total executive pays scaled by country’s GDP per capita are regressed on public 
dummies and executives and firm characteristics and fixed effects. The sample includes executive–year observations from 22 countries during 2001–2012. All 
variables are as defined in Appendix E. All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The t–statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Total Executives Top 5 CEO 
Public  0.25*** 0.24*** 0.11*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.09** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.09** 
 (7.87) (8.23) (2.87) (8.22) (8.22) (2.33) (11.01) (11.92) (2.36) 
Education  0.18*** 0.05***  0.22*** 0.07***  0.24*** 0.06*** 
  (14.71) (6.50)  (9.60) (5.57)  (8.39) (3.56) 
Female   –0.15*** –0.09***  –0.17*** –0.07***  –0.07* –0.02 
  (–11.56) (–4.92)  (–6.80) (–2.88)  (–1.75) (–0.48) 
Ln (age)  0.55*** –0.14  0.92*** 0.13  0.89*** 0.15 
  (5.07) (–1.42)  (7.72) (1.56)  (7.86) (1.32) 
Age 65  –0.25*** –0.15***  –0.14*** –0.03  –0.11*** –0.02 
  (–7.33) (–3.06)  (–4.84) (–0.69)  (–3.26) (–1.10) 
CEO   0.50*** 0.71***  0.39*** 0.50***    
  (12.67) (22.32)  (11.58) (17.33)    
Ln (total assets)   0.31***   0.35***   0.36*** 
   (14.15)   (17.39)   (16.94) 
ROA   –0.17   –0.26**   –0.27** 
   (–1.43)   (–2.14)   (–2.17) 
Sales growth   5.10**   5.00**   4.60** 
   (2.75)   (2.58)   (2.28) 
CAPEX / Assets   0.24*   0.27   0.25 
   (2.02)   (1.57)   (1.24) 
Leverage   –1.09**   –1.17***   –1.26*** 
   (–2.80)   (–3.81)   (–5.26) 
Ln (firm age)   0.02   0.01   0.02 
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   (1.21)   (0.48)   (1.63) 
Constant 1.23*** –1.15** 0.49 1.27*** –2.67*** –0.57 1.37*** –2.32*** –0.34 
 (13.66) (–2.72) (1.18) (12.48) (–5.91) (–1.62) (12.88) (–5.58) (–0.71) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 326,278 326,278 326,278 215,122 215,122 215,122 100,376 100,376 100,376 
R2 0.253 0.315 0.579 0.271 0.338 0.666 0.267 0.306 0.647 
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Table 4–4: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy excluding the U.S. 
Table 4–4 presents the results of the panel regressions in which natural log of total executive pays scaled by country’s GDP per capita are regressed on public 
dummies and executives and firm characteristics and fixed effects excluding the U.S. The sample includes executive–year observations from 22 countries during 
2001–2012. All variables are as defined in Appendix E. All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The 
t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Total Executives Top 5 CEO 
Public  0.33*** 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 
 (11.12) (12.87) (12.09) (10.86) (12.41) (9.39) (11.61) (15.17) (9.50) 
Education  0.18*** 0.05**  0.24*** 0.07***  0.27*** 0.08*** 
  (6.79) (2.41)  (6.29) (3.06)  (7.96) (3.37) 
Female   –0.14*** –0.10***  –0.16*** –0.05  –0.03 0.03 
  (–6.01) (–3.03)  (–3.76) (–1.34)  (–0.48) (0.57) 
Ln (age)  0.47** –0.10  0.79*** 0.15  0.86*** 0.28* 
  (2.57) (–0.56)  (5.90) (1.09)  (5.24) (1.89) 
Age 65  –0.32*** –0.26***  –0.19*** –0.11**  –0.07 –0.05* 
  (–6.68) (–5.09)  (–3.43) (–2.66)  (–1.51) (–1.80) 
CEO   0.46*** 0.66***  0.36*** 0.46***    
  (7.75) (18.68)  (6.88) (14.07)    
Ln (total assets)   0.27***   0.31***   0.32*** 
   (26.45)   (23.86)   (24.91) 
ROA   0.05   –0.00   0.01 
   (0.24)   (–0.02)   (0.04) 
Sales growth   2.69*   2.33*   1.69 
   (1.98)   (1.96)   (1.32) 
CAPEX / Assets   0.27   0.33   0.33 
   (1.24)   (1.17)   (1.00) 
Leverage   –0.74*   –0.96**   –1.19*** 
   (–1.77)   (–2.62)   (–2.95) 
Ln (firm age)   0.04***   0.04***   0.05*** 
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   (2.86)   (2.98)   (3.12) 
Constant 1.36*** –0.62 0.66 1.42*** –2.01*** –0.44 1.49*** –2.15*** –0.63 
 (13.62) (–0.85) (0.82) (10.12) (–3.85) (–0.68) (10.41) (–3.70) (–0.96) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 161,965 161,965 161,965 109,311 109,311 109,311 49,147 49,147 49,147 
R2 0.388 0.433 0.600 0.410 0.461 0.679 0.424 0.465 0.684 
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Table 4–5: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy, Manager deficiency, and 
Brain–drain 
Table 4–5 presents the results of the panel regressions in which natural log of total executive pays scaled by country’s 
GDP per capita are regressed on public dummy, manager, brain, and executives and firm characteristics and fixed 
effects. The sample includes executive–year observations from 22 countries during 2001–2012. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix E. All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99%.  The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Executives Top 5 CEO 
Public  0.45*** 0.32*** 0.39** 0.29*** 0.36*** 0.23*** 
 (3.54) (4.18) (2.79) (3.34) (4.01) (3.41) 
Manager deficiency –0.03  –0.01  –0.02  
 (–0.81)  (–0.11)  (–0.31)  
Public × Manager 0.05**  0.04**  0.04**  
deficiency (2.67)  (2.10)  (2.68)  
Brain–drain  0.10***  0.11***  0.11*** 
  (3.69)  (2.98)  (3.61) 
Public × Brain–drain  0.03**  0.03**  0.02* 
  (2.63)  (2.25)  (1.83) 
Education 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (6.49) (6.21) (5.52) (5.38) (3.56) (3.47) 
Female  –0.09*** –0.09*** –0.07*** –0.07*** –0.02 –0.02 
 (–4.89) (–4.93) (–2.89) (–2.90) (–0.48) (–0.49) 
Ln (age) –0.14 –0.13 0.13 0.14* 0.15 0.16 
 (–1.42) (–1.32) (1.52) (1.81) (1.30) (1.45) 
Age 65 –0.15*** –0.16*** –0.02 –0.04 –0.02 –0.03 
 (–3.04) (–3.31) (–0.68) (–1.03) (–1.08) (–1.71) 
CEO  0.71*** 0.71*** 0.50*** 0.50***   
 (22.30) (21.91) (17.32) (17.24)   
Ln (total assets) 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 
 (14.13) (14.21) (17.37) (17.44) (16.93) (17.03) 
ROA –0.17 –0.17 –0.26** –0.26** –0.27** –0.27** 
 (–1.44) (–1.46) (–2.14) (–2.17) (–2.18) (–2.19) 
Sales growth 5.12** 5.01** 4.99** 4.90** 4.60** 4.51** 
 (2.76) (2.78) (2.59) (2.61) (2.28) (2.30) 
CAPEX / Assets 0.25* 0.24* 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 
 (2.02) (1.89) (1.56) (1.51) (1.23) (1.18) 
Leverage –1.10*** –1.14*** –1.18*** –1.21*** –1.27*** –1.30*** 
 (–2.86) (–3.10) (–3.93) (–4.15) (–5.40) (–5.76) 
Ln (firm age) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (1.21) (1.15) (0.48) (0.42) (1.63) (1.57) 
Constant 0.27 1.12** –0.60 0.09 –0.46 0.35 
 (0.46) (2.15) (–0.83) (0.18) (–0.54) (0.52) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 326,278 326,278 215,122 215,122 100,376 100,376 
R2 0.580 0.581 0.666 0.667 0.647 0.648 
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Table 4–6: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public Dummy, S/H suits, and Transparency 
Table 4–6 presents the results of the panel regressions in which natural log of total executive pays scaled by country’s 
GDP per capita are regressed on public dummy, S/H suits, transparency, and executives and firm characteristics and 
fixed effects. The sample includes executive–year observations from 22 countries during 2001–2012. All variables 
are as defined in Appendix E. All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1% and 99%.  The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Executives Top 5 CEO 
Public  –0.68* –2.13*** –0.65* –1.84*** –0.75** –2.03*** 
 (–1.97) (–3.02) (–2.01) (–2.93) (–2.36) (–3.64) 
S/H suits –0.07  –0.06  –0.06  
 (–1.25)  (–1.00)  (–0.81)  
Public × S/H suits 0.14**  0.14**  0.15**  
 (2.20)  (2.24)  (2.55)  
Transparency  0.04  0.11  0.16 
  (0.29)  (0.73)  (0.94) 
Public × Transparency  0.35***  0.30***  0.33*** 
  (3.33)  (3.27)  (4.12) 
Education 0.05** 0.08** 0.07** 0.09*** 0.07* 0.09** 
 (2.13) (2.83) (2.41) (3.02) (1.87) (2.55) 
Female  –0.16*** –0.11*** –0.12** –0.07* –0.12* –0.06 
 (–2.97) (–3.18) (–2.50) (–1.82) (–2.07) (–1.35) 
Ln (age) –0.63** –0.44* –0.40 –0.17 –0.33 –0.04 
 (–2.23) (–1.85) (–1.45) (–0.74) (–1.46) (–0.22) 
Age 65 –0.06 –0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10* 0.07* 
 (–1.21) (–1.60) (1.39) (1.21) (1.79) (1.76) 
CEO  0.76*** 0.74*** 0.55*** 0.53***   
 (28.68) (23.32) (19.46) (20.32)   
Ln (total assets) 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 (6.51) (7.04) (6.26) (7.30) (5.99) (6.84) 
ROA 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.02 
 (0.62) (0.46) (0.51) (0.27) (0.40) (0.08) 
Sales growth 6.04* 4.91* 6.12* 5.21* 6.04* 4.77* 
 (1.86) (1.79) (2.04) (2.06) (2.01) (2.05) 
CAPEX / Assets 1.49* 1.17** 1.52* 1.18** 1.49* 1.11** 
 (1.96) (2.27) (1.99) (2.27) (2.00) (2.19) 
Leverage –0.95 –1.23* –1.15 –1.33** –0.84 –1.10* 
 (–1.27) (–1.91) (–1.61) (–2.09) (–1.21) (–1.84) 
Ln (firm age) 0.02 0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.77) (0.32) (0.26) (–0.46) (0.97) (0.45) 
Constant 3.08** 1.67 2.09* 0.11 2.10** –0.34 
 (2.74) (1.08) (1.80) (0.07) (2.12) (–0.22) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 326,278 326,278 215,122 215,122 100,376 100,376 
R2 0.381 0.427 0.448 0.503 0.439 0.507 
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Table 4–7: Panel Regressions of Ln (total compensation / GDP) on Public and IFRS Dummies 
Table 4–7 presents the results of the panel regressions in which natural log of total executive pays scaled by country’s 
GDP per capita are regressed on public and IFRS dummies, and executives and firm characteristics and fixed effects. 
The sample includes executive–year observations from 22 countries during 2001–2012. All variables are as defined 
in Appendix E. All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Total Executives Top 5 CEO 
Public  0.08*** 0.06** 0.06** 
 (3.40) (2.60) (2.50) 
IFRS  –0.32*** –0.40*** –0.36*** 
 (–3.82) (–4.06) (–3.87) 
Public × IFRS 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
 (4.03) (5.71) (5.79) 
Education 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (6.38) (5.42) (3.50) 
Female  –0.09*** –0.07*** –0.02 
 (–4.96) (–2.90) (–0.46) 
Ln (age) –0.15 0.12 0.15 
 (–1.43) (1.44) (1.26) 
Age 65 –0.15*** –0.02 –0.02 
 (–3.15) (–0.67) (–1.08) 
CEO  0.71*** 0.50***  
 (22.15) (17.28)  
Ln (total assets) 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 
 (14.25) (17.58) (17.02) 
ROA –0.17 –0.26** –0.27** 
 (–1.45) (–2.14) (–2.17) 
Sales growth 4.90** 4.76** 4.39** 
 (2.68) (2.53) (2.22) 
CAPEX / Assets 0.24* 0.27 0.25 
 (2.01) (1.57) (1.21) 
Leverage –1.14*** –1.23*** –1.31*** 
 (–3.03) (–4.22) (–5.74) 
Ln (firm age) 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (1.14) (0.41) (1.56) 
Constant 0.68 –0.32 –0.12 
 (1.59) (–0.87) (–0.23) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 326,278 215,122 100,376 
R2 0.580 0.667 0.648 
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Table 4–8: Coefficients and t–statistics of Interacted Term of Public Dummy with Manager deficiency, Brain–
drain, IFRS, S/H Suits, and Transparency with expanded definition of compensation and executives 
Table 4–8 presents coefficients and t–statistics of interacted terms of public dummy with “Manager deficiency,” 
“Brain–drain,” “S/H Suits,” “Transparency,” and “IFRS” with the expanded definition of compensation and 
executives. Compensation is defined as salary, salary and bonus, and cash compensation. Executives are defined as 
all executives, top 5 and 3 highest ranking executives, CFOs, and CEOs. The coefficients and t–statistics are based on 
the results of panel regressions in which natural logarithm of salary, salary and bonus, or cash compensation scaled 
by country’s GDP per capita are regressed on public dummy, its interactions with “Manager deficiency,” “Brain–
drain,” “S/H Suits,” “Transparency,” and “IFRS” respectively and all executive and firm level characteristics. Industry 
and year dummies are included in all regressions. Country dummies are included except for the regressions on “S/H 
Suits” and “Transparency.” The sample includes executive–year observations from 22 countries during 2001–2012. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix E. All firm level variables are lagged by 1 year. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
< Compensation > Coefficients and t–statistics of Interacted Term of Public Dummy with  
   Executives Manager 
deficiency 
Brain– 
drain 
S/H Suits Transparency IFRS 
< Salary >      
   All Executives  0.03*** 0.02*** 0.13 0.34** 0.11*** 
 (6.23) (3.03) (1.67) (2.29) (6.19) 
   Top 5 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.13 0.33** 0.11*** 
 (6.73) (3.31) (1.67) (2.34) (7.51) 
   Top 3 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.14* 0.32** 0.11*** 
 (5.35) (2.91) (1.89) (2.52) (6.44) 
   CFOs 0.03** 0.02* 0.06 0.16 0.08*** 
 (2.81) (1.96) (1.05) (1.12) (4.45) 
   CEOs 0.03*** 0.02** 0.15** 0.33*** 0.11*** 
 (5.07) (2.38) (2.16) (3.15) (6.44) 
< Salary + Bonus >      
   All Executives  0.05*** 0.03** 0.15** 0.35** 0.19*** 
 (2.95) (2.82) (2.14) (2.64) (6.65) 
   Top 5 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.15** 0.34** 0.18*** 
 (3.24) (3.09) (2.15) (2.69) (8.16) 
   Top 3 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.16** 0.33*** 0.19*** 
 (2.97) (2.84) (2.40) (2.92) (8.06) 
   CFOs 0.05* 0.03* 0.09 0.18 0.14*** 
 (1.99) (1.78) (1.62) (1.46) (4.90) 
   CEOs 0.05** 0.03** 0.17** 0.34*** 0.18*** 
 (2.36) (2.26) (2.74) (3.60) (8.48) 
< Cash Compensation >      
   All Executives  0.06*** 0.04*** 0.15* 0.37** 0.16*** 
 (3.62) (3.97) (1.98) (2.48) (4.38) 
   Top 5 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.15* 0.36** 0.17*** 
 (4.67) (4.74) (1.91) (2.42) (6.19) 
   Top 3 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.16* 0.35** 0.18*** 
 (3.83) (4.31) (2.06) (2.54) (6.31) 
   CFOs 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.08 0.18 0.13*** 
 (3.62) (3.09) (1.30) (1.28) (4.84) 
   CEOs 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.18** 0.39*** 0.18*** 
 (3.62) (3.71) (2.37) (3.21) (6.01) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation compiles three independent cross-country studies in corporate finance. 
Each study has been designed and implemented for me to better understand important issues in 
financial management in an international setting.  
In the second chapter, I study whether stock market development boosts economic growth. 
Prior studies in the literature have used stock market capitalization over GDP, or the size of a stock 
market, as a proxy for stock market development. And they have not established a robust 
relationship between stock market development and economic growth. I challenge that the size 
measure may not be a good proxy for the functional efficiency of a stock market. I propose a new 
measure of stock market functionality. I term the new measure as “stock market concentration” 
and examine its relationship with capital allocation efficiency, initial public offerings (IPOs), 
innovation, and economic growth, using data from 47 countries worldwide for the period 1989–
2013.  
The extent of stock market concentration is computed annually as the sum of the stock 
market capitalizations of the largest five or ten firms divided by the total stock market 
capitalization of a country’s domestic stock exchanges. The idea is that a concentrated stock 
market dominated by a small number of large firms is likely to indicate the impediment to access 
to necessary funds for small new firms. My empirical goal for the new measure of stock market 
functional efficiency is to investigate the relationship between stock market functionality and 
economic growth, and to examine the channel through which the former affects the latter. 
I first find that stock market concentration is negatively correlated with the proxy for 
capital allocation efficiency, suggesting that a highly concentrated stock market is less likely to 
allocate necessary capital to young, innovative firms that make efficient use of capital. Second, I 
find that stock market concentration is a good (negative) predictor of economic growth in the 
subsequent five or even ten years and has large economic implications. Third, I also examine the 
relationship of stock market concentration with IPOs and innovation. I hypothesize that stock 
market concentration adversely affects future economic growth through a negative effect on 
entrepreneurship by constricting the financing and innovative activities of new, innovative firms. 
I find that stock market concentration is indeed negatively associated with IPO and innovation 
proxies.  
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In the final empirical approach, I employ two-stage regressions to check the link between 
stock market concentration, access to funds by innovative entrepreneurs, and economic growth. I 
first estimate IPO and innovation activities at a certain level of stock market concentration by 
regressing them on concentration. Then I run real per capita GDP growth rates on the estimated 
IPO and innovation activities, finding that they are significantly correlated with economic growth. 
These results reaffirm that a dysfunctional stock market prevents small, new, but innovative firms 
from accessing the funds they require, which in turn hurts economic growth.  
The third chapter revisits the finding of Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2009) that 
the average nominal price for a share of stock in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) has been approximately $25 since the Great Depression. The 
price has not even kept pace with the rate of inflation. They find that 16 other countries did not 
share this peculiar trait.  Hence, they conclude that “the nominal price fixation is primarily a U.S. 
or North American phenomenon.”  
We challenge their last conclusion. We term the tendency of stock prices to remain stable 
as “anchoring” hypothesis. Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the common human 
tendency to rely excessively on the first piece of information offered (the ‘anchor’) when making 
decisions. Because anchoring is such a common human trait, we are skeptical that the United States 
is the only country whose stock markets exhibit this phenomenon. To find out whether the nominal 
price fixation is indeed a North American phenomenon, we extend the analysis by Weld et al. 
(2009) to international markets. We collect the nominal stock prices of firms, in both the local 
currency and the U.S. dollar, at the end of June in each year for 38 countries from 1981- 2010.  
We, first of all, find that the median nominal stock price in dollar terms is remarkably flat 
and stable throughout the sample period for all countries, suggesting that although firms generate 
positive returns on average, their nominal share prices are held roughly constant.  In fact, the level 
of current nominal stock prices in 2010 was remarkably similar to the level of nominal stock prices 
29 years earlier. Second, a firm’s nominal stock price has a tendency to revert to its initial stock 
price level. When we partition our sample firms into tercile groups by their nominal stock price 
levels every year and keep track of the tercile groups to which they belong, we find that a majority 
of firms in almost all countries remains in their initial nominal stock price tercile group.  
We test this last observation formally using a regression model. We hypothesize that the 
initial stock price of a listed firm, an IPO price, may well serve as an anchor for future nominal 
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stock prices and may be the most important determinant of nominal share prices. To the extent that 
investors/managers tend to rely heavily on the first piece of pricing information offered, the anchor 
price is likely to affect how managers “control” the future nominal stock price with corporate 
actions such as stock splits, dividend payouts, and reverse stock splits. The cross-sectional 
regression results show that the IPO price is the single most important variable that explains the 
current nominal stock price. Our empirical results indicate that the nominal price fixation is a 
global phenomenon.  
Finally, we show that nominal stock prices tend to revert back to their anchors due to 
corporate actions such as stock splits, dividend payouts, or even reverse stock splits. This suggests 
that corporate managers seem to manage the nominal stock prices to revert to the anchor. The 
introduction of the euro in January of 1999 offers a natural experiment that further corroborates 
this finding. We find a much higher proportion of euro firm managers than non-euro firm managers 
in Europe taking corporate actions to bring down their nominal share prices just before and after 
the introduction of the euro. It appears that the introduction of the euro brought in a ‘new’ anchor 
for euro firms, which triggered euro firm managers to adjust their nominal stock prices. 
The fourth chapter investigates the pay gap between public and private firm executives, 
using a wide–ranging sample for the period of 2001 ~ 2012 for 22 countries that have enough 
information on both public and private firm executive pays. We test two competing hypotheses 
related to the agency theory in an international setting.  
The first hypothesis is competitive executive labor market hypothesis; If executive labor 
markets are competitive, those economic and institutional elements executives would well explain 
the executive pay gap between public and private firms (Abowd and Ashenfelter 1981; Garbaix 
and Landier, 2008; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; and Peters and Wagner, 2014).  
On the contrary, if the labor markets are not competitive and the executive compensation 
is set by other factors rather than the market forces, the economic and institutional factors would 
not affect the pay level much or work against an economic equilibrium. For example, the 
entrenchment hypothesis predicts that powerful and rent–extracting executives make their own 
way in determining their pays thus the executive compensation mechanism deviates from the 
equilibrium pay level (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen, 
Murphy, and Wruck, 2004; and Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011).    
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We test our hypothesis taking advantage of the fact that each country has different 
economic and institutional environments. Between–country analyses enable us to examine 
whether these economic, market–driven variables that make public firms hard to hire competent 
executives and institutional factors that put more burden and risks on public firm executives drive 
up the pay for public firm executives.    
We first find that public firm executives are paid more in terms of total compensation than 
private firm executives by 11%, controlling for various executive and firm characteristics that may 
affect the executive pay level. This public pay premium is even higher when we exclude the United 
States that takes up the largest portion of the sample and has been arguably blamed for exorbitantly 
high compensation for public firm CEOs. The public pay premium increases to 22% excluding the 
United States. 
We also find that the public pay premium is higher when well–educated, competent senior 
managers are less available in the labor market, when there exists stronger investor protection and 
shareholder power, and when improved disclosure requirements (i.e., introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) are enforced to public firms. These findings are robust 
whether we define total compensation, salary, salary plus bonus, or cash compensation as the 
compensation and whether we narrow down the definition of executives to top 5, top 3, chief 
financial officers (CFOs), or CEOs. 
These findings support the view that executive labor markets are competitive and public 
firm executives receive higher pays when they are harder to be obtained by public firms or they 
are to assume higher risk. Meanwhile, empirical findings in this chapter is largely inconsistent 
with the argument of entrenchment hypothesis that public firms are entrenched by powerful 
executives and CEOs who can control their pays; the pubic pay premium would not be much 
affected by the labor market situation and decrease under the stronger shareholder power and more 
stringent disclosure and scrutiny regime with the entrenchment proposition.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Data Source and Variable Definitions 
“Datastream” refers to Thomson Reuters’ Datastream; “IMD WCC” = International Institute for Management Development, World Competitiveness Center; 
“NBER” = National Bureau of Economic Research’s Patent Database; “SDC Platinum” = Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum Global New Issues; “UNIDO” = 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Statistics; “UN IHDI” = United Nations International Human Development Indicators; and “WB 
WDI” = World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Variables Description Data source Sample period 
(1) Financial Development Measures 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 (10) 
firms) 
Stock market capitalization of the largest 5 (10) firms divided by total stock market 
capitalization of domestic stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
 
Datastream, 
WB WDI 
1989–2008 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP Market capitalization of domestically incorporated companies listed on domestic stock 
exchanges at the end of a year divided by GDP during the year. 
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
Turnover / Cap. Total value of shares traded on domestic stock exchanges during a year divided by stock 
market capitalization at the end of the year. 
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
Credit / GDP Total domestic credit provided to private sector divided by GDP during the year.  
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
(2) Dependent Variables 
Per Capita GDP Growth 
(    ( )) 
Growth in real per capita GDP (%) calculated as:  
    ( ) =   (               ) −   (                 )  × 100 
where per capita GDP is in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
 
WB WDI 1994–2013 
Elasticity of Capital 
Allocation (  ) 
Coefficient estimated from regressions of the growth of      on the growth of 
    . Estimated from the following regression:  
   
    
      
 =      +        
    
      
 +       
where      and     .are the investment and value–added in each country–
industry–year, respectively. The industry data are at the 3–digit level. 
UNIDO 1991–2010 
119 
 
 
IPO Amount / Pop. Logarithm of (1 + amount of IPOs (in million U.S. dollars) in domestic exchanges during 
the year divided by country’s population (in millions)). 
 
SDC Platinum, 
WB WDI 
1994–2013 
IPO No. / Pop. Logarithm of (1 + number of IPOs in domestic exchanges during the year divided by 
country’s population (in millions)). 
 
SDC Platinum, 
WB WDI 
1994–2013 
Patent / Pop. Logarithm of (1 + number of patent applications to USPTO in a year divided by country’s 
population (in millions)). 
 
NBER 1994–2006 
Citation / Pop. Logarithm of (1 + number of citations received by patents in a year divided by country’s 
population (in millions)). 
 
NBER 1994–2006 
Generality / Pop. 
 
Logarithm of (1 + generality level of the patents in a year divided by a country’s 
population (in millions)). Generality measures the number of technology classes of patents 
that cite the given patent. 
 
NBER 1994–2006 
Originality / Pop. 
 
Logarithm of (1 + originality level of patents in a year divided by a country’s population 
(in millions)). Originality measures the number of technology classes of patents cited by 
the given patent. 
 
NBER 1994–2006 
(3) Control / Instrumental Variables 
(Initial) Per Capita GDP Logarithm of real per capita GDP (in 1993). 
 
WB WDI 1994–2013 
Initial Education Logarithm of the average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and 
older in 1990. 
 
UN IHDI 1990 
Gov. Spending / GDP General government consumption expenditure divided by GDP during the year. 
 
WB WDI 1994–2013 
Inflation Inflation rates, GDP deflator during the year. 
 
WB WDI 1994–2013 
Openness / GDP Sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP during the year. 
 
WB WDI 1994–2013 
Bureaucracy Index from 0 to 10 based on executive survey on the bureaucracy level of a country in 
each year, 10 being the lowest level of bureaucracy.  
 
IMD WCC 1995–2013 
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Corruption Index from 0 to 10 based on executive survey on the bribery and corruption level of a 
country in each year, 10 being the lowest level of bribery and corruption. 
 
IMD WCC 1995–2013 
Total GDP  Logarithm of total GDP of a country deflated by GDP deflator. 
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
Territory Size Logarithm of a country’s total area in square kilometers. 
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
Export / Pop. Exports of goods and services in million US dollars during a year divided by country’s 
population. 
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
Legal Origin Legal origin of a country’s commercial law, which could be English common law, French 
civil law, German civil law, or Scandinavian civil law.   
 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
– 
Anti–Self–Dealing Index from 0 to 1 that measures the extent of minority shareholder protections against 
misappropriation by corporate insiders. 
 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
– 
Portfolio Inflows / GDP Net inflows from equity securities in domestic stock exchanges by foreign investors 
divided by country’s total GDP during the year. 
 
WB WDI 1989–2008 
Stability Index from 0 to 1 generated by counting the number of firms that stay in the top 5 (10) in 
both the current year and 5 years ago and dividing it by 5 (10).  
Datastream 1994–2008 
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Appendix B. Stock Market Concentration and Economic Growth: Robustness Test—Regressions with Concentration at t–10 
This table presents the results of panel regressions in which per capita GDP growth rates are regressed on stock market concentration at t–10. The sample includes 
country–year observations for 47 countries during 1999–2013. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by both year and country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–10 –4.52***    –4.68***  
 (–3.61)    (–3.78)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–10  –3.95***    –4.17*** 
  (–3.61)    (–3.66) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–10   –0.91  –0.93 –1.01 
   (–1.26)  (–1.35) (–1.42) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–10    0.24 0.30 0.26 
    (0.70) (0.97) (0.85) 
Credit / GDP at t–10 –0.82* –0.83** 0.29 –0.32 –0.34 –0.31 
 (–1.90) (–1.99) (0.41) (–0.73) (–0.63) (–0.58) 
Initial Per Capita GDP –0.78*** –0.77*** –0.79*** –0.81** –0.80*** –0.79*** 
 (–2.65) (–2.69) (–2.60) (–2.44) (–2.98) (–3.04) 
Initial Education 0.97** 0.82* 1.14** 1.17** 1.14** 0.97** 
 (2.13) (1.78) (2.54) (2.47) (2.38) (2.02) 
Gov. Spending / GDP –8.80* –8.20* –12.67*** –11.57** –8.82* –8.25* 
 (–1.94) (–1.79) (–2.65) (–2.36) (–1.89) (–1.75) 
Inflation –0.00 –0.01 0.00 –0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (–0.17) (–0.20) (0.12) (–0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Openness / GDP 0.55*** 0.59*** 0.49* 0.21 0.92*** 0.99*** 
 (3.08) (3.28) (1.65) (1.12) (2.66) (2.69) 
Constant 10.47*** 10.87*** 9.03*** 9.10*** 10.07*** 10.53*** 
 (6.23) (6.38) (5.35) (5.75) (7.05) (7.37) 
No. of Observations 623 623 623 620 620 620 
R2 0.227 0.228 0.202 0.190 0.246 0.248 
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Appendix C. Stock Market Concentration and IPO: Robustness Test—Regressions with Country Fixed–Effects 
This table presents the results of panel regressions in which measures of IPO activities are regressed on stock market 
concentration at t–5 with country fixed–effects. The sample includes country–year observations for 46 countries 
during 1994–2013. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
IPO Amount / Pop. IPO No. / Pop. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 –1.09**  –0.24  
 (–2.05)  (–1.63)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5  –1.20**  –0.29** 
  (–2.26)  (–2.13) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.68*** –0.68*** –0.21*** –0.21*** 
 (–4.16) (–4.24) (–3.56) (–3.62) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5 –0.23** –0.23** –0.06* –0.05 
 (–2.03) (–2.02) (–1.68) (–1.66) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 –1.26*** –1.25*** –0.20** –0.20** 
 (–3.40) (–3.40) (–2.07) (–2.06) 
Per Capita GDP 1.21*** 1.23*** 0.05 0.06 
 (3.18) (3.27) (0.33) (0.39) 
Gov. Spending / GDP –27.25*** –26.71*** –4.17*** –4.03*** 
 (–5.23) (–5.06) (–2.83) (–2.73) 
Inflation –0.02*** –0.02*** –0.00*** –0.00*** 
 (–5.67) (–5.73) (–3.08) (–3.13) 
Openness / GDP 0.36 0.37 0.10 0.10 
 (1.03) (1.04) (0.65) (0.66) 
Constant –5.54 –5.71 0.29 0.24 
 (–1.58) (–1.64) (0.21) (0.18) 
Country Fixed–Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 820 820 820 820 
R2 0.571 0.572 0.725 0.726 
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Appendix D. Stock Market Concentration and Innovation: Robustness Test—Regressions with Country Fixed–Effects 
This table presents the results of panel regressions in which measures of innovation are regressed on stock market concentration at t–5 with country fixed–effects. 
The sample includes country–year observations for 43 countries during 1994–2006. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The t–statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
Patent / Pop. Citation /Pop. Generality / Pop. Originality / Pop. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mkt. Con. (top 5 firms) at t–5 –2.39**  –4.60***  –2.97***  –2.12**  
 (–2.58)  (–3.04)  (–3.78)  (–2.58)  
Mkt. Con. (top 10 firms) at t–5  –2.52***  –4.90***  –3.13***  –2.24*** 
  (–2.97)  (–3.56)  (–4.46)  (–3.01) 
Mkt. Cap. / GDP at t–5 –0.40* –0.40** –1.05** –1.03** –0.85*** –0.84*** –0.41** –0.40** 
 (–2.01) (–2.10) (–2.31) (–2.42) (–2.91) (–3.10) (–2.15) (–2.24) 
Turnover / Cap. at t–5 –0.28* –0.27* –0.47* –0.46* –0.17 –0.17 –0.25* –0.24* 
 (–1.95) (–1.97) (–1.84) (–1.87) (–1.21) (–1.21) (–1.99) (–2.01) 
Credit / GDP at t–5 –1.11* –1.05* –1.86* –1.76* –0.68 –0.61 –0.87 –0.82 
 (–1.89) (–1.85) (–1.83) (–1.79) (–1.36) (–1.27) (–1.66) (–1.61) 
Per Capita GDP –1.68** –1.67** –4.73*** –4.72*** –2.83*** –2.82*** –1.19* –1.19** 
 (–2.30) (–2.44) (–2.97) (–3.19) (–3.06) (–3.33) (–1.92) (–2.02) 
Gov. Spending / GDP 4.95 5.98 3.59 5.67 –4.47 –3.19 3.61 4.53 
 (0.68) (0.85) (0.29) (0.46) (–0.52) (–0.37) (0.56) (0.71) 
Inflation –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.02*** –0.02*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** 
 (–2.83) (–2.88) (–2.74) (–2.82) (–3.33) (–3.40) (–2.75) (–2.80) 
Openness / GDP –0.19 –0.18 –1.05 –1.03 –0.05 –0.04 –0.14 –0.13 
 (–0.46) (–0.44) (–1.07) (–1.02) (–0.10) (–0.08) (–0.36) (–0.34) 
Constant 15.20** 15.29** 43.12*** 43.25*** 26.21*** 26.33*** 10.94** 11.01** 
 (2.48) (2.65) (3.16) (3.41) (3.28) (3.57) (2.11) (2.24) 
Country Fixed–Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 
R2 0.842 0.845 0.808 0.814 0.765 0.775 0.824 0.827 
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Appendix E. Data Source and Variable Definitions  
 
Variables Description Data source 
Ln (total compen–sation / 
GDP) 
Natural log of (sum of all the compensation components of the executive for the year over GDP per 
capita). 
Capital IQ 
 
Ln (salary / GDP) 
 
Natural log of (amount paid as salary to the executive for the year over GDP per capita). 
 
Capital IQ 
 
Ln (salary & bonus / GDP) 
Natural log of (amount paid as salary or bonus to the executive for the year over GDP per capita). 
 
Capital IQ 
 
Ln (cash compen–sation / 
GDP) 
Natural log of (amount paid as cash to the executive for the year over GDP per capita). 
 
Capital IQ 
 
Education 
 
The number of educational institutions where this person used to study in, which is counted by the 
commas in "education" description. 
Capital IQ 
 
Female  
 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if an executive is a female and zero otherwise. 
 
Capital IQ 
 
Ln (age) Natural log of (executive’s age). Capital IQ 
Age 65 
 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if an executive is 65 years or older and zero otherwise. 
 
Capital IQ 
 
CEO  
 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if an executive is the CEO or co–CEO of a firm and zero  
otherwise. 
Capital IQ 
 
Ln (total assets) 
 
Natural log of the book value of total assets in 2012 US dollars in the previous year. 
Capital IQ 
 
ROA Return on assets. Capital IQ 
Sales growth Difference in natural log of sales in the current and previous years. Capital IQ 
CAPEX / assets Capital expenditure over total assets. Capital IQ 
Leverage Ratio of long–term debt to shareholder's equity. Capital IQ 
Ln (firm age) 
 
Natural log of firm's age computed by subtracting the year the firm was founded from the current 
year.  
Capital IQ 
 
Public 
 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a firm is a public one and zero otherwise. 
 
Capital IQ 
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Manager deficiency 
 
 
Index that ranges from 0 to 10. It is multiplied by –1. A higher score indicates “competent senior 
managers are less readily available in the country."  
 
IMD 
 
 
Brain–drain 
 
 
Index that ranges from 0 to 10. It is multiplied by –1. A higher score indicates "emigration of well–
educated and skilled people hinders competitiveness in the economy." 
 
IMD 
 
 
S/H suits 
 
 
Easy of shareholder suit index. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater powers 
of shareholders to challenge the transaction of executives and sue them for misconduct. 
 
World Bank 
 
 
Transparency 
 
 
Corporate transparency index. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating the higher level 
of corporate transparency that lets shareholders monitor executive's compensation and financial 
prospects with ease. 
World Bank 
 
 
IFRS 
 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 in the years since a country adopted the IFRS or zero 
otherwise. 
Balsam et al. 
(2016) 
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Appendix F. Country–level indices and IFRS Adoption dates by country 
 
“Manager deficiency” and “Brain–drain” are averaged during the sample period for each country. “IFRS Adoption 
Date” is retrieved from Balsam et al. (2015).  
 
Country 
Manager 
deficiency 
Brain– 
drain 
S/H suits Transparency IFRS Adoption Date 
Australia –6.53 –5.75 6.00 7.00 12/31/2005 
Canada –6.69 –5.36 7.50 5.50 12/31/2011 
China –4.04 –3.43 3.00 7.00 Never adopted 
Denmark –6.88 –6.50 9.00 7.00 12/31/2005 
Finland –6.39 –7.11 8.50 6.00 12/31/2005 
France –6.21 –5.46 7.50 8.00 12/31/2005 
Germany –6.54 –6.06 9.00 6.50 12/31/2005 
Hong Kong –7.20 –6.44 9.00 6.00 12/31/2005 
India –6.64 –5.63 9.00 8.50 Never adopted 
Ireland –6.87 –6.85 7.50 8.00 12/31/2005 
Italy –5.20 –4.17 9.00 7.00 12/31/2005 
Malaysia –6.70 –5.31 6.00 6.00 Never adopted 
Netherlands –6.80 –6.75 10.50 5.00 12/31/2005 
New Zealand –5.26 –3.31 7.50 7.00 12/31/2007 
Norway –5.97 –7.51 8.50 8.50 12/31/2005 
Slovenia –4.34 –3.58 7.50 5.00 12/31/2005 
South Africa –4.30 –2.15 5.50 6.00 12/31/2005 
Sweden –6.94 –6.50 9.00 6.50 12/31/2005 
Switzerland –6.90 –7.36 10.00 8.00 12/31/2005 
Thailand –5.77 –5.33 7.00 5.00 Never adopted 
United Kingdom –5.87 –5.49 8.00 8.00 12/31/2005 
United States –7.27 –7.66 5.10 6.50 Never adopted 
 
